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This is a study of approaches to fisheries management in the United Kingdom (UK) 
between 1945 and 1996. It examines the choices and incentives faced by UK Governments when 
designing policy instruments to deliver international commitments to sustainable fishing. The 
failure of international agreements to sustainably manage fisheries resources is often attributed to 
international institutions, the politicization of negotiations and their distributive outcomes. This 
thesis makes an original contribution by arguing that the success of international agreements was 
also dependent upon local negotiations that shaped the design of national delivery mechanisms. 
The central research question concerns the role and influence of local interests in 
delivering global economic and environmental agendas and how national governments 
accommodate local tensions within this process. A sustained content analysis of UK Government 
archives is used to argue that local political and sectional industry interests had a significant 
bearing on the development of UK fisheries policy and the design of domestic delivery 
mechanisms. The exception was UK policy on the international distribution of fisheries 
resources at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences (1958, 1960 and 1973-82). 
Economic considerations drove early environmental policy with sectional fishing industry 
interests of secondary importance to the potential economic benefits associated with the more 
valuable energy resources.  
In then seeking to implement controls on fishing activity, this thesis argues that UK 
fisheries management mechanisms were designed to compensate for tension between global 
commitments mandating a reduction in fishing effort and the local fleets and communities that 
had to bear the costs of industry contraction. This created a policy-making environment in which 
social and political motivations continually trumped the application of economic and scientific 
advice. This advice advocated a contraction in the size of the fleet which had become necessary 
as technical change and falling stocks resulted in overcapacity. The use of fisheries policy as a 
political tool to ease local tensions incentivised policy choices that directly contributed to the 
UK’s failure to reduce fishing pressure and deliver international commitments. This thesis 
demonstrates the importance of local negotiations and interests in the construction of national 










This study of UK fisheries policy-making between 1945 and 1996 argues that the success 
of international agreements on the sustainable management of fish stocks have been influenced 
by negotiations with local interests. It provides evidence of local actors shaping national and 
international approaches to environmental and natural resource problems. Local political and 
fishing industry interests in the UK had less influence on the international distribution of 
fisheries resources at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences (1958, 1960 and 1973-82). 
In these negotiations, fishing industry interests were of secondary importance to the more 
valuable energy resources. 
This thesis argues that UK fisheries policies were designed to protect the fleets and 
communities from the economic and social costs of a reduction in the size of the industry. This 
had become necessary as technical change and falling stocks resulted in overcapacity. The 
political importance attached to the socio-economic outcomes of fisheries policy reduced the 
influence of economic and scientific advice in the policy-making environment. The outcome was 
the design and application of national policies that directly contributed to the UK’s failure to 
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This thesis is a study of the development of approaches to fisheries management in the 
United Kingdom (UK) between 1945 and 1996. It analyses attempts by UK Governments to 
manage fisheries resources within the context of international concern for over-fishing. The 
choices and incentives faced by successive administrations when deciding on the policy 
instruments for delivering international commitments are examined. This thesis is concerned 
with the management of property rights as well as stocks and the experiments with developing 
politically-acceptable and economically-viable management mechanisms.  
A theme of this thesis is the accommodation of local interests within international 
environmental and economic agendas. In this thesis, the term ‘local interests’ represents sub-
national political interests and sectional industry interests that were often representative of 
regions and local communities within the UK. This thesis argues that the success of international 
commitments on stock conservation were dependent on local negotiations and shaped by the 
influence of local interests in the choice of national policy mechanisms. 
The global and fugitive nature of sea fisheries resources necessitated international 
cooperation and agreement. The tendency for international fisheries management agreements to 
fail to conserve stocks is commonly attributed to inadequacies and failures of international 
machinery and structures. Key criticisms of the European Common Fisheries Policy relate to the 
politicization of fisheries advice, negotiations and the distributive outcomes (Holden 1994; 
Symes 1997; Daw and Gray 2005; Khalilian et al. 2010). Academic consideration has been given 
to the influence of UK national politics on the creation of EEC and EU fisheries policy sub-
national (Wise 1983; Holden 1994; Symes 1997, Asgeirsdottir 2008) but less to the role and 
influence of national and sub-national interests in the design and effectiveness of national policy 
implementation.  
This thesis argues that attempts by successive UK Governments to adopt economic and 
conservation-based approaches to fisheries policy were repeatedly frustrated by local political 
tensions. Analysis of this process is used to demonstrate the influence of local concerns on the 




arbitration between the global agenda and local interests to the marginalisation of local concerns 
in the development of global agreements.  
Analysis of UK Government archives demonstrates that from the mid-1980s increasing 
use was made of economic and scientific advice, fisheries management theory and international 
experience. Yet a policy-making environment prevailed in which these influences were 
continually trumped by social and political motivations. Domestic politics led to the use of 
fisheries management as a tool to maximise the social value of fisheries resources. Policies were 
designed to spread the costs of industry contraction across the UK and support fishing activity as 
a source of employment in economically marginal areas of the UK. Fishing opportunities (de 
facto property rights) were allocated on the criteria of political acceptability, administrative ease 
and distributive equity. This thesis argues that the resulting policy choices directly contributed to 
the UK’s failure to reduce fishing pressure and meet international commitments.  
This thesis makes an important contribution to the existing literature by providing insight 
into the local negotiations that had to occur if policies were ultimately to be successful.  It 
identifies that property rights were crucial at a supranational United Nations level as well as a 




Overfishing became a global concern during the 20th century. Overfishing can be defined 
as biologically and economically unsustainable levels of fishing that can lead to the depletion 
and exhaustion of stocks. The transference of a fish stock from a renewable to a non-renewable 
resource occurs when its biomass has been reduced to the point where it is unable to reproduce 
and replace members removed.  
Opportunities for over-fishing were driven by technological advances and facilitated by 
the res communis status of global fisheries resources. From the mid-19th century, new 
technologies created opportunities for an intensification of fishing pressure. Railway 
infrastructure and ice and canning technology expanded markets. The shift from sail to steam 
power and the development of more efficient engines increased the size and power of vessels and 
the area of fishing grounds. These increasingly powerful fishing vessels had unimpeded access to 




was ground in the 17th century principle of Mare Liberum. Coastal states had sovereignty over a 
3-mile belt of water known as territorial waters. 1 Beyond this, the sea was international territory 
and all nations were free to use it.  
The combination of technological advances and the international legal regime allowed 
the rate of fisheries exploitation to increase at an unprecedented rate throughout the 20th century. 
Global catches increased 7 per cent per annum in the two decades following the end of the 
Second World War.2 Roberts (2007) described the intensification of fishing pressure in these 
decades as “mirror[ing] the industrialisation of terrestrial agriculture”.3 While the initial 
application of technology allowed for increased catches per unit of effort (CPUE), exploitation 
rates gradually outstripped the biologically determined supply of stocks.4 Initial signs of 
overfishing – falling CPUE– were masked by the greater efficiencies offered by technology and 
the ability to fish for longer, trawl larger nets and reach previously unexploited distant and deep 
waters.  
Though recognised as a modern global environmental crisis, the impact of overfishing 
was often felt initially and most severely at local levels. This was influenced by the relative 
immobility of local fishing fleets and a traditional lack of alternative economic opportunities in 
the coastal communities allied to the industry. Roberts’ (2007) study of the industrialisation of 
fishing indicates that the UK’s local fleets experienced the initial effects of overfishing due to the 
damage fishing trawls caused to the inshore seabeds that housed important immature fish and 
spawning stocks.5 Similarly, Jónsson (1982) argued that initial attempts to conserve stocks were 
often spatially local such as the attempt by the Icelandic Government in the 1930s to prohibit 
trawling in the Faxa Bay nursery grounds.6 
                                                      
1 The three-mile limit is now an outdated concept in international law originally intended for military purposes. It 
represented a stretch of water, often referred to as ‘Territorial Waters’ that extended three nautical miles from the 
shoreline of a coastal state over which the littoral state had sovereignty over the foreshore, waters, seabed and air 
above.  
2 Roy I. Jackson, “Some observations on the future growth of world fisheries and the nature of the conservation 
problems”, Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, June 26-29, 1967, ed. 
Lewis M. Alexander (Rhode Island: University of Rhode Island, 1968), p.11. 
3 Callum Roberts, The Unnatural History of the Sea: The Past and Future of Humanity and Fishing (London: Island 
Press, 2007), p.176.  
4 James A. Crutchfield, “Overcapitalization of fishing effort”, Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of the 
Law of the Sea Institute, June 26-29, 1967, ed. Lewis M. Alexander (Rhode Island: University of Rhode Island, 
1968), p.24. 
5 Roberts (2007), p.160. 
6 Hannes Jónsson, Friends in Conflict: The Anglo Icelandic Cod Wars and the Law of the Sea (London: C. Hurst & 




The effects of the First World War (1914-18) confirmed early suspicions of stock 
depletion. The interruption to fishing activity allowed stocks to recover and a short post-war 
increase in catches was experienced.7 The 19th century perception of the “inexhaustibility” of 
fisheries resources was gradually dislodged.8 In 1936 and 1946, international conferences on 
‘Overfishing’ were convened with the latter producing the Convention for the Regulation of the 
Meshes of Fishing Nets and Size Limits of Fish (hereafter, the 1946 Mesh Regulation 
Convention), an attempt to protect juveniles and stock biomass by regulating fishing inputs.9  
Increasing scientific evidence of over-fishing coincided with a growing academic interest 
in the application of property rights theory to natural resources. During the 20th century, 
economic theory was increasingly applied to environmental policy to control actions that 
produced negative externalities such as overfishing and pollution. The contributions of H. Scott 
Gordon (1954), Anthony Scott (1955), Dales (1968) and Garett Hardin (1968) drew attention to 
the potential use of private property rights as a tool for global fisheries management. Like clean 
air and air pollution, private ownership of fisheries resources was complicated by the nature of 
the resource, the environment in which the resources existed and the local and transnational 
externalities created by uncontrolled use. Assigning tracts of the sea to individuals was 
unrealistic given the fugitive nature of the resource. Fish stocks would simply swim between 
physically invisible man-made boundaries. Traditional input controls such as the Mesh 
Regulation Convention became replaced in the global fisheries management literature with 
property-rights inspired instruments such as permits and quotas to control access to fish stocks 
and limit how many fish could be removed. As overfishing produced environmental as well as 
economic externalities, a meaningful limit on take from a stock had to be informed by natural 
science knowledge.   
The second key development in the 20th century’s increasingly economic approach to 
environmental policy was a shift in the literature to favour the use of economic incentive 
instruments as opposed to traditional command-and-control regulations. While the traditional tax 
                                                      
7Roberts (2007), p.193. 
8 In 1884, the prominent British biologist Thomas Huxley claimed that “all the great sea fisheries, are 
inexhaustible.” Tim D Smith, Scaling Fisheries: The Science of Measuring the Effects of Fishing, 1855-1955 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.38.  
9The first conference on ‘Overfishing’ was held in 1936 in London. While agreement on mesh regulations was 
achieved, it was not implemented due to the outbreak of the Second World War. TNA (1959) MAF 209/1678, 
Committee of Inquiry into the Fishing Industry: Departmental Evidence Report II ‘International Action- Historical 




and subsidy approach associated with Pigou (1920) attempted to correct the consequences of 
market failure, the property rights approach – influenced by the work of Dales (1968) - 
considered how the market could be reformed to internalise externalities.10  
Recognition of a need to manage fishing practices and create missing property rights 
implied a role for government. The nature of fisheries resources necessitated international 
agreements. Initiated by the League of Nations’ ambition to codify international law, the first 
United Nations Law of the Sea (LOS) Conference was held in Geneva in 1958. The conference 
produced four Conventions on marine jurisdictional matters but failed to settle the issue of 
international fishing limits. A second LOS Conference convened in 1960 but a new international 
legal regime for marine spaces and activities was not created until the Third LOS Conference 
(1973-82). This produced the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 
1982. The creation of a new international legal framework did not displace the role for national 
governments who were required to negotiate on behalf of their domestic interests and accept 
responsibility for domestic compliance with the new international agreements.  
 
Table 1.1. UK demersal landings by weight and value, 1948-95 
 
Year UK demersal landings 
by weight (tonne) 
UK demersal landing by 
value (£’000) 
£ per tonne (in market 
prices) 
1948 783,031 39,867 50.9 
1960 693,420 48,184 69.5 
1965 798,660 55,072 68.9 
1970 730,961 64,025 87.6 
1975 579,120 122,578 211.6 
1980 383,803 158,368 412.6 
1985 402,254 227,175 564.8 
1990 268,347 298,377 1,111.9 
1995 386,000 369,400 956.9 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics, 1960-95. (London; HMSO).  
 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis examines the development of UK Government policy on fisheries 
management at an international and national level. From 1945, the role for UK Governments to 
manage domestic fishing activity increased significantly. This accelerated from the mid-1970s. 
                                                      




This study focuses on the management of offshore whitefish (demersal) stocks which were of 
commercial interest to fleets across the UK.11 Figure 1.1 shows that demersal landings as a 
proportion of total UK fish landings decreased sharply from the mid-1960s. From a peak in 
1965, UK demersal landings by weight halved from 798,600 tonnes to 386,000 tonnes by 1995 
(Figure 1.1). From the mid-1970s, remaining UK demersal landings were increasingly landed 
into Scottish ports.  
 
 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics Tables, 1948-95. (London; HMSO). 
 
Despite declining volumes of demersal landings, Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2 show that the 
value of demersal landings increased from the 1970s. Over the periods 1970-75, 1975-1980 and 
1985-90, the per tonne price of UK demersal landings doubled. While total supplies of demersal 
fish were constrained by international restrictions on fishing areas and conservation measures 
that limited total landings, the value of the remaining catch increased. Excluding the costs of 
fishing (vessel, crew and fuel), this would have worked to offset the economic incentives for 
fishers to exit the industry in response to declining fishing opportunities.  
 
                                                      
11 The term demersal fish covers species living on or near the sea bed. Species historically targeted by UK vessels 
include haddock, cod and whiting. The term pelagic refers to species found mainly in coastal waters in shoals near 
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Figure 1.1 UK Vessel Demersal Landings (tonnes) by Region, 
1948-1995.





Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics Tables, 1948-95. (London; HMSO). 
 
Chapter two provides a review of the literature relevant to this thesis. Chapter three then 
examines the development of UK policy for the UN LOS Conferences. It argues that over the 
period 1945-71 the incentives for the UK Government to support the extension of fishing limits 
as a tool for global stock conservation were severely weakened by its position as a maritime 
nation. Policy on international fishing limits was shaped primarily by domestic non-fishing 
interests. Unlike the Norwegian and Icelandic Governments, up until 1973 the principal aim of 
UK policy on international fishing limits was not to secure access to offshore waters for its own 
fleet but to retain access for UK maritime interests to waters off other nations’ coastlines. 
Growing concern and international disputes related to fish stocks arose more from considerations 
of access than from those of conservation.  
The incentives for the UK to support broad national marine jurisdictions shifted sharply 
from 1971. This was primarily shaped by confirmation of the extent of hydrocarbon resources in 
the Continental Shelf surrounding the UK. From 1971, the UK Government consciously traded-
off national fishing interests in international negotiations as part of a strategy to maximise 
ownership of hydrocarbon resources.  
While policy in this period was predominantly driven by non-fishing interests, the UK 









1948 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Figure 1.2 UK Vessel Demersal Landings by Value (£'000) by 
Region, 1948-1995.




chapter argues that this conflict had a strong geo-political dimension as extending national limits 
would have affected the Scottish and English fishing fleets in broadly contrasting ways. At 
several points, local interests surfaced to shape national negotiations in international matters.  
 
New international agreements in the 1970s required the UK Government to take on 
increasing responsibility for managing domestic fishing activity. Chapter four examines the early 
years of UK fisheries policy prior to the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
conservation regime in 1983. It argues that the replacement of an initial laissez-faire approach 
with increasingly interventionist and distributive policies was a direct response to industry calls 
to protect local fleets from competing for quota. Two dominant local tensions shaped the design 
of the first quota management mechanism. The first was the decline of the economically 
dominant English distant-water fishing sector which heightened political concern for the social 
and political costs of industry contraction. The second was the strong Scottish identity attached 
to the first whitefish stocks, haddock and whiting, to be managed. Together, the influence of the 
local concerns on national politics worked to embed UK fisheries management as a tool for 
social policy.  
This chapter argues that over 1974-81 the objectives of quota management evolved to 
become the maintenance of employment and the spreading of potential industry profit in an 
equitable manner. Policy mechanisms that favoured labour were prioritised and little 
consideration was given to the impact on the economic performance of the fleet or the behaviour 
of fishers. This chapter identifies that the early politicisation of fisheries management created a 
conflict within government as to the adoption of a short- or long-term approach to fisheries 
management. Economic and scientific advice that advocated a shift from a labour to a capital 
focus was marginalised within decision-making processes due to the perceived political costs 
associated with increased unemployment.  
 
The UK Government’s decision to devolve decision-making to local industry bodies from 
1984 is examined in chapter five. It argues that the introduction of Producer Organisation (PO) 
management represented an acknowledgment by the UK Government that a local and/or sectoral 
approach to fisheries management could be more effective in delivering international 




government’s approach to quota management as the role of capital was given increasing 
attention. Policy change was driven by a need to appease multiple sources of local political 
pressure and alleviate severe economic pressures experienced by the UK fleets. To achieve the 
latter, PO management would grant vessels greater autonomy over the time of use of capital and 
quota. PO management did not represent a shift to an economic approach to fisheries 
management. This chapter argues that it represented a continuation in the UK Government’s 
attempt to avoid the social and political costs of addressing the underlying issue of excess 
capacity.  
 
In examining the development of UK structural policy, chapter six argues that the UK 
Government adopted an increasingly economic approach to fisheries management from 1989. 
This was influenced by policy learning, the increased use of economic and scientific advice in 
policy-making and the favouring of a markets-based approach to economic policy from 1983. 
Attempts were made to use market mechanisms to allocate quota and reduce fishing capacity and 
effort and adopt a long-term approach to fisheries management. However, this chapter argues 
that these attempts were obstructed and diluted by local political pressures. This led to the UK 
failing to meet a series of targets set by the European Commission over 1983-1995 to reduce 
fishing capacity and effort. The aim was to conserve and protect deteriorating fish stocks. 
Industry opposition to the use of market forces was prominent in Scotland. In this period, the 
Scottish Office and Scottish Fisheries Department used its considerable influence in this area to 
weaken the impact of market forces to protect Scottish fishing interests. From 1989, intra-
governmental tension was no longer between government economists and politicians but 
between the UK and Scottish Fisheries Departments.  
 
Sources  
This thesis studies UK policy-making and implementation. Material for the thesis has 
been almost exclusively sourced from UK Government documents in the National Archives at 
Kew and Edinburgh. From these sources, a systematic content analysis of government 
documents over the period 1945-1996 provided a wealth of relevant information and evidence. 
This has been used to identify and account for specific outcomes as well as key trends and policy 




attention has been paid to the feedback loops that exist between the different policy stages. This 
includes the tempering of initial policy objectives by subsequent consultation and engagement; 
the shaping of policy implementation by practical and political barriers; and continuous policy 
refinement and development through monitoring, evaluation and changing political 
circumstances.  The scope of this thesis has been narrowed to consider policy-making and 
implementation for only one sector of the UK fishing industry, the whitefish fleet. Given the 
complexity of fisheries regulation and the wide range of competing local interests within the UK-
wide whitefish fleet, a narrowing of the subject matter has allowed for a sustained in-depth and 
detailed study over a fifty-year period.  
While rich archival material exists for this subject, written documents in the archives do 
not always provide a comprehensive view of policy-making processes. Key discussions and 
decision-making junctures may not have been written down or kept as records. To accommodate 
this, consideration was given to the supplemental use of oral history. Early on, and through 
practice, it became clear that this would be of limited use. The information obtained was unlikely 
to be sufficiently systematic and robust to be useful, with recruitment of respondents difficult. 
Where possible, existing literature has been used to provide context for key decisions and policy 
development junctures not adequately detailed in the archives.12  
  
                                                      
12 For example, both The National Archives at Kew (TNA) and the National Archives of Scotland (NAS) were 
unable to account for a notable hardening of UK Government policy towards extended fishing limits global after the 
Second World War (1939-1945). Carmel Finley’s 2011 study of the United States (US) State Department’s 








This chapter provides a review of the academic literature relevant to this thesis. The literature 
crosses histories and contemporary studies of environmental policy and natural resource 
management, economics, international law and relations, politics, public choice and theories of 
governance. Seven themes within this literature have been selected for their relevance: 
overfishing in the 20th century; the influence of economics in fisheries management; the 
international cooperative management of environmental resources; political distributions of 
international fishery resources; evaluation of the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy 
and UK fisheries policy; the role of local actors and local decision-making in fisheries 
governance; and history, policy and policy learning.  
 
Overfishing as a 20th century phenomena  
Studies on the emergence of overfishing as an economic and environmental problem 
contain two key commonalities concerning time and cause. The First World War (1914-1918) is 
identified as playing a key role in dislodging the 19th century belief in the inexhaustibility of fish 
supplies. Historical analyses of fisheries management often reference the prominent zoologist 
Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) in accounting for the 19th and early 20th century myopia towards 
increasing evidence of overfishing. Smith’s 1994 historical analysis of the development of 
fishery science between 1855-1955 quotes Huxley directly: “[P]robably all the great sea-
fisheries, are inexhaustible”.13 Crutchfield and Pontecorvo (1962) refer to the “myth of limitless 
supply” as a key factor in inhibiting the 20th century understanding of the impact of commercial 
fishing on fish stocks.14 
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With the cessation of fishing over the war, Roberts (2007) argues that “suspicions about 
the previous depleted state of fish stocks were confirmed as fishers enjoyed a catch bonanza”.15 
This was supported by the period’s increased scientific and economic interest in explaining the 
size of fish populations and the impact of commercial fishing upon them. The first mathematical 
models for determining fisheries population dynamics were created by the American biologist 
Milner Baily Schaefer in 1954. Smith (1994) traced the concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield16 
(MSY) to the ideas of ‘surplus yield’ and ‘optimum catch’ developed by the Norwegian fisheries 
researcher John Hjort in work for the International Whaling Committee (IWC) in the 1930s.17  
The importance of the First World War is echoed in Engesaeter’s analysis of the history 
and role of the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES), the world’s oldest 
intergovernmental scientific organisation.18 While the possibility of overfishing received 
attention following the foundation of ICES in 1902, Engesaeter argues that a defining point was 
a meeting of Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden in May 1918 to discuss “the 
effects of reducing fishing intensity, due to the war, on fish stocks in the North Sea”.19 The 
beginning of international, cooperative dialogue on the effects of fishing on fish stocks 
culminated into the first international conference on fisheries, the so-called ‘Overfishing 
Conference’ held in London, 23-28 November 1936. International action to address overfishing 
was delayed until the cessation of the Second World War in 1945.  
 
 The second common feature within the literature on overfishing as a growing 
environmental problem is the evaluation of the role of technology. Barrett (2003), Leal (2005), 
Roberts (20017) and Harrison (2011) all identify the application of technological advancements 
as a key driver of unsustainable levels of fishing. The interplay between technology and evidence 
of overfishing is an interesting theme. Technological advances increased the market for fish and 
the opportunities for increased catches per unit of effort. The opportunity for larger catches was 
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15 ibid., p.193.  
16 In population ecology and economics, maximum sustainable yield or MSY is theoretically, the largest yield (or 
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17 Smith (1994), p.264. 
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influenced by the movement from sail to steam, the mechanisation of hauling and the use of 
larger boats. On land, the development of the railways and canning and freezing technology 
expanded the market.  
The application of technology also worked to mask initial evidence of the effects of 
overfishing. This is considered by Roberts: “catches were sustained only by growing fishing 
power, by fishing further afield, by going deeper and by switching to previously less favoured 
specifies like dogfish and monkfish.”20 While evidence and popular interest in overfishing 
increased from 1945 so too did catches – global catches increased 7 per cent per annum in the 
two decades following the end of the Second World War. 21  
 
 The work of Smith (1994) and Roberts (2007) has played an important role in framing 
this thesis. Their analysis of the growing concern for overfishing during the 20th century provides 
important context for understanding the attitudes and actions of the UK Government in the 
period from 1945. This thesis identifies that UK fisheries policy in this period was resistant to 
the ideas of overfishing and stock conservation. It argues that this was due to the UK 
Government’s opposition to the idea, which was taking hold at a global level through the 
extensions to marine jurisdiction as a tool for conservation. It provides evidence of the UK 
Government actively using superficial catch data in the 1950s to obstruct calls from the scientific 
community and Icelandic Government to control and limit fishing levels. While there was a clear 
political and economic rationale to this mind-set and behaviour, it is important to understand that 
evidence of overfishing in this period was limited.  
 
The influence of economics in fisheries management 
Helm (1991) identifies two general economic approaches to addressing environmental 
problems.22 The Meade-Pigou tax/subsidy approach focused on correcting the consequences of 
market operations and the Chicago approach which used property rights to internalize 
externalities. Property rights theory has had a significant impact on fisheries regulation. The vast 
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economic literature on fisheries management consistently identifies that overfishing - in both a 
biological and economic sense – stems from the existence of fisheries as a common pool 
resource. Barnes (2009) defines the term ‘common pool’ as “describe[ing] the quality of the 
resource, rather than the legal regime applying to it”.23 While Barnes distinguishes common pool 
resources from the legal regimes that customarily govern their use, fisheries economists (such as 
Scott in his 2008 study The Evolution of Resource Property Rights) use the term common pool 
interchangeably with those that define property rights arrangements, notably ‘open-access’ or 
‘common property’.24 This reflects the dominance of property rights theory in explaining over-
entry into the industry and the outcome of overfishing.  
Garrett Hardin’s 1968 essay The Tragedy of the Commons is commonly held to have 
argued that natural resources exploited in an unrestricted common property form would lead to 
over-exploitation by individuals acting in their rational self-interest.25 Fourteen years earlier in 
1954, the Canadian economist H. Scott Gordon published The Economic Theory of a Common 
Property Resource: The Fishery in the Journal of Political Economy.26 This provided an 
economic theory of common property resources using the example of sea fisheries. Examined in 
greater detail in chapter 3, Gordon argued that to promote a biologically and economically 
sustainable level of fishing, the property rights status of fisheries should be redefined from that 
of common property to private property. 
One of the most recognisable ways in which property rights theory has been applied to 
global fisheries management is through the 20th century ‘enclosure movement’ whereby some 
national governments unilaterally extended jurisdiction over the littoral seas and resources 
within. This approach to resources management became enshrined in international law through 
the concept of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) at the Third LOS Conference which awarded 
coastal states economic jurisdiction over the waters out to 200-miles off their coastlines. Barnes 
argues that the scholarship of economists such as H. Scott Gordon and Frances Christy in 
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advocating for private property regime of fisheries provided “strong intellectual support for the 
enclosure movement represented by the exclusive economic zone”.27  
While the influence of these academics in international scientific and economic circles is 
evident, consideration of how property rights theory influenced national policy-making is 
limited. A good example is Carmel Finley’s 2011 study of the origins of MSY as a leading 
scientific concept and the actions of the US State Department over 1949-1955. Finley argues that 
in this period the US State Department used its political influence in international forums to 
promote the use of the scientific concept of MSY to block the enclosure movement and the 
application of the ‘sole owner’ concept. Finley identifies that the USA Government’s approach 
to stock conservation was dictated by foreign policy considerations. The USA Government 
prioritised the retention of free passage for American ships and planes through international seas 
and skies over the extension of national jurisdiction as a tool for stock conservation.  
Finley’s analysis provides insight into the influence of domestic non-fishing interests in 
the distribution and management of global fisheries resources. Early environmental policy was 
dictated by foreign policy as the use of MSY as a management tool offered an alternative to the 
extension of jurisdiction. Her conclusion that fisheries were of strategic importance during the 
Cold War period is important but confined by the scope of her research and the period 
considered. This thesis complements Finley’s work by arguing that military concerns also 
influenced UK sea fisheries policy-making during the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, by examining the 
development of UK Law of the Sea negotiation positions over a longer period, it argues that 
fisheries had a strategic influence beyond the Cold War. It argues that in the 1970s, the UK 
Government moved to support the marine enclosure movement as part of a concession to secure 
maximum access to more economically valuable subsea energy resources.  
Wise (1983) acknowledged the UK’s policy shift to support the EEZ concept but did not 
identify the non-domestic fishing interests driving this policy reversal. This thesis provides 
detailed analysis of the domestic trade-offs required by the UK Government to produce a 
negotiation position that would support agreement at the Third LOS Conference.28 Together with 
Finley’s work, it argues that economic and scientific support for the EEZ concept had limited 
influence on the US and UK’s policy-making.  
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Property rights theory also played a dominant role in fisheries management through its 
use in creating regulatory tools and instruments for environmental policy. These tools were used 
to create de facto private property rights in common property resources and therefore replace 
missing property rights. The most prominent mechanism can be traced back to the Canadian 
economist John Dales. Dales published Pollution, Property and Prices in 1968, the same year as 
Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons.29 As Bond and Erion (2012) note, Dales went much 
further than Hardin by providing a solution to the overexploitation of common resources.30 
Examining water pollution, Dales proposed a total quota of allowable waste for each waterway 
and the creation of a market in which polluting rights could be traded between firms. Drawing 
upon Coase (1960), Dales argued that the ability of firms to trade pollution rights amongst 
themselves would lead to the most efficient firms making the largest pollution reductions and 
then selling their remaining rights to the less efficient firms.31  This would reduce pollution at 
lowest social cost.  
In contrast with the substantial body of work designing economic approaches to 
environmental regulation, little consideration has been paid to how governments and fisheries 
managers choose between different theories and tools. As Hahn and Stavins (1992) note, there 
has been insufficient attention paid to the political and institutional environment of instrument 
choice.32 This is an important deficiency given Scott’s caution in 1979 that “observed action or 
apparent effect of a regulation may not tell us much about the motives that originally inspired 
it.”33 
 Studies that consider the practical application of economic theory to environmental and 
economic policy-making identify that market-based approaches only became used from the mid-
1980s.34 It is broadly recognised that Dale’s 1968 proposal took a back seat to the command-and-
                                                      
29 John Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices – An Essay in Policy-making and Economics. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1968). 
30 Patrick Bond and Graham Erion, “South African carbon trading: A counterproductive climate change strategy”, in 
David A. MacDonald ed., Electric Capitalism: Recolonising African on the Power Grid (London: Routledge, 2012), 
p.346.  
31 R. H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law Economics 3 (1960), pp.1-44. 
32 Robert Hahn and Robert Stavins, “Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory and 
Practice”, The American Economic Review 82 (1992), pp.464-468.  
33 Anthony Scott. “Development of Economic Theory on Fisheries Regulation,” Journal of the Fisheries Research 
Board of Canada 36 (1979), p.727. 




control approach to environmental policy that characterised the 1970s. This thesis seeks to 
contribute to this area by examining the incentives facing key decision-makers when choosing 
between different regulatory and resource allocation instruments. It uses a study of UK fisheries 
policy-making to consider how economic theory maps across to political objectives for fisheries 
management to understand better the political-economic realities surrounding the application of 
economic theory.   
 
International relations: the international cooperative management of 
environmental resources 
 
This thesis is concerned with the behaviour and actions of the UK Government in the 
design and delivery of international agreements that aimed to distribute and sustainably manage 
global fisheries resources. It therefore feeds into the well-studied literature of why nations 
cooperate and voluntarily enter such agreements. 
The post-1945 customary legal framework of ‘Freedom of the High Seas’ and the 
naturally fugacious nature of fisheries meant that any change to the property status of regional 
and local fisheries required international cooperation. International agreements are a common 
tool for the global, cooperative management of nature resources. The European Union has 
concluded more than 20 international fisheries agreements.35 Scott Barrett’s 2003 analysis of 
climate change treaties argued that the post-1945 increase in the number of global agreements 
was due to the increasing trans-boundary nature of 20th century global environmental problems. 
D’Arge (1975) in turn attributed increased transnational environmental externalities to the 
growth of the human population and increased material consumption per capita relative to the 
environment’s assimilative capacity.36 Within the global agreements, the use of a property rights 
approach to overfishing - or the realpolitik appropriation of natural resources – implied a role for 
government. In his 2008 study of the long evolution of rights associated with fugacious (fish and 
water), mineral (mining rights to minerals, gold, coal, oil and gas) and wood resources, Scott 
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identifies national governments as the key supplier of exclusive property rights through 
legislature.37 
 
The growth in theoretical and empirical work on international cooperation mirrored the 
post-Second World War growth in the number of international agreements.38 A seminal 
contribution is Olson’s 1971 study of group and organization behaviour ‘The Logic of Collective 
Action’. Olson refuted the assumption in economic and social sciences that if a group shared a 
common interest, individuals within the group would act in a rationale, self-interested manner to 
collectively further those interests. Olson argued that: 
 “though all the members of the group have a common interest in obtaining this collective 
benefit, they have no common interest in paying the costs of providing that collective good. Each 
would prefer the others pay the entire cost”.39  
Olson was describing the practice of free-riding. Individuals within a group will be 
unwilling to pay the costs of action if others will act to deliver the outcomes for them. ‘Free-
riders’ benefit from the actions of others while carrying none of the costs. Olson argues that in 
the absence of coercion or an incentive to make individuals act in the common interest, 
individuals – particularly in a large group such as the international community – would not do 
so.  
Harrison’s 2011 study of law of the sea regime and Barrett’s 2003 analysis of 
environmental policy-making both identify sovereignty as the key obstacle to collection 
agreement.40 Harrison argues that “creating a universal regime for the seas and oceans is 
complicated by the decentralized nature of the international legal system”.41 There is no global 
legislature that can impose rules on all relevant actors and national governments. To remedy this, 
both authors tack back to Olson’s 1971 conclusion that coercion or incentives are required to 
achieve agreement.  
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Barrett and Harrison argue that the choice of incentive structures and mechanisms in the 
negotiation process and final agreements are vital if the issue of sovereignty is to be 
accommodated and compliance with agreements achieve. Harrison attributes the success of the 
Third Law of the Sea Conference to the adoption of consensus voting procedures and the 
negotiation of a ‘package deal’.42 The Third LOS Conference had separate committees covering 
the seabed regime, law of the sea and marine environment and scientific research but all parts of 
the final Convention was negotiated as “an entity, a single negotiated package”.43 This forced 
nation states to compromise and make trade-offs between different domestic preferences.  
This thesis supports Harrison’s argument and provides a case-study for understanding 
how this occurs in practice. An examination of the decision-making processes that created UK 
compromise positions allows this thesis to go further and provide insight into how domestic 
trade-offs were made. It argues that central UK Government departments, notably the Cabinet 
and Foreign Office, chose to marginalise the Fisheries Department and fishing industry in the 
creation of compromise positions as it prioritised the production of a global agreement over its 
acceptability to key national objector groups. This thesis aims to draw attention to a limitation of 
studies that evaluate the success of global agreements by examining international to nation-state 
negotiations. It examines how the repercussions of this exclusory approach adopted by the UK 
Government at the Third LOS Conference negatively impacted domestic delivery mechanisms as 
tensions with local actors were left to be accommodated through sub-national negotiations. This 
thesis explores the importance of local negotiations to the success of global commitments. 
 
National policy in an international setting – distributing fisheries resources  
As Scott explained, “in economists’ language, the phrase ‘property rights’ is typically 
little more than a synonym for ‘ownership’ or perhaps ‘possession’.”44 A change in property 
rights therefore donated a redistribution. Redistributions that occur at an international level are 
felt by national and local actors. A theme in the international relations literature is that domestic 
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politics is therefore a crucial factor shaping a nation’s international objectives, its bargaining 
space and the shape and content of final agreements.  
A good example of this is Asgeirsdottir’s (2008) study of seven years of negotiations 
between Norway and Iceland that sought to distribute straddling fish stocks.45 Her work takes the 
study of international cooperation further by examining why states cooperate and how 
international regimes and domestic factors shape negotiations and final agreements. Asgeirsdottir 
argues that while international legal regimes and agreements (in this case UNCLOS and the 
Straddling Stock Agreements) create a structure for distribution, it is domestic level politics and 
the influence of local interest groups that have shaped changes in the distribution of quota over 
time. 
 Asgeirsdottir’s analysis is important in outlining the influence of local pressures on 
national policy for international spheres. Firstly, it identifies the power of local lobby groups as a 
key determinant of the bargaining space available to national governments when making 
international arrangements. This bargaining space, and final agreements, tend to reflect what 
domestic actors are willing to bear.46 She attributes Iceland’s increasingly favourable outcomes 
during the negotiations to the strengthening of Icelandic domestic fishing interests compared to 
the weakening of Norwegian domestic fishing interests. 
Wise’s 1983 study of the formation of the Common Fisheries Policy gives similar insight 
into how UK domestic electoral considerations influenced the formation of the CFP. Wise 
describes Member States as being “locked into a bitter struggle over who should get what of a 
diminishing resource”. This indicates that the CFP can be identified as a distributive conflict.47 
Though he adopts an impartial view in examining the factors shaping the formation of the CFP, a 
clear argument is that UK national electoral issues interfered with the formation of the CFP and 
caused delay in achieving an agreement. Wise argues that the UK Government maintained a 
stalemate on agreement in 1978 due to the likelihood of an election by Spring 1979. Fishermen 
represented 0.1% of the British labour force during this period. Wise explains their ability to 
gather national support and the prominence of electorally marginal consistencies in fishing 
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communities as key to explaining their influence in national politics.48 Wise argues that the 
deadlock – where the UK Fisheries Minister Mr Silkin rejected an offer of 31.5% of total 
community TAC –was only overcome with the election of the new Conservative Government in 
1979.49 As Wise clearly demonstrates, perceptions of national interest were “inevitably more 
potent determinations of behaviour than any wide sense of European Community.”50  
Asgeirsdottir and Wise both argue that domestic fishing interests have shaped the 
outcome of international agreements. Tracking back to Harrison (2011) and the package-deal 
nature of the UN LOS Convention, negotiation positions and international arrangements are 
often the result of trade-offs and concessions at nation-state level. This thesis starts with this 
acknowledgement but provides evidence of the explanatory power of examining the intersections 
where different industries and policies meet. It argues that non-fishing interests often played a 
dominant role in shaping international fisheries distributions. 
 
Evaluations of the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy  
In 1997, Symes argued that “given that the greatest challenge facing Europe’s fisheries is 
overexploitation and depletion of the resource base, the CFP must surely be judged a failure.”51 
This assessment is echoed throughout the literature evaluating the CFP, in particular EU fishing 
structural policy and the operation of a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota regime.  
 
CFP Structural Policy  
Academic consideration of the CFP’s structural policy is the more limited of the two. 
Hatcher (1999) provides a concise overview of the development of the European Community’s 
structural policy between 1971 to 1999.52  He identifies that while European funding for the 
community fishing fleet increased over the period, the purpose of financial aid shifted from 
grants for building vessels to removing vessels. From 1983, EU structural policy sought to 
balance industry capacity with stock availability by reducing the capacity of the European fleet. 
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By reviewing how EU fisheries structural policy developed over time, Hatcher provides insight 
into how the objectives, ambition and penalties associated with non-compliance changed over 
time as many Member States failed to meet their capacity reduction targets. 
A limitation of the literature on EEC and EU structural policy is that it tends to evaluate 
Member States’ performance against their targets. It contains little analysis or insight into why 
targets were achieved or missed. Suris-Regueiro et al., (2003) made some progress by identifying 
a correlation between quota availability and compliance with capacity reduction targets. They 
found that greater relative availability of quota led to poorer performance but acknowledged that 
the correlation was “not very strong”. This thesis aims to contribute to this literature by 
examining how the choice and design of different policy instruments for delivering capacity 
reduction affected the UK Government’s achievement of EU targets. It also examines the 
incentives faced by UK policy-makers to reduce capacity in line with EU obligations.  
 
CFP TAC and Quota Regime 
The literature on the development and effectiveness of the CFP’s TAC mechanism has 
consistently argued for a failure of the CFP to achieve its objectives of maintaining fish stocks 
and conserving the resources. Several themes are used to account for this failure, with a central 
tenet the prioritisation of a politically acceptable allocations of quota over the “scientific 
imperative of resource conservation.”53 Karagiannakos’ (1996) analysis of North Sea demersal 
fisheries and Daw and Gray (2004) both argued that scientific advice was diluted by political 
considerations.54 Karagiannakos identified that over 1980-1994 TACs were frequently set higher 
than the levels recommended by scientific advice. Daws and Gray argued that this continued 
from 2002. Holden (1994) and Symes (1992 and 1997) provided a similar analysis by arguing 
that the need for an equitable allocation, which was defined by political acceptability, prohibited 
the implementation of a rigorous conservation regime.55 The notion of scientific 
recommendations being at variance with the political desire for economic opportunities is 
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mirrored in evaluations of the International Whaling Commission (Gambell 1977, Andresen 
1989, Heazle 2004).  
A second key theme within evaluations of the CP is poor enforcement of quota 
restrictions and technical rules. Da Rocha et al., (2012) emphasised “regular lack of enforcement 
at national fisheries authority level.”56 Karagiannakos’ discussion of non-compliance highlighted 
two separate impacts from a lack of control: lax enforcement of rules and non-compliance by 
individual fishers, and deficiencies in the design of the TAC mechanism that result in a lack of 
control or limit on actual fishing mortality.57 Khalilian et al., argued that the “insufficient control 
and enforcement” of the CFP was more evidence of “short term political considerations 
overriding scientific advice”.58 
 
Evaluations of UK Fisheries Management 
Analysis of UK fisheries policy within the CFP has tended to produce a descriptive 
account of policy development with a focus on domestic quota management. Valatin (1999), 
Symes (1992), Hatcher and Read (2001) and Le Floc’h et al., (2015) tend to catalogue changes in 
UK fisheries policy rather than identify the factors which drove and altered policy outcomes and 
account for their relative influence. Le’Floc’h et al., made an initial in-road into this by 
identifying a general trend in which Member States have implemented management mechanisms 
centred on ‘fishing rights individualisation’ and limited access. They argued that this has been 
shaped by increasing restrictions on accessing fish stocks.59  
Symes (1992) identified the CFP as creating significant distributive issues between 
sectors of the UK fleet.60 The UK was one of the EC9 to sustain the heaviest landing losses from 
the loss of access to third-party waters (waters outside the EEC 200-mile EEZ). He argued that 
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this carried a disproportionate cost for the distant-water fishing ports at Grimsby, Hull, 
Fleetwood and Aberdeen. From 1965 to 1986, Hull moved from being the first UK port to the 
sixth, and combined landings at Hull and Grimsby fell from 40% to 5% of total UK demersal 
landings. A regional shift in UK fishing opportunities was identified, with an expansion of 
landings in the North-East and North-West of Scotland such that Peterhead emerged as the 
leading UK port in 1986. However, by examining the outcomes of quota allocations as opposed 
to the design and decision-making behind the chosen allocation mechanisms, there was a lack of 
visibility over how local political pressures and social policy attempted to mitigate against or 
encourage such changing regional variations. 
 
Role of the local in fisheries management  
This thesis is concerned with the negotiations that occurred between national 
administrators and local interests in the delivery of international commitments. Interest in the 
local dimension of fisheries management began in the 1990s as certain academics came to 
question the prevailing policy approaches of the 1970s and 1980s to common-pool problems - 
either privatisation of the resource (Demsetz 1967; Johnson 1972) or regulation by the state 
(Hardin 1978).  
An alternative approach developed which put resource users at the centre of decision-
making. It rejected the traditional evaluation of why resource depletion occurred as set out in 
Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) that rational users of a common pool resource would exploit it 
until expected benefits equalled expected costs leading to eventual resource exhaustion.61 In 
1990, Ostrom et al., rejected the view of resource views as  “helpless individuals caught in an 
inexorable process of destroying their own resources.”62 By 1999, Ostrom et al., claimed more 
defiantly that it was “time for a reassessment of the generality of the theory that has grown out of 
Hardin’s original paper”.63 
The new approach instead posited that resource users themselves could create contracts 
and resource management programmes that supported the sustainable use of the resource. In 
1992 Schlager and Ostrom drew upon Clark (1977) to challenge the prevailing assumption that 
only ‘owners’ of a resource made long-term investments to improve the resource as if a private 
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owner used a high discount rate – high enough to discount almost all future returns – the decision 
could be taken to exhaust the resource.64  
The resulting user-participation model of governance retained the location of decision-
making with resource users and communities, as opposed to decisions being made by 
government through a bureaucracy-based mechanism or by economic forces through a market 
mechanism. It drew from a body of empirical evidence that detailed informal management 
arrangements used in predominantly indigenous, artisanal fisheries that had developed with little 
or no help from government authorities (Cordell 1972; Alexander 1977; Forman 1970; Berkes 
1986). The collective management arrangements in these fisheries often rested on the creation of 
de facto rules and rights agreed between users and reflected custom or community practice.65  
The argument was that user-participation could deliver an alternative governance 
structure that would deliver a more effective system of fisheries management at lower cost.66 
Delivery of this rested upon two central concepts in the literature. Firstly, that user-participation 
in decision-making would overcome principal-agent problems associated with management by 
an external regulatory agency. Involvement of resource users in the design of rules would 
improve their legitimacy while social capital - which Grafton (2005) identified as trust, civic 
engagement, cooperation and social networks – between fishers would improve levels of 
international monitoring and compliance. The second element was the idea that resource users 
had better, more timely information on the fisheries than a regulatory agency.67 When combined 
with scientific knowledge, local knowledge (seasonal fluctuations in stock density and migration, 
local market conditions and the methods of fishing) could work to create more effective 
allocation and management structures.68  
A central tenet of the user-participation model is the use of the relationships and social 
and cultural norms and connections norms between fishers to create cooperation as opposed to 
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competition. Social networks, shared norms and trust are argued to lead to higher levels of 
individual and group compliance. As Ostrom noted:  
“When an individual has strongly internalized a norm related to keeping promises, for example, 
the individual suffers shame and guilt when a personal promise is broken. If the norm is shared 
with others, the individual is also subject to considerable social censure for taking an action 
considered to be wrong by others.”69  
 
Grafton (2005) sets out the important role that social capital can play in improving 
monitoring and enforcement. Monitoring is a prerequisite for effective fisheries management:  
 “In every group, there will be individuals who will ignore norms and act opportunistically when 
given a chance. There are also situations in which the potential benefits will be so high that even 
strongly committed individuals will break norms”.70 
Cooperation between fishermen is viewed as limiting the likelihood that an individual 
will behave in a way that impinges on their neighbours as the expectation of social sanctions and 
penalties creates a social incentive to comply with collectively agreed to fishing rules.71 If fishers 
trust one another to comply with regulations, then the cost of monitoring the actions on 
individual fishers is reduced. User-participation management frameworks are argued to create 
improved conditions for internal monitoring, thus reducing the need and cost of external 
monitoring programmes. Self-monitoring, or the monitoring of others by resource users, can 
occur in fisheries due to the close physical presence between fishermen in that they can observe 
the type of gear their neighbour uses, the size and type of fish he lands and where he catches. 
Reporting on observed behaviour is incentivised by self-interest in that the free-riding of another 
will reduce the benefits others will derive from the agreement. Self-monitoring and reporting will 
reduce costs of enforcement.  
This thesis provides a detailed insight in to the relationship between government officials 
and industry prior to the development of the user-participation literature. It finds that successive 
governments consulted with industry groups regularly and that industry representatives 
consistently fed into policy-making processes. However, it identifies a strong political tenet to 
the contributions from industry representatives. Their aim was political and protectionist to get 
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the most for their members. Moreover, if they supported mechanisms and policies that were 
focused on economic and biological sustainability, this was often conveyed to government in 
private. This negated the idea of the industry input creating compliance and legitimising policies 
as their members were unlikely unaware of their support for high cost policies. This thesis 
contributes to the participation governance literature by providing insight into the nature of 
government-industry relations and supports the case for fisheries managers working more closely 
with resource users as opposed to local representatives who were, in effect, lobbyists.  
 
History and Policy and Policy Learning  
While this thesis is focused largely on policy implementation, the fifty-year time period 
considered provides insight into policy learning over time. Some consideration has therefore 
been given to the literature on history and policy and policy learning. The cyclical nature of 
policy-making and implementation witnessed in UK fisheries policy makes this literature 
particularly relevant. Practical experience, evaluation and the changing relative abilities of 
different interest groups to influence policy-making created feedback loops in which 
implementation influence future policy design.  
 Pemberton (2003) builds upon the rich literature on policy outcomes, networks and 
policy learning supplied by the likes of Hall (1993), Peters (1998) and Marshal and Smith (2000) 
in his archival study of British economic policy-making during the 1960s.72 His study of the new 
economic ‘growth’ policy networks in the 1960s revealed several similarities with the movement 
for a more economic approach to fisheries management in the UK from 1979. Both newly 
formed networks drew upon negative feedback to previous policies, with new ideas for 
correcting policy failure coming from academia.73 Pemberton argues that despite a rich 
environment of policy learning and new networks, the application of new policy and change was 
obstructed by networks of actors that had the power to resist change. Of specific relevance to this 
thesis is his argument that the UK Government was reliant on producer networks to implement 
policy change. This was a crucial barrier to the application of new ideas. In Pemberton’s study, 
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the key producer networks were financial and industrial networks. In this thesis, the government 
was reliant on the fishing industry and the Producer Organisations.74  
Similarly, Berridge’s (2008) study of the use of history in public health policy-making 
offers relevant insights for this thesis.75 While this study concentrates on the role and use of 
economic advice in policy-making, the time period considered and the role of policy legacy in 
fisheries management creates a strong historical dimension to the advice and ideas considered 
from 1945. Berridge’s discussion on institutional memory is interesting and directly relevant to 
this thesis. In part, she attributes “a lack of such memory within government” and amongst civil 
servants to the realities of the work.76 The constant movement of civil servants between posts, 
the lack of time and space in a working week to dedicate to reading, and the relative ‘openness’ 
of different stages of the policy cycle to external ideas all created barriers to the incorporation of 
academic ideas (whether historical, economic or scientific) into the policy process. Berridge’s 
insights are important context for considering the policy learning processes identified in this 
thesis. Successive UK Governments considered the same ideas and mechanisms for fisheries 
management, with little reference made to previous discussions. The use of transferable quotas 
or effort controls are a key example with many discussions on their potential use repeated over 
several decades. This thesis contributes to this literature by providing insight into the factors 
which altered the government’s position on certain ideas over time; arguing that economic 
advice was used in a selective manner when it was politically convenient.  
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3. Sovereignty, property rights and marine resources: UK 




This chapter argues that the formation and development of UK Government policy on the 
international issue of national fishing limits over 1945-76 was shaped predominantly by 
domestic non-fishing interests. UK fisheries policy in this period initially reflected the needs of 
the economically and politically dominant distant-water fishing fleet. This led to the government 
rejecting the extension of jurisdiction as a tool for stock conservation or local economic 
protection. Over time, the ability of this sector and the Fisheries Department to influence UK 
policy diminished. In 1964 and 1976, the UK extended fishing limits to reconcile growing 
political tension in Scotland where support for an extension of limits had been marginalised 
within UK policy-making. More fundamentally, however, the extension of UK fishing limits 
represented negotiated concessions at an international level designed to protect military and 
foreign policy interests in the 1960s and energy interests in the 1970s. This chapter argues that 
the UK Government’s agreement to the concept of 200-mile fishing zones at the Third LOS 
Conference represented an acknowledged direct trade-off between UK fishing interests in return 
for maximising domestic oil interests.  
 
Ownership and the extension of national jurisdiction over the seas became an important 
international issue from 1945. This was driven by increased interest from national governments 
in exploiting resources in and under the seas that technological advances had made both 
economically and technically viable. From its early beginnings in the 1900s, technological 
developments enabled the offshore hydrocarbon industry to flourish from the 1950s. In October 
1947, the first commercial offshore oil well was drilled out of sight of land by a mobile rig in the 
Gulf of Mexico. Though the rig only drilled through a water column of less than 20 feet, a new 
event horizon was created for the exploitation of offshore hydrocarbons. A decade later 




to extraction continually re-defined.77 Similarly, the application of new technologies to the 
exploitation of sea capture fisheries facilitated a shift to offshore, deep-water and industrial 
fishing practices. The transition from sail to steam technology in the late 1800s enabled larger, 
more powerful vessels to fish for longer, farther from home and hold larger catches. War-time 
technologies such as sonar and the use of on-board freezing allowed vessels to target fish more 
effectively and protected against spoilage on long trips. The application of technology allowed 
British vessels to fish off the coast of Iceland by the turn of the 19th century. Iceland as a region 
of capture entered the British Sea Fisheries Statistics in 1921, with 73,708 tonnes landed off the 
coast of Iceland. By 1950 this has doubled to 137,685 tonnes, reaching a peak of 228,000 tonnes 
in 1970.78 
 
Technology-driven advances in marine resource exploitation produced two predominant 
international concerns. The first was a reconsideration - initially at nation-state level - of the 
traditional boundaries of marine jurisdiction. Prior to 1945, the international legal position was 
defined by the 17th century doctrine ‘Freedom of the High Seas’ – that all waters beyond the 
territorial seas and the resources within were considered res communis and free for all to exploit. 
The second concern was for technology-enhanced exploitation rates and for the over-exploitation 
of fish stocks. Prior to the application of new technologies, sea fisheries were offered protection 
from heavy-exploitation by high costs and dangerous physical conditions.79 Rapidly changing 
fishing practices eventually enabled fleets to increase catches, often in excess of the natural 
sustainable yield of the stocks. Concern for over-fishing was present in the late 19th and early 
20th century. However, it was not until the end of the Second World War (1939-45) that over-
fishing and the conservation of fish stocks became a persistent international environmental 
matter. 
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The two issues of marine jurisdiction and over-fishing became intertwined as certain 
national governments unilaterally extended jurisdiction over littoral waters to protect fish stocks 
and national fleets from the new danger of over-fishing. These extensions – to which the 1945 
Truman Proclamation is often held as a catalyst – often had a dual economic and conservationist 
objective.80 The intention was often to protect fish stocks from over-exploitation by limiting the 
right of access (and in turn capture) to sea areas to nationals of the littoral coastal state.  Such 
national actions had international ramifications as unilateral extensions by countries such as 
Norway and Iceland displaced vessels from traditional maritime nations such as the UK from 
rich fishing grounds. In response, the maritime nations contested the lawfulness of the 
nationally-imposed fishing limits, arguing that the extensions contravened the existing 
international law of ‘Freedom of the High Seas’. While the objections to extensions of 
jurisdiction and sovereignty were often arguments based on principles, the conflict spawned 
from the distributional consequences of such actions. 
 
Political and economic motives were inherent in both the extensions of national marine 
jurisdiction and the protests against the unilateral acts. This process and the concern for over-
exploitation of fish stocks overlapped with a growing academic interest in the application of 
property rights theory to natural resources. Economic policy was applied to environmental 
problems and natural resources as a means of correcting market failures and resulting negative 
externalities. Economic analysis and approaches have been used in the design of environmental 
policy. Economic approaches to the environment have typically followed two schools of thought: 
the Meade-Pigou tax/subsidy approach and the Chicago approach associated with Coase that 
focuses on property rights. Helm (1991) differentiated between the two approaches by arguing 
that “the former approach is essentially aimed at corrections of the consequences of market 
operations. The latter considers how market institutions can be reformed to internalize 
externalities”.81 The application of economics to environmental problems coincided with a post-
1945 growth in the number of international agencies and resulting international environmental 
agreements (IEA). Barrett (2003) argued that the rapid growth of international agencies and IEAs 
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was driven by need because of the arrival in the middle of the 19th century of transnational 
externalities as a “pervasive feature of international relations”.82 
 
With an inevitable time lag between the implementation of new technology and the 
formation of legal institutions to control and channel risks and benefits, the first UN LOS 
Conference held in Geneva in 1958 attempted to create a new international consensus on marine 
jurisdiction.83 Four conventions were produced but the issue of national fishing limits was not 
settled and a second LOS Conference was held in 1960.84 The failure of the 1960 Conference to 
reach agreement and an escalation in international conflict led to the Third LOS Conference 
convened in New York in 1973 which produced the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) in 1982.85 The 1982 Convention - brought into full force in 1994 - enshrined in 
international law the rights and responsibilities of the international community with respect to 
the seas and seabeds. In terms of national marine jurisdiction, it defined territorial waters as 
being measured out to 12-nmiles in breadth and introduced the concept of Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZ) that extended from the edge of the territorial sea out to 200 n-miles. Within the 
EEZs, adjacent coastal states were awarded exploitation rights over all natural resources in the 
water and the exclusive right to harvest mineral and non-living minerals in the subsoil of their 
continental shelves.  
Negotiations in the Third LOS Conference continued for 10 years as it represented a 
complex process of distributing international access to and ownership of marine space and the 
resources within. From 1958-73, the number of nation states participating in the UN LOS 
process increased from 86 to 163. Due to the multiple uses of the seas, the competition between 
domestic interests for priority in national negotiation strategies was often complex and varied. As 
discussed in the last chapter, Harrison (2011) argued for the importance of the Conference’s 
incentives structures and negotiation mechanisms in facilitating trade-offs at nation-state level. 
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Marine issues were considered in separate committees with the Convention negotiated as a single 
package deal.  
The development of UK Government policy on fishing limits and wider marine 
jurisdiction within the UN LOS process is of relevance and interest for several reasons. The UK 
fishing fleet was diverse in its character, operations and structure. This produced a stark division 
at a local-community level in terms of the industry’s attitude towards the extension of national 
fishing limits. The English and Welsh fleets were predominantly comprised of large distant-
waters trawlers that fished off the coasts of other nations. The Scottish fleet was made up of 
smaller vessels fishing in the inshore and offshore waters of the coast. Table 3.1 highlights the 
concentration of large (over 140ft) trawlers in ports in England and Wales and Aberdeen in 
Scotland. An extension of limits would have affected the fleets very differently. This forced the 
government to arbitrate between the conflicting local interests when forming national policy. 
This chapter argues that local politics play a decisive role in shaping national policy. Over time, 
the dominance of the distant-water fleet declined as Scottish fishing interests became 
increasingly politicised and organised but more importantly as the interests of the distant-water 
fishing sector became misaligned with broader UK marine interests.  
 

























Fleetwood 12 52 24 9 - 1 - 4 12 52 
Grimsby 4 27 51 50 4 - - 105 4 27 
Hull - 1 - 93 2 - - 6 - 1 
Lowestoft 6 84 26 2 2 2 - - 6 84 
Milford Haven 3 18 - 5 - - - - 3 18 
North Shields 3 14 4 - - - - 16 3 14 
Other Ports 
(England Wales) 
490 497 105 97 395 53 3 41 490 497 
Aberdeen 3 48 60 2 27 3 7 15 3 48 
Buckie 4 68  - 13 - - 33 4 68 
Fraserburgh 7 44 8 - 40 2 1 42 7 44 
Leith 9 38 - - 2 -  15 9 38 
Lossiemouth - 20 - - - 12 37 69 - 20 
Other (Scotland) 81 170 68 - 325 17 - 257 81 170 





Local political tensions within the fishing industry were crucial in shaping UK fisheries 
policy. Nonetheless, this chapter argues that UK Government policy on fishing limits was shaped 
by non-fishing interests. In the 1950s and 1960s, defence interests were the key policy driver. 
This was replaced by energy policy in the 1970s. From 1945 UK fishing interests and the 
Fisheries Department became increasingly marginalised within the UK LOS policy process. By 
the early 1970s, UK fishing interests had been trumped by domestic oil interests. This chapter 
argues that the UK Government’s agreement to 200-mile fishing limits was a trade-off for 
securing maximum jurisdiction over the seabeds and hydrocarbon resources within.  
Section 1 of this chapter provides an overview of the development of economic thought 
on the application of property right theory to fisheries resources in the decades following World 
War Two. Section 2 analyses the early development of UK policy on extended fisheries limits 
from 1945-64. It is argued that the UK Government’s rejection of extended limits as a tool for 
stock conservation was determined by the negative impact this would have had on the 
commercially dominant distant-water fishing sector and defence interests. Section 3 focuses on 
UK policy development for the Third LOS Conference 1973-82 to demonstrate that UK fishing 
interests became increasingly marginalised within UK LOS policy-making. It provides evidence 
of the key trade-offs made by the government whereby fishing interest were intentionally 
trumped by energy interests.  
 
3.1. The sole owner: the application of property rights theory to fisheries  
 
Early academic interest in the issue of over-fishing and the application of property rights 
theory to fish resources flowed from the concern of economists with externalities. Externalities 
are the consequences of industrial or commercial activity that affect other parties without being 
reflected in market prices. A common example is pollution. Economic instruments are 
commonly adopted to align the private and social marginal costs of activities by forcing the 




Garrett Hardin’s 1968 Tragedy of the Commons in Science is regarded as the seminal work 
which addressed how common ownership of a resource could lead to its over-exploitation.86  
 
Figure 3.1 Simple static model of an open-access fishery 
 
 
Source: Ian R. Smith, Territorial use rights and economic efficiency: the case of the Philippines fishing 
concessions. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 24. (FAO UN: Rome, 1992).  
 
Fourteen years earlier, a fisheries-specific analysis was published by H. Scott Gordon in 
his article The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, published in 
The Journal of Political Economy in 1954.87 In ‘The Fishery’, Gordon argued that to promote 
biological and economic sustainability the property rights status of fisheries should be redefined 
from that of common property to private property. Gordon’s economic interest in fisheries 
exploitation grew from his objection to the monopoly held by biologists in the formation of 
fisheries research and regulation. In 1958, Gordon argued in ‘Economics and the Conservation 
Question’, that “a great deal (perhaps the greater part) of what has been done in the name of 
“conservation policy” turns out, upon subjection to economic analysis, to be essentially 
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worthless”.88 In 1954, Gordon argued that the question of conservation was one for the 
traditional theory of capital and that conservation of fish stocks was not related to the ecology of 
the seas but to “man’s use of the resources for his own (economic) purposes”.89Gordon’s 
application of property rights theory to fisheries resources mirrored Frank H. Knight’s analysis 
of externalities and property rights in the 1924 paper ‘Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of 
Social Cost’.90 Knight challenged Pigou’s view that road congestion was justification for the 
taxation of roads.91 Knight argued that the application of property rights – private ownership of 
the road – would produce the same outcome without the need for government intervention. 
Gordon applied Knight’s analysis of the ‘two-roads’ paradigm to two fisheries to argue that over-
exploitation of fish stocks was caused by the common-property status of fish resources.92 The 
combination of the common property regime that allowed for unrestricted or open access with 
the fixed biological yield of a fishery led to what Gordon termed the ‘bionomic equilibrium’ 
(Figure 3.1. open-access equilibrium).  
Gordon argued that if access to fish resources remained unrestricted, fishers would 
continue to enter the fishery and exploit the resource beyond the point where the harvest was 
both biologically and economically sustainable. The fishery would be exploited until total 
revenues equalled total costs (open-access equilibrium). While irrational at a fishery-level and 
leading to rent dissipation and overexploitation, it was driven by the rational behaviour of 
individual fishers as the marginal private cost of entry was lower than the marginal social cost. If 
a fisher wanted to limit their activity and fish less for economic or biological reasons, the 
common property status of the resource meant that the benefits of this - such as larger future 
yields and revenue streams as remaining fish reproduced – were not guaranteed. Abatement at an 
individual level would benefit other fishers as fish left would be taken by others. Strong 
incentives operated for individuals to fish as hard as possible as any remaining catch was not 
guaranteed to be available on their return.  
Several negative externalities were created when fishing effort increased up to and 
beyond economic and biological equilibriums. The first was biological and related to the 
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theoretical concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY). The European Commission defines 
MSY as the “optimal catch that may be taken from a fishing stock year after year without  
endangering its capacity to regenerate for the future.”93 Overfishing of a stock occurs when catch 
exceeds MSY.94  This is when more fish are removed than is required to maintain the stock’s 
population size and biomass through growth and spawning. Constant fishing in excess of MSY 
will lead to stock collapse. The second set of externalities are economic in nature and relate to 
the concept of maximum economic yield (MEY) – the harvest or level of fishing effort that 
maximizes the net returns from fishing. As demonstrated in Figure 3.1, fishing beyond MEY – 
based on the assumption that fishing costs rise proportionately with effort – produces a sub-
optimal resource rent and as fishing effort approaches the bionomic equilibrium total marginal 
costs equal total marginal revenue.95 As fishing at MEY is lower than fishing at MSY, optimal 
economic management of a fishery will allow for conservation of the stocks.   
Gordon’s approach to bridging the gap between private and social marginal costs in a 
fishery was influenced by Knight as opposed to Pigou. He argued that over-fishing could be 
addressed by re-defining the property regime for fisheries away from common property by 
awarding private property rights over the resources. This immediately worked to limit entry and, 
like Knight’s two-roads analysis, vested power in the owner to control exploitation levels. 
Gordon argued that the owner of the resource would attempt to maximize profit and would 
therefore establish fishing effort at MEY thereby protecting against over-exploitation. Ownership 
of a fishery would create new incentives for lower levels of fishing effort. The owner could incur 
present costs associated with restricting effort to MEY as the benefits of this action would accrue 
to them in the future through larger yields. This extended the fishers’ time horizon as rational 
behaviour became less about short-term economic gains and more about husbandry of a 
renewable resources to produce an indefinite revenue stream. The economic case for applying 
property rights to fisheries as a solution to over-fishing was reinforced in Anthony Scott’s 1955 
article The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership. Scott mirrored Gordon’s argument that if 
a single body had a secure property right for a yield, the resource would be husbanded rather 
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than over-exploited.96 Scott’s analysis took Gordon’s original proposition further by emphasizing 
the element of time. He outlined that not only was complete control of the asset necessary but 
that the ownership rights would have to be secure over the long run. 
 
The concept of sole ownership has been applied most directly as a fisheries management 
tool in circumstances where small, spatially defined fisheries can be harvested by an individual 
or single authority.97 These fisheries tend to be inshore and for shellfish such as mussels and 
cockles that do not move between defined jurisdictions. Sea capture fisheries, especially for 
migratory stocks that move between sea areas, are too vast and complex for a literal application 
of sole ownership. In practice, the approach has been to interpret sole ownership in terms of 
national sovereignty – an exclusive claim by nation state governments over a defined sea areas– 
over areas of sea and the resources within and later as national economic jurisdiction over sea 
areas. From 1945 to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, coastal states universally extended 
sovereignty and jurisdiction over littoral seas in a bid to gain exclusive access to the fisheries 
resources within. The most notable examples include a series of extensions of national fishing 
limits by the Icelandic Government to 12 miles in 1958 and 50 miles in 1972 and the application 
of 200-mile fishing limits by several Latin American countries in the 1960s. The concept of 
national fishing limits was then enshrined in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention that 
established exclusive economic zones up to 200-miles in international law.  
 
3.2. The cost of conservation: UK policy on exclusive fishing limits, 1945-64.  
 
This section argues that UK policy on national fishing limits between 1945 and 1964 was 
shaped by the needs of the UK’s distant-water fleet and national defence policy. The 
concentration of the distant-water fishing industry in Hull, Grimsby and Fleetwood created local 
communities with strong cultural and economic ties to the industry. The political and economic 
clout of these local and national interests led the UK Government to reject the use of extended 
fishing limits as an international tool for stock conservation. 
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UK policy on the extension of Norwegian and Icelandic territorial waters, 1948-52.  
 
The need to develop UK policy on national fishing limits arrived in 1948 as the 
Norwegian Government enforced a 1935 Royal Decree to measure territorial limits from a series 
of base points around the coast. Territorial waters were traditionally drawn from the low-water 
mark. Norway’s heavily indented coastline meant the effect and intent of measuring territorial 
waters from base-lines was to increase Norwegian territorial waters from 3 to 4 miles.98 The 
Norwegian Government’s motivation, as cited by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 
judgment on 19 December 1951, was to protect local and dependent fishing communities from 
the larger, more powerful foreign trawlers.99  
The UK’s delegation to the ICJ presented its objection as one of principle: by drawing 
territorial waters from the low-water mark, the Norwegian extension contravened customary 
international law. Internal government discussions indicated that the issue for the UK 
Government was not one of legality but of how UK economic and commercial interests would be 
affected. A 1949 Cabinet Memo outlined that the government’s position was shaped by concern 
for the reciprocal effects of broader territorial waters upon maritime freedoms for military and 
commercial shipping interests.100  
An attempt to produce a settlement that aimed to protect UK distant-water fishing 
interests indicates that the impact of the Norwegian decree on this fleet was a primary concern 
for the UK Government. Before the government chose to take Norway to the ICJ, bilateral 
negotiations attempted to produce a settlement with the UK Government proposing that the area 
in dispute be divided length ways into two equal parts. In the Southern half, the UK would 
accept Norway’s claim and in the Northern half Norway would permit UK vessels access on 
account of the historical presence of UK vessels in the area since 1900. The Cabinet 
Memorandum noted that this would largely safeguard UK fishing interests which largely fished 
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in the Northern area.101 The predominant fishing-related issue for the UK was that of securing an 
access arrangement for UK trawlers.  
 
 The Norwegian dispute provides evidence of the political influence held by the UK’s 
distant-water fishing fleet. The UK and Norway were both major fishing nations. Asgeirsdottir 
(2008) argues that the influence of the Norges Fiskarlag (Norwegian Fishing Association) on 
Norwegian domestic politics and the international system has decreased since the mid-1970s. 
Asgeirsdottir attributes this to a fall in the number of fishermen and the rise of the oil sector.102 
Prior to this, domestic fishing interests played an influential role in Norwegian domestic politics 
with the country’s rejection of EEC membership in 1973 led by fishing and agricultural interests.  
 The UK Government’s Law Offices advised the government against taking the case to the 
ICJ but pressure to do so came from the distant-water fishing lobby. The FCO noted that the 
industry was now “highly organised and united against any concessions to the 
Norwegians…[they] are pushing to go to the ICJ rather than yield to Norwegian claims which 
they consider…detrimental to British fishing interests”.103 The pressure from the fishing industry 
also severely limited the ability of the UK Government to negotiate bilaterally with Norway with 
the FCO stating that “finding any agreement that would be accepted by the Norwegian 
Government and by the British fishing interests was now very slim”.104  
 The ‘British fishing interests’ alluded to in this quotation specifically meant those of the 
distant-water fleet. This fleet was comprised of large steam trawlers of over 40ft that fished in 
deep, distant waters far from the UK’s coastline. The fleet was typically owned by large fishing 
companies and operated on a high capital to labour ratio. The fleet was economically dominant 
in terms of its economic contribution to the wider UK fishing industry. Of total UK landings of 
£53 million in 1951, £42 million was landed by the distant water fleet, with £7.5 million caught 
within 12-miles of the Icelandic and Norwegian coastlines.105 In 1951, over half of the total 
landings from the deep-sea fleet (6,827,208 cwts of 11,735,343 cwts) were of cod, a high-value 
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species, and almost 50 percent of the landings were caught in the Barents Sea or off the coast of 
Iceland (Table 3.2). The Cabinet was aware that 86 per cent of UK landings from Iceland would 
be reduced by an extension of fishing limits to 12-miles.106  
 
Table 3.2 UK deep-sea landings by area of capture, 1951. 
 
Area of Capture Quantity (weight cwts) % of Total UK Deep Sea 
Landings by Area of Capture 
Barents Sea 2,943,315 25.1 
Norwegian Coast 666,397 5.7 
Bear Island and Spitzbergen 1,871,421 15.9 
Faroe 558,746 4.8 
North Sea 1,313,596 11.2 
Iceland 2,618,721 22.3 
West of Scotland 554,746 4.7 
West Coast of Greenland 227,392 1.9 
Total UK Deep-Sea Catch 11,735,343 91.6 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics, 1951. (HMSO: London, 1952). 
 
 Distant-water fishing interests were also politically organised. This was facilitated by its 
commercial nature, industrial scale and geographical concentration in the large ports in England 
and Wales. In 1951, 88 per cent by weight and 81 per cent by value of total UK deep-sea 
landings were made into the three ports of Hull, Grimsby and Fleetwood.107 In Scotland, the 
deep-sea fleet operated out of Aberdeen with over 70% of Scottish landings from steam trawlers 
landed into this port in 1951.108 Representative groups included the British Trawler’s Federation 
(BTF), the British Fishermen’s Federation (BFF) and National Federation of Fishermen’s 
Organization (NFFO). The economic value of the fleet in terms of its landings, capital assets and 
employment in the catching and onshore ancillary sectors, led to the UK Government viewing 
distant-water fishing interests as representative of the UK fishing industry. The economic 
dominance and political organisation of the distant-water fleet enabled the local interests 
attached to the sector to influence and define UK national fisheries policy. 
 The ability of the distant-water fleet to shape UK policy was strengthened by its alignment 
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with wider UK maritime interests. On 18 December 1951, the ICJ found in favour of Norway. 
Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary for the third time, called for a policy re-set to consider how the 
UK could benefit from extending fishing limits. In a Cabinet Memo, Eden argued that the new 
‘Hague Court Principle’ could be used to increase considerably the area over which the UK 
Government could claim jurisdiction. Eden’s argument was two pronged. Firstly, prior to the 
ICJ’s ruling several other countries had adopted the principle of extension. He noted “evidence 
of support for the principle in Court and internationally and that Britain’s ability to resist and 
influence this was weak, even within the Commonwealth.”109 The UK would be better able to 
exert influence by applying the principle in a “moderate and conservative fashion”. 110 
  Secondly, Eden proposed use of the principle – the measuring of territorial waters by 
baselines - as a tool to reconcile domestic pressure in Scotland. Like the Icelandic and the 
Norwegians, Scottish inshore fishermen had long resented the presence of foreign trawlers in the 
Moray Firth, the Minch and the Firth of Forth. The White Fish Authority (WFA) and the Scottish 
Office had lobbied central government to enact measures to protect inshore fishermen from 
competition with larger, foreign trawlers. The issue was presented as one of conservation and not 
competition in that the deep-water trawling equipment of the foreign vessels damaged the 
important shallow waters and sea beds that housed important spawning masses. The use of 
baselines under the ICJ ruling would rectify this as large tracts of inshore waters would come 
under national sovereignty because of the heavily indented coastline of the UK and Scotland. 
In comparison to the politically organised and economically dominant distant-water fleet 
based in England, outside of the port of Aberdeen the Scottish fishing fleet was predominantly 
made up of small vessels that fished in the inshore and offshore waters of the UK (Table 3.3). 
The ownership structure of the Scottish fleet was also different with vessels primarily owned by 
families or through share-partnerships from within local communities. The vessels were smaller, 
often under 40ft and employed higher levels of labour to capital. The Scottish offshore fleet was 
largely made up of sail vessels, motor vessels, steam drifters or liners as opposed to the more 
powerful steam trawlers. Of 14,531 registered as full and part-time employees in the Scottish 
fishing industry in 1951, only 2,025 (14%) worked on steam trawlers.111 Political organization by 
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Scottish fishing interests was made harder by the geographical dispersion of the fleet around the 
heavily indented Scottish coastline.  
 
Table 3.3 Scottish vessels by port, 1951 
 















All districts 3,458 4 206 12 2,097 683 22- 
Eyemouth 61 - - - 36 25 - 
Leith 134 - 33 - 50 49 2 
Anstruthur 111 - - 4 69 38 - 
Arbroath 96 - - - 58 24 2 
Aberdeen 278 4 173 7 70 65 - 
Peterhead 152 - - - 86 85 - 
Fraserburgh 162 - - - 77 83 - 
Macduff 165 - - - 82 92 - 
Buckie 119 - - - 27 106 - 
Lossiemouth 128 - - - 22 28 - 
Helmsdale 65 - - - 34 52 3 
Wick 129 - - - 73 34 4 
Stornoway 603 - - - 450 34 119 
Loch Broom 101 - - - 79 4 18 
Kyle 160 - - - 97 35 38 
Oban 64 - - - 58 2 4 
Campbeltown 106 - - - 72 30 4 
Tarbet 54 - - - 38 13 3 
Ayr 169 - - - 116 42 11 
Orkney 377 - - - 364 1 12 
Shetland 224 -  -- 139 8 - 
Source: Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistics 1951. (HMSO: Edinburgh, 1952): Table 20, p59. 
 
On 22 July 1952, a memorandum was submitted to the Cabinet by the Secretary of State 
for the Co-ordination of Transport, Fuel and Power, the First Lord of the Admiralty and the 
Ministry of Transport.112 Eden’s moderate and progressive approach was rejected and an 
argument was advanced that UK policy on the width of territorial waters “should be defined by 
her existence as a great naval and maritime power and not as a coastal state”.113 UK defence 
interests were defined by maximum freedom of movement. The joint memo argued that the costs 
of supporting The Hague Principle were far reaching and would disadvantage the Royal Navy 
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and UK commercial shipping interests.114 UK defence interests would be further harmed as 
sovereignty over the seas carried equal sovereignty over the air above.  
The memo pointed out that 90% of total UK landings came from distant-waters in the 
offshores of foreign countries. Therefore, “any advantage pertaining to inshore interests would 
be undermined by substantial losses as deep-sea trawlers were excluded from distant 
grounds”.115 Further to the memorandum, on 29 July 1952 the Ministry of Defence submitted a 
commissioned report to the Cabinet outlining the negative military impact of extended 
jurisdiction. It argued that the Royal Navy would be hampered in war as the use of straits would 
become impeded as countries extended sovereignty. With the protection of local Scottish fishing 
interests coming up against the combined political and economic weight of the Admiralty and 
UK commercial shipping interests, the Cabinet concluded: “the substantially wider naval, 
maritime, aviation and deep-water fishing interests should not be subordinate to much narrower 
Scottish opinion.”116 
 
 UK distant-water fishing, defence and shipping interests underwrote the UK Government’s 
rejection of extended fisheries limits as a tool for stock conservation. This materialised in 1952 
when on March 19 the Icelandic Government extended its territorial limits by applying the 
baselines principle. This prohibited trawling and seine-netting within the enclosed area with 
access only permitted to local inshore vessels. The Icelandic extension of territorial waters to 4 
miles was shaped by two factors. The first was scientific advice from the International Council 
for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) that the Faxa Bay area and the shallow waters off the 
coast of Iceland were important nursery grounds for domestic stocks in the North Atlantic, in 
particular for the heavily exploited cod stocks further off the Icelandic shore. ICES commented 
that trawling activity in the areas had led to the destruction of spawning beds and spawning 
biomasses.117 In 1946 ICES proposed that Faxa Bay - an indent of water running 30 miles along 
the southeast Icelandic coastline - should be closed for an experimental ten-year period.  
 Secondly, with the 1951 ICJ ruling on the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries dispute awarding 
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them legal precedent, the Icelandic Government argued that they had a moral entitlement to 
implement baselines because of the dependence of the Icelandic economy on fisheries resources. 
As of 2008, fish and fish-related products made up 75 per cent of Iceland’s export earnings.118 
Economic and conservation arguments became intertwined, with Iceland arguing that urgent 
conservation measures such as the extension and the ban were required for long-term economic 
prosperity. The Norwegian and Icelandic extensions references to the dependence of littoral local 
populations on fisheries resources were representative of a wider trend at the time to foster a 
factual relationship between coastal states and adjacent seas based on proximity to, and a social 
and economic dependence upon, coastal waters. This argument can be identified in the 1945 
Truman Proclamation that stressed a physical and social-economic connection between the coast 
and sea beds. It stated that the: “effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve these resources 
would be contingent upon cooperation and protection from the shore, since the continental shelf 
may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation…. self-protection 
compels the coastal nation to keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of the 
nature necessary for utilization of these resources”.119 
 Following legal advice, the UK Government chose not to fight the Icelandic extension on 
legal grounds. The Cabinet accepted the FCO’s recommendation that on account of “a 
regrettable tendency” on the part of the ICJ to be influenced by non-jurisdictional considerations 
such as economic and social dependency, it was better to avoid further harm to UK prestige with 
another failure in The Hague.120 Instead, the decision was taken to contest the conservation basis 
of the Icelandic argument. In building a case against the 1952 Icelandic extension of territorial 
waters, the UK Government made use of scientific data, specifically superficial catch data to 
undermine the argument that stocks around Iceland were showing signs of over-exploitation and 
that the Icelandic economy, in terms of its fish supplies, had been negatively affected.121 The 
FCO produced landings data to demonstrate that over the period 1936-38 and 1953-55 Icelandic 
demersal landings had increased two-fold. The FCO pointed out that Icelandic landings had 
increased relative to the landings of all other countries that fished in the area. It argued that any 
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impact from over-fishing was due to Icelandic fishing effort and if Iceland was concerned with 
conservation it could mitigate against this by decreasing Icelandic fishing effort. The UK 
Government argued that increased landings were evidence that the stocks were not being over-
exploited and pointed to haddock catches per unit of capacity increasing 50% 1930-38 to 1946-
49.122 
 
Table 3.4 Average landings by country from Icelandic coastlines, 1936-38 to 1953-
55 
 
 Average annual landings 1936-38 Average annual landings 1953-55 
 Quantity 
(million kg) 
Percentage of total 
landings from area 
Quantity 
(million kg) 
Percentage of total 
landings from area 
Iceland  149 31 384 45 
United Kingdom 175 37 225 26 
Germany 117 24 200 23 
Other 37 8 48 6 
All Countries 478 100 857 100 
Source: TNA (1958) CAB 21/2762, Territorial Waters and the Law of the Sea, ‘Icelandic Fisheries 
Dispute’, FCO No. 105 INTEL, 29 May 1958, p.1. 
 
 What the UK Government failed to appreciate was that landings can be sustained and even 
increased while stocks declined. This was facilitated by greater effort per unit of catch or the 
application of new technology that enabled catch per unit of effort to increase. The UK also 
failed to consider that ICES had identified Icelandic coastal waters as important nursery grounds 
for incoming year classes. Therefore, increasing landings of adult fish did not necessarily mean 
that the future year classes, current juveniles, were sustainable. In 1952, scientific data was used 
in a superficial manner to support an already ingrained political position as opposed to providing 
advice and evidence as a basis for policy-making. The outcome was that the UK Government 
positioned itself against stock conservation as justification for the extension of fishing limits. 
This spawned from its understanding that extensions would bring the UK negligible benefits but 
high costs for the economically and politically dominant distant-water fishing and for defence 
interests. 
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The 1964 extension of UK fishing limits 
 
 This section argues that the decision to extend UK fishing limits in 1964 was forced by 
changing international and domestic circumstances that altered the associated costs and benefits 
to the UK from extending maritime jurisdiction. The extension of fishing limits represented a 
tool to reconcile local domestic tension within the national fishing industry. It was also an 
internationally strategic decision designed to protect dominant military interests.  
 
 In 1964, the UK Government introduced the Fishery Limits Act. This had the intent and 
effect of securing exclusive UK national access to over 20,000sq miles of offshore waters. The 
Act allowed for this appropriation in two ways. In accordance with the 1951 Hague Ruling and 
the subsequent 1958 Geneva Convention, UK territorial waters became measured by baselines. 
This limited foreign access to a significant number of bays and inlets by drawing straight lines up 
to 24 miles in length across prominent landmarks particularly in Scotland.123 The UK 
Government then established a 12-mile fishery zone measured from the baselines. Access to the 
first 6-miles was exclusively restricted to UK nationals. Within 6-12 miles of the UK coastline, 
nationals of countries party to the European Fisheries Convention were granted access but were 
subject to UK legislation.   
 The first factor that influenced the extension of UK fishing limits in 1964 was growing 
local political pressure in Scotland. From the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian fisheries dispute to the 
formation of UK policy for the 1958 LOS Conference, the archives indicate that the Scottish 
fishing interests were marginalized within the UK fisheries policy-making process. From 1951, 
Scottish interests had supported an extension of UK territorial waters to protect inshore waters 
from foreign trawlers. The Territorial Waters Committee (TWC) – a government committee 
formed explicitly to consider maritime jurisdiction – rejected the Scottish inshore interests by 
placing them in the wider context of the UK’s maritime interest. In a TWC paper ‘Review of UK 
Policy’, 30 November 1959, it was stated that any advantage gained by the inshore industry 
would be offset by the disadvantages incurred elsewhere due to the “negligible economic 
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contribution of the [inshore] industry”.124 
 By the 1960s, the ability of the inshore interests to influence central government had 
increased considerably. This was driven by improvements in political organisation, the use of 
official channels such as the Scottish Office and politicization of the issue by the Scottish 
National Party (SNP). A letter from the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries Scotland 
(DAFS) to the Scottish Office, 21 October 1960, outlined that ever since the government had 
affirmed its support for three-mile territorial waters, the Conservative Governments had come 
under intermittent fire from the SNP for “allowing the interests of Scotland to be suppressed to 
those of England.”125 Prior to this in March 1959, the SNP had submitted a six-point 
memorandum to the Committee of Inquiry into the Fishing Industry calling for the restoration of 
a 15th-17th century Scottish claim of territorial waters out to 12 miles or for the establishment of a 
12 mile exclusive fishing zone.126  
 The political sensitivity of the issue increased in 1959 as a Scottish political consensus was 
formed on the issue. John Smith, SNP Party Secretary wrote to Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan, 24 November 1959, to highlight that while the SNP’s campaign for extended 
jurisdiction had been resisted by other Scottish political parties, the Scottish Unionist Party, and 
Scottish Liberal and Labour Ministers had “come round to the SNP view that straight baselines 
are essential in determining Scottish territorial waters.”127 Smith proposed that the Prime 
Minister “put forward proposals to give effect to this unanimous Scottish opinion”.128 Though 
the SNP’s proposition was rebuffed, the Cabinet was aware of the growing pressure in Scotland, 
with a note entitled ‘Scottish Fishing Interests’ 28 May 1959, stating that policy on UK fishing 
limits had taken on “nationalist connotations”.129 The Scottish Office commented in a LOS 
Committee meeting that the “propaganda” of the inshore industry was attracting considerable 
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attention at home and aboard which the government attributed to the work of the SNP and a 
belief that the inshore industry had the ear of the media.130 
 Scottish inshore interests also became better organized. Compared to the well-represented 
and resourced distant-water sector that operated out of the major fishing ports in England and 
Wales, inshore fishing interests initially lacked strong political representation. This was 
influenced by the size of the industry, the more solitary nature of fishing operations and its 
sporadic distribution around the coast. In 1962, inshore fishing interests amalgamated into a 
single voice – spear-headed by the Scottish Inshore Fishermen’s Association and the Clyde 
Fishermen’s Association – to lobby government.131  The group wrote to the Secretary of State for 
Scotland calling for an extension to UK territorial and fishing limits.132 The letter argued that 
“due to recent developments in the international scene and the encroachment of trawlers off the 
Scottish coast…the balance of advantage to British fishermen has altered and the time has come 
when the British Government must take steps to protect the legitimate interest of its own 
citizens”.133 The letter led to a meeting between the group and the Secretary of State at which the 
issues of territorial waters and a 6-mile exclusive fishing zone to protect inshore fishing gear and 
promote stock conservation were discussed.134 The Scottish Office became an effective line of 
communication for the Scottish industry to central UK Government. On 14 December 1962, the 
Secretary of State for Scotland wrote to the LOS Committee outlining the pressure in Scotland 
and stated that that the government “can no longer go on stalling about the future British policy 
on fishing limits”.135  
 Despite this, the decision by the UK Government to stress publically that an eventual 
extension to UK fishing limits in 1964 was not related to stock conservation highlighted the 
continued influence of distant-water fishing interests in national policy making. In the first 
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reading of the Bill in the House of Commons, on 15 June 1964, Parliament argued that “the sole 
motivation in taking this decision was to secure more scope for our own fishermen in the waters 
around our coasts…to secure for inshore fisherman a wider area in which they can conduct their 
operations without interference from foreign vessels.”136 A key motivation identified was 
“international changes out with the government’s control”.137 Similarly, the LOS Committee 
outlined that “the main effects of extending fishery limits is not so much to conserve the fish as 
to enable our fishermen to catch more while fishermen of other countries catch less.”138 
 The 1964 Fishery Bill was designed to improve the government’s relationship with 
Scottish fishing interests. Though the Bill gave the government the power to regulate and control 
fishing effort within 12-miles of its coast, it had no intention to do so in toto.  While foreign 
activity would be limited, the Commons debate showed that the government intended to use this 
displacement to facilitate an increase in the number of UK nationals fishing in this area, with a 
focus on increasing fishing activity in the Highland areas.139  
 The government’s openness in defining its motivation for the Bill was also a tactical 
decision designed to protect the UK Government’s negotiating position and the UK distant-water 
fleet against further extensions of fishing limits. The government was concerned with the 
“dangers in attempting to justify an extension by reference to conservation since it might give the 
Icelanders and others a pretext for advancing claims for further extensions of their own limits on 
pseudo-conservation grounds.”140 A LOS Committee meeting that considered a paper entitled 
‘Effects of the Extensions of UK Fishery Limits on Conservation’ decided that the preferred 
route was to avoid a justification of the Bill on conservation grounds as this would protect the 
distant-water fleet from further extensions elsewhere.141 In the House of Commons debate on the 
Bill, it was put forward that the UK “[did] not accept conservation as justification for other 
countries extending their limits and we do not claim it today in justification of the Bill”.142 
 This tactic of rejecting conservation as a reason for extending jurisdiction enabled the UK 
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Government to continue to insist internationally that conservation would not be best served by 
extensions of national jurisdiction over sea areas but by international cooperation over common 
pool resources. This allowed the UK Government to resist further extensions of jurisdiction over 
deeper waters.  
 
UK negotiation strategy for the Second Law of the Sea Conference 1960 
  
The creation of the 12-mile UK fishing zone in 1964 was used to appease growing 
Scottish political pressure. However, this section argues that UK Government support for 12-
mile fishing limits had in fact been established in preparation for the Second LOS Conference in 
1960 (LOS II). The UK’s agreement to exclusive fishing zones out to 12-miles represented a 
trade-off in the UK’s negotiation position for LOS II in which defence interests trumped distant-
water fishing interests.  
In the run up to LOS II, UK officials met with traditional allies to gain support for 
retaining narrow limits to territorial waters. The aim was to discuss the detrimental impacts 
extended limits would have on maritime activities such as defence and commerce. Through this 
process, the UK Government became aware that countries such as Belgium and Canada did not 
share the UK’s need to secure narrow territorial waters for defence and commercial interests. It 
also became clear that several nations prioritised fishing interests over defence interests.143 
Following a meeting of nation states in Ottawa, Canada on 11 March 1959, the UK Government 
understood that many countries were planning to support 12-mile territorial waters not for 
defence purposes but because this offered “the surest way to extend their exclusive fishing 
rights”.144 
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This realisation led to a policy re-set and a shift in the UK Government’s position on both 
territorial water and fishing limits. The UK’s Territorial Waters Committee published a paper on 
23 June 1959 entitled ‘Law of the Sea: Review of Policy and Tactics’. This set out the UK 
Government’s tactic to move away from supporting a 3-mile limit to territorial waters.145 This 
was part of a strategy to separate out the issues of territorial waters and fishing limits so that the 
former would not be used to deliver the latter. In agreement with the US, the UK would support 
an extension of territorial waters up to 6-miles in a bid to stem the international trend towards 
12-mile territorial waters and ensure the 1960 conference produced an agreement.146 The Cabinet 
defined the objective for LOS II as being “to secure a universally acceptable rule which would 
provide for no more than a six-mile territorial sea.”147 The UK would concede on fishing limits 
to secure a narrower territorial sea.   
 
This concession represented a willingness on the part of the Cabinet to supress domestic 
distant-water fishing interests so as to increase its bargaining space in international negotiations. 
This approach is evident in the construction of fishing concessions. In this period, the ability of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) to influence the UK Cabinet declined. For the 
TW Committee paper ‘Law of the Sea: UK Review of Policy and Tactics’, MAF argued that to 
protect UK fishing interests any extension of national fishing limits had to allow access for 
foreign vessels on grounds of historical rights with a phase-out period of 10 years.148 This would 
allow the UK distant-water fleet reciprocal access to the fishing zones of the nations it had 
previously fished off. MAF’s position was that short-term access rights would have to be secured 
if the LOS II agreement was to be acceptable to the distant-water industry.   
The issue facing MAF was that in November 1959 US officials had outlined to the UK 
Government that the concept of historical access rights would not gain support at the conference 
and a six-mile territorial water and further six-mile exclusive fishing zone should be pursued.149 
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Despite a MAF warning that this would “carry significant political consequences”, MAF was 
unable to influence the Cabinet’s position.150 MAF’s influence was further diminished when the 
UK Government was unable to gain sufficient support for 6+6 negotiation at LOS II and the 
Cabinet sanctioned a 9-mile limit to territorial waters without consulting with MAF or the 
industry. Strategically, side-stepping MAF and the industry, retaining decision-making within 
the Cabinet gave the UK delegation at LOS II a larger bargaining space as consulting with MAF 
or the industry would have limited the options available to the government. The 9-mile territorial 
water concession was ultimately unsuccessful as the 1960 LOS Conference failed to reach an 
agreement by one vote thus leaving the question of territorial waters and fishing limits 




The 1964 Fishery Limits Bill was the first piece of UK Government legislation to address 
the issue of fishing limits since the Sea Fisheries Act of 1883. Prior to this, legislation had 
focused on encouraging the industry to expand through grants and loans.151 The decision to 
extend national jurisdiction over offshore-waters was shaped by the intention of securing 
national access to the fisheries resources within. The decision was not directly influenced by a 
concern for the health of stocks, a desire to limit fishing pressure upon the stocks or an attempt to 
rationalize the fishing industry’s labour and capital inputs.  UK policy on the national fishing 
limits over 1945-64 was instead shaped by domestic and international pressures. The extension 
to fishing limits in 1964 represented a concession to Scottish political pressures and a strategic 
move to protect commercial and military navigational freedoms. The process of policy-making 
in this period also represented the beginning of a trend in UK LOS negotiation tactics whereby 
support for extended fishing limits was used as a trade-off to secure what the Cabinet deemed to 
be economically and politically more substantive interests.  
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3.3 UK policy at the Third Law of the Sea Conference (1973-82): The concept 
of Exclusive Economic Zones  
 
 This section argues that the UK Government’s agreement to the concept of a 200-mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for fisheries resources at the Third LOS Conference was 
shaped primarily by changes in the UK energy scene in the 1960s and 1970s. The UK 
Government agreed to support the concept of 200- mile EEZs for fisheries resources as part of a 
deal that would give the UK maximum jurisdiction over the seabed and the hydrocarbon 
resources within. It is argued that the UK Government consciously traded off UK fishing rights 
to secure exclusive rights to the oil resources around Rockall. 
 With the ICJ ruling in favour of the 1958 extension of Icelandic fishing limits to 12-miles 
and with no agreement reached at LOS II, a further round of unilateral extensions took place in 
the 1960s. In 1967, 40 coastal states claimed a territorial sea of 12-miles and 17 a jurisdiction out 
to 200 miles.152 Gradually the concept of extended state jurisdiction over fisheries began to 
crystalize into customary international law.153 The continuing lack of international consensus on 
the legal rights of states in marine spaces and the limitations of the 1958 Conventions in 
providing a robust legal regime led to calls for a Third LOS Conference (LOS III).154 The first 
session of the LOS III convened in New York in December 1973 with the ambition of  preparing 
a single, comprehensive convention to guide nation states in the use of the seas. Eleven sessions 
were held between 1973 and 1982 and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and 
the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (hereafter the UN Seabed 
Committee) held six sessions over 1971-73 and acted as a preparatory body for the Conference. 
 The Conference was split into three committees: the first dealt with the international 
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regime and institutions for the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; the second with 
the territorial seas, straits, the economic zone, access to the sea and the continental shelf; and the 
third committee addressed issues of pollution and marine technology. The Convention, 
provisionally adopted by the Delegation on 30 April 1982, represented an integral package 
agreement across the committees. Almost four decades after the Truman Proclamation of 1945 
had initiated discussions on the issue of national jurisdiction over the seas and its fisheries 
resources, a new international regime of nation-based access rights was created.  
 One of the most recognizable concepts of UNCLOS was that of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ). Article 55 of the Convention defined the legal definition of the EEZ as: “an area 
beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea…under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal 
State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this 
Convention.” UNCLOS granted coastal states “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the 
waters superajacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.”155 From a coastal states 
baseline, territorial waters extended out to 12-miles and the EEZ out to 200-miles. The extension 
of national jurisdiction out to 200-miles enclosed approximately 90 per cent of global fish stocks 
under a new property regime analogous to that of private property. 
 
UK Energy Policy and the Third Law of the Sea Conference 1973-1982 
 
 The UK Government’s acceptance of the EEZ concept during the Third LOS Conference - 
translated into national primary legislation through the 1976 Fishery Limits Act - represented a 
significant shift in UK policy.156 A certain inevitability surrounded this. By 1974 international 
opinion had begun to galvanize behind the EEZ concept and, in a bid to protect itself in the fall-
out of a lost fight, the UK fishing industry moved to favour national fishing limits. In April 1974, 
the FCO argued that “[the EEZ concept] would deprive us of our distant-water fishing grounds. 
There has however been pressure from the industry that we should pronounce in favour of 200-
mile fishing limits lest we get the worst of both worlds by losing our distant water interests while 
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being unable to protect our interests in home waters.”157 This created political space for a shift in 
the position of the government with the MAF Minister stating that “it would be in our interests to 
support this concept”.158 This position was put forward despite awareness that the UK would not 
have exclusive rights to fish in the waters 200-miles off its coastline because of geographical and 
existing treaty obligations, notably its membership of the European Economic Community 
(EEC). 
 This section argues that the UK Government’s decision to support the EEZ concept 
occurred before the Third LOS Conference and, as such, pre-dated both MAF and the UK fishing 
industry’s support for the concept. Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPO) papers - the 
Committee responsible for UK policy for the UN Seabed Committee and the Third LOS 
Conference – and Cabinet discussions over 1971-73 are used to argue that this policy shift was 
not shaped by the potential of ownership as a solution to overfishing or by a desire to capture the 
commercial benefits that could flow to the fishing industry from controlling access to offshore 
waters and the fish stocks within. The significant reversal in the UK’s international and domestic 
fisheries policy was instead forced by changes in the UK fuel and power scene in the 1960s and 
1970s.  
Despite efforts by the government to protect the domestic coal industry from the 
competitive effects of oil’s price advantage, from 1950 to 1970 UK crude oil imports increased 
tenfold and by 1969, oil had captured 40 per cent of the UK’s energy market.159 A memorandum 
by the Minister of Technology of 12 October 1970, revealed concern over the increased cost of 
imported oil on the country’s balance of payments - with net oil imports of £400million in 1968 - 
and perceived security of supply fears as 80 per cent of the UK’s oil supplies came from the 
Middle East and North Africa.160  
The Ministry of Power’s 1965 ‘Fuel Policy’ White Paper outlined that the economic 
benefits of North Sea oil and gas were not yet fully realised. The White Paper was conscious that 
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the “discovery of oil and natural gas in the North Sea could help to alleviate the UK’s reliance on 
imported oil”, with the White Paper projecting the balance of payments bill for imported oil to 
rise to £600 million by 1970.161 The White Paper emphasized that in 1965 “major uncertainty 
about the availability of natural gas from under the North Sea” existed and that government 
policy towards North Sea oil remained in an exploratory phase.162 
In contrast, by 1970 the Minister of Technology foresaw the introduction of North Sea 
gas as bringing “big economic benefits” with the industry estimated to produce up to 4,000 cubic 
feet a day by the mid-1970s.163 In a 1974 policy paper ‘North Sea Oil Policy’, the Secretary of 
State for Energy projected annual oil production forecasts to rise to 100-140 million tons per 
annum by 1980, with this increasing across the decade to 100-150 million tons.164 With prices 
remaining high, annual pre-tax profits were estimated at £3,000 million.165  
It was the UK Government’s position on the distribution of seabed territory for LOS III 
that redefined the UK’s marine interests away from that of a maritime, distant-water fishing 
nation. The UK’s position on jurisdiction over the seabed came into focus for the government 
over 1971-73 following the publication of a 1971 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) report 
on prospective resources in the shelf surrounding Rockall and was shaped by its geographical 
and geological position. The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf awarded coastal states 
sovereign rights over their continental shelves “to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to 
wherever the depth of the superajacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural 
resources”.166 As the areas of the North Sea, the English Channel and the Irish Sea allocated to 
the UK were at a depth of less than 200-meters, domestic oil interests had been protected. With 
the advent of new technology permitting exploitation of the seabed at depths far greater than 
200-meters and a DTI assessment of an “excellent prospect of finding hydrocarbon resources 
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around Rockall”, from 1970 the Cabinet was no longer satisfied with the 1958 Convention in 
delimiting seabed jurisdiction.167 
 
Table 3.5. UK Landings (Demersal and Pelagic) by Region of Capture in 1971 
Region of Capture England and Wales Scotland UK Total 
Cwts (000) £’000 Cwts (000) £’000 Cwts (000) £’000 
Distant-waters (outside 200-miles of Britain) 
Norwegian Coast 558 3,336 1 2 571 3403 
Barents Sea 880 6,404 29 168 909 6,572 
Iceland 3,000 23,030 73 480 3,073 23,510 
Faroes 130 910 327 2,249 457 3,159 
Bear Island and 
Spitzbergen 
98 732 0 0 98 732 
West and South of 
Ireland 
7 61 0 0 7 61 
Rockall 2 12 68 408 60 480 
West and East Coast 
of Greenland and 
Labrador 
92 670 0 0 92 670 
Grand Banks of 
Newfoundland 
159 1,127 0 0 159 1,127 
Total  4,926 36,282 498 3,311 5,426 39,714 
Offshore Waters (within 200 miles of Britain) 
North Sea 2,781 19,223 4,631 23,372 7,412 42,595 
West Coast of 
Scotland 
117 1,176 3,507 10,853 3,678 12,029 
English and Bristol 
Channel 
356 2,134 0 0 356 2,134 
Total  3,254 22,533 8,138 34,225 11,446 56,758 
Source: UK Sea Fishing Statistics 1971. (HMSO: London, 1982). 
 
The UK Government used its position on 200-mile fishing limits as a strategic 
compromise to secure maximum economic jurisdiction over the seabed and hydrocarbon 
resources within. Despite an increasingly clear direction of travel for wide fishing limits at an 
international level, up until 1973 the UK Government and most of the UK fishing industry 
remained in support of narrow fishing limits. This was defined as a policy priority of the DOPO 
Committee up until March 1973. The rationale for this, set out in a note by the MAF of 18 
January 1972, was the UK fishing industry’s “reliance on fishing off other nation’s coasts rather 
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than within inshore British waters”.168 In a brief for the UN Seabed Committee sessions, 30 
October 1972, the stated objective was to press for an agreement which allowed coastal states to 
make preferential claims to fisheries resources outside an exclusive 12-mile national fishing zone 
as this concession would allow UK vessels some access to distant-waters.169 The notion of the 
industry’s ‘reliance’ on access to distant-waters can be challenged. While Table 1.3 highlights 
that in 1971 the English and Welsh sectors of the UK fleet were reliant on fishing in distant-
waters (around 60% of their catch by weight and value came from distant-water fishing), at a 
UK-level almost 60% of the total catch by value and almost 70% by weight came from offshore 
fishing regions within the 200-miles of UK shores. This indicates that the formation of UK 
policy on fishing limits was still dominated by distant-water fishing interests in England and 
Wales.  
In March 1973, the UK Government’s position on fishing limits was significantly altered 
as it became aware that its position on retaining access rights for distant-water fishermen could 
undermine the newly-dominant domestic interest in oil and gas resources in the continental shelf. 
This policy shift is evident in a series of exchanges between the MAF and the Treasury. A MAF 
memorandum argued that UK tactics should continue to treat national distant-water fishing rights 
as a priority in the international negotiations.170 The MAF paper was received coldly by the 
Treasury. In a note on the ‘Law of the Sea’ 6 of March 1973, the Treasury argued that the 
“authors were too preoccupied with the immediate problem of the Icelandic Cod War” and that it 
“attached too much importance to the objective of securing a positive outcome for the UK 
fishing industry”.171 The Treasury’s position had been influenced by the DTI assessment of 
hydrocarbons on the continental shelf surrounding the UK. The assessment led the Treasury to 
conclude: “hydrocarbons now represent the major economic interest [for LOS III]” and ‘if 
conflict between these objectives [UK distant-water fishing and oil rights] does arise there can 
surely be no doubt that we should be prepared to sacrifice our-distant water fishing rights”.172  
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This assertion redefined the UK’s primary interest in the economic uses of the seas. The 
ascension of domestic oil interests had swung the spotlight of policy-making for the LOS process 
away from the maintenance of fishing and navigational freedoms. In DOPO meeting (74) 1, in a 
paper entitled ‘Law of the Sea Policy: Fishery Limits’, it was agreed that “Ministers should wish 
to take decisions on fisheries policy in the context of our overall objective at the Law of the Sea 
Conference.”173 The DOPO Committee settled its position in support of the EEZ concept and in 
November 1973, MAF was instructed to begin confidential talks with fishing industry leaders to 
develop a strategy for the future of the industry.174  
 
The decision to support the EEZ concept at a domestic level allowed the UK Government 
the bargaining space it required internationally to achieve its objective of maximum jurisdiction 
over the seabed. In a DOPO Committee meeting of 2 July 1970, the UK Government concluded 
that its position for the UN Sea Bed Committee and LOS III would be to support national 
jurisdiction on the seabed out to 200-miles.175 Up to this point the UK Government had assumed 
that jurisdiction of the valuable seabed around Rockall would be secured by recognition of UK 
sovereignty over Rockall. In 1955, a team of naval officers had attempted to stake the UK 
Government’s claim to the island by cementing a brass plaque on the island and hoisting the 
Union Flag. It was through this claim of sovereignty over Rockall - and subsequent jurisdiction 
out to 200-miles on the surrounding continental shelf - that the UK Government aimed to control 
the resources of the plateau embracing Rockall, the bank to the North-West and the area in 
between. 
The UK Government was forced to reconsider its support for a 200-mile definition to 
seabed jurisdiction as the UN Seabed Committee moved towards a position whereby uninhabited 
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islands would not be awarded their own EEZ. The DOPO Committee set up a working group to 
report on the UK’s economic interests at the LOS Conference. This concluded that “further 
discussions have shown that our primary economic interest lies in securing jurisdiction over 
mineral resources out to the edge of the continental margin”.176 To secure exclusive rights to the 
oil resources around Rockall, the UK Government agreed to support a limit to national 
jurisdiction on the seabed out to the continental margin - later known as the ‘Irish Formula’.  
For the negotiating block of developing countries at LOS III (G-77) to support seabed 
jurisdiction out to the continental margin, the UK Government knew it would have to support a 
200-mile EEZ for fisheries. The Working Group’s report to the Committee stated that “following 
the DTI note on the probability of hydrocarbon deposits on our continental shelf and margin, it is 
clear that this is our major economic interest at stake” and that “to secure agreement of the 
Group of 77 to modify the EEZ concept in this respect [secure definition of seabed jurisdiction 
out to continental margin]; this will require our acquiescence to a 200-mile fishery zone”.177 
This process represented an important trade-off for the G-77 as well as the UK Government and 
the other coastal states desiring maximum control over offshore hydrocarbons. The Group of 77 
was a conglomerate of developing states acting as a unified negotiating block during the nine 
sessions of the LOS III process.178 The wider the limits to coastal state jurisdiction over the 
seabed, the less left for the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to govern. Influenced by the 
Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo’s famous speech to the UN General Assembly 1 Nov 1967 
calling for the seas and sea bed areas outside national jurisdiction to be defined as the ‘common 
heritage of mankind’ and distributed to help close the gap between rich and poor nations, 
UNCLOS created the ISA. Hope-Thompson (1980) estimated that that an estimated 98 per cent  
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of seabed petroleum supplies lay within the continental margin.179 The ISA has hitherto been 
principally concerned with governing the exploitation of manganese nodules that lie outside the 
Continental Shelf.  
In negotiations over the size and rules for EEZs, the UK also placed oil interests ahead of 
those of fishing. The DOPO Committee agreed that EEC policy should reflect a ‘common 
European position’ to maximise the chances of seeking the Irish Formula accepted at the LOS 
conference. To foster this common position, the UK Government fostered the notion of a 
‘pooling of resources’ to encourage the other EEC countries to form a uniform position on the 
EEZ concept and the Irish Formula. Offering the EEC countries access to the UK EEZ would 
have been a strong pull for the EEC as 60 per cent of Community catches were taken in the 
prospective UK 200-mile EEZ.180 The Committee stated that while the government would be 
willing to do this for future fishery resources, “this would of course not be acceptable for subsoil 
oil resources”.181 This tactic was employed despite a warning from the FCO that it would 
“effectively nullify any commercial benefit to be gained from a 200-mile exclusive fishery for 
the UK”.182 The intention of the UK Government was to play upon the ‘common access’ 
principle of the EEC’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) to gain support across Europe and then 
re-negotiate the conditions of the CFP following the conference. As was noted in the FCO 
“British policy as approved by Ministers is to seek modifications to the CFP following the 
conclusion of the Conference to provide preference in favour of the coastal state in its zone in 
matters of fisheries jurisdiction and catch levels.”183 
 
The Third Law of the Sea Conference and UK Defence Interests 
 
International agreements emanating from negotiations in the UN Seabed Committee also 
worked to reduce support for narrow fishing limits from the policy position representing 
aggregate UK marine interests. Central to this was the de-coupling of distant-water fishing and 
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defence interests in that both traditionally supported a narrow limit to national jurisdiction.  This 
came in 1974 with the DOPO Committee announcing that “the defence interest has been 
settled”.184 UK policy for LOS I and II had been shaped by the Admiralty and Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) arguing strongly for narrow limits. The high level of influence that these 
departments exerted over the formation of central UK policy reflected the prioritisation of 
defence interests and the UK Government’s strong identification as an island and trading 
nation.185 In 1974,  the DOPO committee estimated that 98.5 per cent of the UK’s trade by 
weight and 80% by value was transported by sea and in 1974 the UK commercial shipping fleet 
was estimated to be 29 million gross tonnes (MGT).186 This represented 10 per cent of the 
world’s fleet, with the UK ranking third in size after Japan (35MGT) and Liberia (50MGT).187 
The defence interests of the UK and other maritime nations was to retain maximum 
manoeuvrability for ships at sea with this need heightened by the Cold War. The extension of 
territorial waters to 200 miles by Peru, Chile and El Salvador during the 1960s threatened this 
goal. In 1973, UK Ministers agreed to support a 12-mile territorial waters on the understanding 
this would receive a high level of support at UN LOS III. 
A threat to defence and shipping interests remained in the form of growing support for 
the EEZ concept. DOPO Working Group B, charged with examining UK defence interests for 
the UN Seabed Committee and UN LOS III, outlined that UK support for the EEZ concept 
should be on condition of the preservation of freedom of overflight, navigation and the laying of 
submarine cables in the EEZs beyond 12-mile territorial waters. As the DOPO committee noted 
in 1974: “a broad limit to sea bed jurisdiction has always been clearly desirable for our 
petroleum interests. For defence and fishery reasons, we previously favoured narrow limits. But 
now our defence interests can be accommodated within the economic zone, provided this grants 
coastal states rights only in respect of the sea and seabed.”188 With key navigational freedoms 
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188 TNA (1974) CAB 148/139. ‘UK Policy on Territorial Waters’, para 2, p.1. This position was also accepted by the 




protected within the design to the EEZ, UK defence interests were no longer opposed to the 
extension of marine jurisdiction out to 200-miles.  
The result was that overflight and innocent passage clauses were inserted into the 
parameters for EEZs. Retention of these freedoms within another nation’s EEZ was one, if not 
the, key condition stopping a 200-mile EEZ from being virtually indistinguishable from a 200-
mile limit to territorial waters. Coastal states did not have sovereignty within their 200-mile EEZ 
but economic jurisdiction to exploit resources in their waters. This process allowed for the 
alignment of UK defence and hydrocarbon interests for LOS III. The main beneficiary was UK 
defence interests as government discussions indicated that it was prepared to accept an 





The UK Government’s lack of support for conservation as a reason for supporting the 
extension of fishing limits reflected its calculation of the relative costs and benefits for the UK of 
the implementation of such a principle. In terms of the formation of UK Fisheries Department 
policy, national concern for employment in the fishing industry overshadowed international 
concerns for stock conservation. Throughout the period from 1945 to the early 1970s, UK policy 
on fishing limits was influenced primarily by non-fishing marine interests, firstly, by national 
defence and later oil interests with fishing interests only of secondary importance.  
 In the 1950s and 1960s, the costs to defence and distant-water fishing interests of 
maritime restrictions and limits significantly outweighed the benefits expected to flow to the 
offshore Scottish fishing fleet. Yet, by 1973, support for wide fishing limits represented a means 
by which to unlock and secure access to the hydrocarbon resources in the seabed. The UK 
Government’s support for the EEZ concept was not shaped by the potential solution that national 
ownership offered to the problem of over-fishing or the conservation-related benefits of re-
                                                                                                                                                                           
defence requirement will be adequately secured by freedom of navigation an overflight”. TNA (1974) T 224/2092. 
Law of the Sea Fishing Limits Negotiations. Note ‘Law of the Sea Fishing Limits Negotiations’, 9 April. 
189 TNA (1973) CAB 148/135. Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee: Sub-Committee on the Sea; 
Meetings 1-10 and Papers 1-23. A DOPO 73 note, 19 Feb 1973, outlined that if UK defence interests threatened to 
jeopardise the creation of a convention the UK should ratify the agreement because of the “greater relative interest 




defining property rights at sea. The significant switch in its negotiating stance and outlook 
reflected its changed perception of national self-interest. Oil was worth more than fish. 
Over time fishing interests represented by the industry and the government departments 
MAF and DAFS became increasingly marginalised. Nowhere was this more evident than in the 
government’s decision to agree to a European common pool for fish resources to secure the 
agreement of the EEC to a delimitation of sea bed jurisdiction stretching to the continental 
margin. Though the UK industry moved to coalesce behind the EEZ concept in 1974, this 
represented an attempt to protect itself from what it deemed ‘the worst of both worlds.”  The UK 
Government’s decision to support this approach was taken in 1973 without any consultation with 
the MAF or the UK industry leaders and fully aware of the consequences of a 200-mile EEZ for 
the fishing industry. In return, UK negotiators worked to secure an international agreement that 
gave the government greater control of sub-sea hydrocarbon resources. While government 
arbitrated between the differing interests represented by different departments, it (and probably 
the Treasury) was not a neutral participant.  Potential economic benefits won out over sectional 
industrial interests, although the conjunction in Scotland of inshore and offshore fishing interests, 
an important proximity to hydrocarbon resources in the Continental Shelf and its representation 
by a specific Scottish Office assisted the efforts of fishing interests in making their case heard. 
 While concern for conservation significantly increased over the period, the debates driving 
policy shifts were shaped by the relative ascension and descent of specific interests and lobby 
groups’ ability to influence central government. UK Government policy was the outcome of a 
process in which the government acted as an arbitrator between such conflicting interest. The 
ability of key interests to influence government was shaped by interacting international and 
domestic forces. In the case of the changing dominance of fishing interests, the improved 
organization of Scottish interests and use of political channels such as the Scottish Office, paired 
with the gradual expulsion of the distant-water fleet from foreign waters, worked to shift the 






4. The management of UK fishing opportunities between 




The previous chapter examined the extension of international fishing limits and the role 
of domestic fish and energy interests in shaping UK policy. This chapter focuses on the 
development of UK domestic fisheries policy in the period around the introduction of EEZs and 
following the accession of the UK to the EEC. It argues that the primary objective of UK 
fisheries policy in the period 1974-1981 was to maintain employment in the fishing industry. The 
political aim given to the civil service was to managing fishing opportunities in a way that would 
minimise the political and socio-economic costs of fleet contraction that became necessary as 
technical change and falling stocks resulted in over-capacity in the fleet. The primary focus was 
to maintain employment in the catching sector, although consideration of industry-related 
employment in the onshore processing sector also influenced policy decisions. It is argued that 
the political primacy given to this objective constrained policy-makers’ choices when designing 
mechanisms for allocating fishing opportunities by necessitating mechanisms that would deliver 
outcomes that favoured labour over capital inputs. In the period, little account was taken of the 
impact policy choices would have on the economic performance of the fleet or on conservation. 
   
The UK Government’s new requirement to intervene directly in the operations of the 
industry and actively manage fleet activity was influenced by developments at an international 
level. The introduction of EEZs and a developing European fisheries conservation agenda 
created a need to manage a contraction in domestic fishing activity. Article V of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provided a legal mechanism for national 
governments to limit international entry into newly-designated national fishing waters. The 
exclusivity of EEZs provided the opportunity for more effective fisheries management.190 The 
                                                      
190New access conditions increased the likelihood that future benefits of regulation would flow to those incurring the 
short-term costs of conservation. A key determinant of this was the new legal precedence to deny third parties (free-
riders) entry into national fishing zones. Free-rider issues had undermined previous attempts to regulate post-Second 




UK’s fishing limits were extended out to 200-miles through the 1976 Fishery Limits Act. 
However, the UK had not and never would operate an exclusive 200-mile fishing zone. This was 
due to the UK’s geographical proximity to eight other countries (Ireland, France, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Norway and the Faroes Islands). This proximity (less than 
400-miles in distance) required large tracts of the countries’ EEZs to be defined by median lines 
as opposed to 200-miles. 
The exclusivity of UK fishing rights within its EEZ was also determined by membership 
of the EEC and later the European Union (EU). The UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the EEC 
on 1 January 1973.  Article 38 (4) of the 1957 Treaty of Rome contained an intention to establish 
a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (the “establishment of a common agricultural policy 
among the Member States”) with Article 38 (1) defining agricultural products as “the products of 
the soil, of stock-farming and of fisheries”.191 On 30 June 1971 - the day that entry negotiations 
for the UK, Norway, Denmark and Ireland commenced -, the European Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP) (Article 2 Regulation (EEC) No 2141/70) was established by the EEC’s 6 founding 
members.192 The most controversial element of Regulation 2141/70 was the principle of equal 
access that allowed Member States equal access to fellow Member States’ waters. In 1972, the 
Norwegian electorate rejected EEC membership partly due to the access provisions of the CFP. 
In 1974, under Article 100 of the Accession Treaty, the three joining countries negotiated a 
derogation from the principle for 10 years within their existing 6-mile fishing limits. 193   
The derogation delayed the introduction of the CFP’s conservation regime until 1 January 
1983. One of the most well-known components of the conservation regime has been the use of a 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and Quota Regime for commercially important stocks (hereafter 
referred to as the TQR).194 A TAC regulates fishing effort by limiting the amount of fish taken 
from a stock by fishing activity. This is known as fishing mortality. Prior to the introduction of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and the International Whaling Commission (IWC), were binding only on the fleets 
of nations party to the conventions.  
191 European Union, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), March 25, 1957, 
Article 38 (4) and (1). 
192 The founding six members of the EEC were France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. Christopher Barclay, The EU Common Fisheries Policy. House of Commons Research Paper 96/6 
(London: HMSO, 1996), p.6.  
193 Henry Valen, “Norway: ‘No’ To EEC”, Scandinavian Political Studies 8 (1973), pp.214-226.  
194 From 1 January 1983, the CFP operated under a mandate granted under Article 5 of the 1970 CFP Regulation 
2141/70: “Where there is a risk of over-fishing of certain stocks…to adopt the necessary conservation measures” 
with specific reference made to the inclusion of restrictions relating to “the catching of certain species, to areas, to 




the CFP’s TQR in 1983, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) operated a 
TAC for selected European fisheries from 1974-76. From 1977, NEAFC quotas were replaced 
by a series of EEC quota agreements. These aimed to limit fishing effort in new Community 
waters at 1977 levels until the CFP TQR was implemented in 1983.195 The allocation of fishing 
opportunities (the TACs) between Member States was primarily on a historical basis.196 Wise 
(1984) and Holden (1994) both provide a thorough analysis of the negotiation process for the 
CFP allocation system.197 
 
Member States party to the NEAFC, EEC and CFP quota regimes retained key 
competencies that allowed for relatively autonomous national fisheries policies to develop. This 
chapter focuses on the UK Government’s responsibility for managing access to and allocations 
of national shares in TACs.198 This chapter argues that, despite this autonomy, choices made by 
the UK Government regarding access and quota management were shaped primarily by a need to 
manage declining opportunities. From the mid-1970s through the 1980s, TACs for commercially 
important stocks almost continually declined with significant declines for certain key 
commercial stocks such as haddock and cod triggering policy changes.  
The downward trend in fishing opportunities reflected the introduction of quota 
management as a reactive measure to over-fishing and flaws within the TAC mechanism. One of 
the most notable flaws within the CFP machinery had been the operation of controls on Total 
Allowable Landings (TAL) as opposed to a TAC.199 The operation of a TAL created no limit on 
                                                      
195 The UK Government’s first decisions regarding white fish quota management came November 1974 when 
NEAFC allocated the UK 84,000 tonnes of cod quota, 106,000 of haddock quota and 44,000 of whiting quota for 
1975. Over the period 1970-1975, these three-species represented around 72 per cent of total UK demersal landings. 
NAS (1976) AF62/3884. White Fish Conservation. ‘Background Note: Quota’,5 February 1975. 
196 Historical catches – national landings over a defined reference period - was the key determinant of the fixed TAC 
shares awarded to the Member States. The allocation formula also included a proviso for areas deemed heavily 
dependent on fishing activity (known as The Hague Formula) and for jurisdictional losses that compensated Member 
States that would be adversely affected by loss of access to external EU waters. The allocation formula was known 
as Relative Stability as it aimed to fix a Member State’s share of a TAC and stabilise the allocation of total 
opportunities between Member States. This fixed share was to allow for long-term industrial planning. (Holden 
1994: 43). The fixed percentages did not, however, create stability in terms of how many tonnes of fish a Member 
State could expect its share to produce on a year by year basis. Fluctuations in the TAC were liable to produce 
increases or decreases in aggregate total fishing opportunities and apportioned shares. 
197 Mike Holden, The Common Fisheries Policy (London: Fishing News Books, 1994). Mark Wise, The Common 
Fisheries Policy of the European Community (London: Methuen, 1984).  
198 Member States also retain responsibility for monitoring fishing activity and enforcing regulations at a national 
level. 
199 For the purposes of this thesis, reference to a CFP TAC will denote the TAL system that operated up until 2015. 




actual fishing mortality as vessels were legally permitted and perversely incentivised to catch in 
excess of their landings quota and discard the difference between total catch and the legal 
amount they could land.200 As discarded fish were often returned to the sea dead or dying, actual 
control or accurate information on fishing mortality eluded fisheries scientists and managers for 
decades. In 2015, the European Commission began to address this with the phased 
implementation of the Landing Obligation which will be fully implemented by 2019. Control and 
information on actual levels of fishing mortality was further undermined by illegal over-quota 
landings.  
With policy decisions taken through the prism of declining opportunities, the period 
1974-1981 is one characterised by a strong degree of consistency in terms of successive 
administrations’ attempts to use quota management to maintain employment. This chapter argues 
that the government rejected, chose and designed approaches to fisheries policy based on the 
likely impact on employment levels.  Section 1 examines the design of the UK licensing system 
introduced in 1975 and Section 2 the quota management policy choices of the Labour Wilson-
Callaghan administrations of 1974-79. Section 3 examines the succeeding Conservative 
Government’s approach to fisheries management defined by the 1980 Ministerial Review of 
Quota Management.  
It finds that the new Conservative administration in 1979 coincided with a growing 
concern for the impact of policies on the economic performance of the fleet. Yet, it is argued that 
the new concern for efficiency – driven by practical experience with earlier fisheries policies – 
was ultimately unable to displace the political prioritisation of employment. While this period 
witnesses an increase in the political use of economic and scientific advice, this did not produce 




                                                                                                                                                                           
Monitoring landings has historically been far easier than monitoring catches at sea. A shift to a TAL under the 
Landing Obligation has been driven by public pressure to reduce the discarding of fish and gain better control of 
actual fishing mortality 
200 The practice of discarding was in many ways incentivized by the operation of landings quotas as fishermen had 
an incentive to discard small perfectly marketable fish above Minimum Landings Sizes (MLS) for larger 
counterparts to maximize the price received. This practice, known as ‘high-grading’, is one of several known drivers 
of discarding. Heather Stewart, Review of Management Options for the Landing Obligation (Marine Scotland 




4.1. The Administration of Fisheries Regulation: Designing the UK Licensing 
System 
 
This section argues that while the introduction of a licensing system in 1975 removed the 
‘public right to fish’, political and resource constraints led to the management tool serving a 
largely administrative function for the first decade of its operation. From 1 January 1975, a 
vessel could only fish commercially for sea fish and land catch for profit if it had the necessary 
licence to do so, with vessels required to register and formally apply through the Fisheries 
Departments. The conferring of the right to fish through a licence by government represented a 
significant conceptual shift as vessels had previously been free to go to sea and fish as an 
unrestricted public right.  
The licensing system was to act as a crucial administrative framework that would allow 
the government to manage its quota holdings. A political decision was taken to grandfather 
access rights by placing no limitation on licence numbers and to issue free of charge. This was 
politically pragmatic but represented a missed opportunity to use licensing as a tool to regulate 
the size of the industry relative to the new internationally determined UK fishing opportunities. 
The decision to place no restriction on entry by limiting the number of licences issued cut against 
the grain of evolving fisheries management theory and practice. The experience of the Pacific 
Halibut fishery, studied by Crutchfield and Zeller (1962), was that if the economic and biological 
benefits of quota restrictions were to be realised then limiting access to the TAC through a 
restrictive licensing system was crucial.201 The intention was that allocation of a TAC to 
individuals would limit access to the stock, without which regulated-open access problems 
would occur.202  
For the UK Government, there was a strong political reason for retaining open access. A 
recurring debate in the history of fisheries policy-making concerns the political acceptability of 
restricting entry as this would force industry exit on some fishermen. There was a high risk 
                                                      
201 Gordon (1954) and Crutchfield and Zeller (1962) outlined the benefits of limited entry. However, the concept of 
restricting access and granting individual, semi-private rights in a TAC was not a common feature of fishermen’s 
management literature until David G. Moloney and Peter H. Pearse’s 1979 article “Quantitative rights as an 
instrument for regulating commercial fisheries” in the Journal of Fisheries Research Board of Canada 36 (1979), 
pp.869-866. No specific mention was made of trading quota entitlements until Dales (1968). 
202 Regulated open-access issues arise when fisheries managers have control over the harvest (the TAC) but not over 
the fleet. Excess capacity and a race to fish for the TAC will therefore persist without limited entry and allocated 




attached to this in the early years of quota management when fishers could argue for established 
historical rights and the use of grandfathering.  In January 1975, the government decided not to 
limit or charge for licensing, so that licenses would “be freely available for any vessel wishing to 
participate in the fishery.”203 MAFF officials saw this as reflecting the Ministerial wish “to 
manage remaining rights in such a way as to sustain opportunities for all those interested… and 
to allow fair and equal fishing opportunities for all those interested.”204 
 
The design of the licensing system indicated that its principal intention was to act as an 
administrative framework through which the government could manage and monitor national 
quota uptake against holdings. The power of the licensing system was that it enabled the 
government to condition the right of access by specifying rules that vessels had to adhere to 
while at sea and on landing. The ability to vary licence conditions also enabled Fisheries 
Ministers to implement new regulations through a non-statutory instrument, thus by-passing the 
need for a Parliamentary process when changes were required. 
The way in which the UK Government used the licensing system reflected its awareness that 
additional regulatory tools were required if national fishing activity was not to overshoot 
internationally determined national quota limits. The licensing system supported this by altering 
fishers’ behaviour in three key ways: it was used to define the stocks a vessel could target; to 
monitor landings; and, later, to allocate fishing opportunities. 
 The licensing system removed a vessel’s ability to fish in and land catches from sea areas 
of its own choosing. Control over this was necessitated by the basing of the TAC mechanism on 
the concept of fish stocks as opposed to fish species. From the turn of the 19th century, fisheries 
biologists became aware that - aside from a few species that formed a single homogenous 
population- most species could be subdivided into local populations.205 To aid the collection and  
 
                                                      
203 NAS (1976) AF62/3884. ‘Management of NEAFC White Fish Quota’, G. P. Jupe, 29 Jan 1975, para. 5. This 
decision was made although the government had the legislative power to control entry to fisheries under Section 
Four of the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act of 1967. 
204 NAS (1992) AF62/5942. Fisheries Quota Management. Letter from M.T. Haddon, MAFF to R.J.W. Clark, 
DAFFS, 29 October 1986. 
205 These are often referred to as ‘population units’ that have varying degrees of temporal and spatial integrity 
(Carvalho and Hauser 1994). The benefit of basing scientific assessments on stocks as opposed to species is that it 
enables scientific advice to take into consideration genetic differences between stocks of the same species and to 
consider local environmental factors such as feeding habits, habitat preferences, predation threats and varying 




Figure 4.1 ICES Sea Areas around the UK and North-West Europe. 
 
 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics Tables. (London; HMSO, 1995). 
 
analysis of individual stock data, sea areas were geographically delineated (see Figure 4.1).206 
Multiple TACs were set for an individual specie in the different sea areas where it was found. 
Allowed fishing mortality (the TAC) was based on an assessment of each local population’s 
                                                      
206 Halliday and Pinhorn’s 1990 analysis of the delineation of the Northwest Atlantic concluded that the process of 
creating sea areas for stock analysis was influenced by biological indicators (stock structure, species and fishery 
distributions, oceanographic features and submarine topography), political and administrative boundaries, the 
homogeneity of international fisheries activities and the practicalities of data collection and fishery regulation (R.G. 
Halliday and A.T. Pinhorn, “The Delimitation of Fishing Areas in the Northwest Atlantic”, Journal of Northern 





individual structure – an assessment of growth, natural mortality, sexual maturity and 
reproduction. For example, individual TACs were set for haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus) 
in the three ICES sea areas (Areas IV, VI and VII) that bordered the UK and within the 16 sub-
divided areas within these (IVa, IVb, IVc, VIa, VIb and VIIIa-k). The licensing system was used 
to define whether a vessel could land catches from haddock stocks in the West of Scotland (Area 
VI) or the North Sea (Area IV).  
The licensing system was also a key mechanism for monitoring landings. A licence 
condition that increased in importance with the introduction on individual vessel quotas from 
1978 was that vessel operators had to record all landed catch and submit a landings declaration to 
the Fisheries Inspectorate. MAFF collated the data to monitor quota uptake at a national level 
and could close a fishery when quota limits were about to be exceeded.207  
In practice, poor quality information and time delays undermined the ability of the 
licence system to control quota uptake. The self-reported nature of the data created the incentive 
for vessels to under-declare landings and thereby increase revenue. Resourcing was also an issue. 
In March 1984, the government identified a key issue as the lack of inspectors in many of the 
small ports around the Scottish coast. A culture of non-compliance with misreporting in terms of 
quantity and area of capture was known to exist, which “spread from the vessels to the port 
authorities and markets”.208 Timing was also an issue, with a six-week time lag between input of 
landings data and the output of statistical analysis and a subsequent policy response. This 
resulted in several quotas being overshot. Over 1985-87, four of the five main UK fisheries were 
overfished as entry was not suspended in time. Lastly, with the move to individual vessel quota 
allocations from 1978, a vessel’s licence was used to confer the weekly weight of fish it was 
permitted to land. Once a vessel had landed its limit of a stock, its licence for that fishery was 
suspended. 209 This provided a mechanism for the government to limit how much an individual 




                                                      
207 NAS (1976) AF62/3884. ‘Draft consultation letter on North Sea White Fish Quota – letter to industry from White 
Fish Authority’, 23 December 1974.  
208 NAS (1984) AF62/5615. ‘North Sea cod 1979-84’, 3 May 1984. 
209 NAS (1976) AF62/3884. ‘Draft consultation letter on North Sea White Fish Quota – letter to industry from White 




4.2. The Management of UK Quota Holdings, 1974-79.  
 
This section examines a series of policy decisions made by the UK Government under the 
Labour and Labour-Liberal Coalition Governments from 1974-1979.  It identifies an early shift 
in the UK Government’s approach to fisheries management from one of arms-length regulation 
to the adoption of an increasingly interventionist set of policy objectives. This shift was forced 
by the industry lobbying for greater protection from the socio-economic impacts of quota 
restrictions. It argues that the subsequent objective of sustaining employment necessitated an 
administrative and labour-saving approach to quota management. The design of the Individual 
Vessel Quota system in 1977-78 evidences the extent to which policy-makers’ decisions were 
constrained by political objectives and industry influence.  
 
The Management of NEAFC Quota, 1974-76 
 
The government’s initial policy objective for quota management was to create business-as-
usual conditions for the fleet. When considering how to manage quota awarded to the UK 
through the 1974-76 NEAFC quota scheme, MAFF outlined its intention to “have a system 
which is as simple as possible and interferes to the minimum extent with the industry’s 
management of its own affairs, both on the catching and processing side.”210 This policy steer led 
to the favouring of what was called a ‘whistle-blowing’ mechanism – the fleet would fish 
unimpeded against national quota holdings with the government closing the fishery once quota 
for the stock has been taken.  
The fishing industry rejected this management mechanism as it sought to protect itself from 
the economic impacts of new quota restrictions. In a meeting between the industry and 
government on 17 February 1975, industry representatives outlined that a lack of control over 
quota uptake would reduce the length of the fishing season.211 The industry argued that “the free-
for-all concept was an abhorrent idea and a recipe for an economic and bureaucratic 
nightmare.”212 
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211 NAS (1976) AF62/3884. ‘Meeting with Industry on Fisheries Quota’, 17 February, para. 4.  The government-
industry meeting on 17 February 1975 also discussed the onshore impacts of not maintaining a 12-month fishery. 




The industry’s concern was two-fold. Firstly, international experience from the Pacific 
Halibut fishery in the 1950s was used to argue that a “scramble to take the fish as quickly as 
possible” would occur.213 The economic impacts of this ‘race to fish’ – whereby fishermen 
would try to capture as much of the quota for themselves before the fishery was closed– were 
identified as a shortening of the fishing season, unsafe fishing practices, an overinvestment in 
capital (to fish harder and faster than competitors) and periodic oversupply in the market.214  
Secondly, the industry argued that a system that did not allocate within and between fleets 
would lead to unfair competition between the different sectors. This was influenced by the on-
going displacement of distant-water trawlers from foreign grounds. Both the Orkney Fishing 
Association (OFA) and the Scottish Trawler’s Federation (STF) wrote to DAFS in early 1975 to 
argue that national quota holdings should be allocated to mitigate local tensions and protect 
smaller fleets and the local communities they represented from having to compete with the more 
powerful and mobile vessels. 215 The STF letter suggested separate allocations of UK quota to 
the offshore and distant-water vessels and in a meeting between government and industry on 27 
November 1974, national allocations to England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were 
suggested.216 
In the note ‘Quota Management’, 2 February 1975, the government rejected the option of 
sub-dividing the quota between sectors, nations or fleets.217 Influenced by the industry’s 
concerns, the government did adopt an increasingly interventionist approach to quota 
management. The initial policy of minimal intervention was replaced with the objective of 
managing quota to produce specific social and economic outcomes. The primary policy objective 
                                                      
213 Op. cit. 
214 NAS (1976) AF62/3884. ‘White Fish Quota for 1974’, J. Ross, 3 January 1975, point C. It was understood that 
early closure of the fisheries could work to disadvantage sectors of the fleet that operated on a seasonal basis and 
began fishing in October. 
215 The Orkney Fishing Association (OFA) referred to a visible increase in distant-water trawlers operating off the 
coasts of Orkney. The OFA argued that the issue was not just one of sheer capacity and fishing power but of the 
choices available to the vessels; while the larger vessels had the economic mobility to move on to other grounds 
following the closure of a fishery, the smaller were not nomadic. The result was that the costs of this competition 
would be disproportionately carried by the smaller and less competitive vessels of the inshore and middle-distant 
fleet and by the onshore ancillary industries and communities dependent upon the operation of the local vessels.  
216 NAS (1976) AF62/3884. ‘Meeting with Industry on Fisheries Quota,’ 17 February. The latter idea was 
introduced almost four decades later under the 2012 Concordat on management arrangements for fishing quotas and 
licensing in the UK put in place. This allocated annually agreed shares of UK quotas to the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the Northern Ireland Executive, the Scottish Government and the 
Welsh Assembly Government for distribution to their fleets. 




was to use quota management to sustain industry employment.218 This was first considered by 
the White Fish Authority (WFA) in December 1974, a quasi-government organisation 
established in 1951 to operate jointly with the private fishing industry to further the interests of 
the fleet.219 In a letter to industry organisations, 23 December 1974, the WFA defined the 
objective of quota management as “to ensure continuity for employment for fishermen and avoid 
disruption for buyers and consumers.”220   
The aim of using quota management to sustain employment limited the allocation and 
management mechanisms available to the government. Industry lobbying on the importance of a 
12-month fishery led the government to decide that “in order to ensure continuity of employment 
for fishermen and avoid disruption of supplies for buyers and consumers, it is desirable for some 
measure to be taken to spread the quota over the calendar year”.221 This was to be achieved by 
“dividing the quota into quarterly seasons and allocating the quota appropriately.”222 Managing 
quota uptake through a seasonal whistle-blowing mechanism would create the same perverse 
incentives as an annual scheme, the difference being that closures would be seasonal as opposed 
to annual. This would soften the impacts of quota restrictions on employment with a note on 
‘White Fish Quota’ of 2 January 1975, confirming that “the main aim of the seasonal division is 
to spread out the possibilities for the sake of fishermen’s employment.”223 
The decision to use a seasonal whistle-blowing mechanism represented a balance between 
the new socio-economic objective of quota management and a lingering preference for minimal 
intervention. This mechanism had a dual objective of “ensur[ing] that fishing can be spread 
throughout the year to prevent unemployment for fishing and ancillary industries and to create a 
system which interferes to a minimum with industry operations.”224  
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219 Under the 1981 Fisheries Act, the White Fish Authority was amalgamated with the Herring Industry Board to 
establish The Seafish Industry Authority, a Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB). Activities were funded through 
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Individual Vessels Quotas 1977-1978 
As the concept of fishing effort became a key determinant in the government’s quota 
management considerations, the objective of minimal interference gave way to a fully 
interventionist approach to fisheries management. Fishing effort, in the economic approach to 
fisheries management, is a measure of the ‘amount of fishing’ that takes place and reflects 
parameters such as time spent fishing and the use of different gear and mesh sizes.225 This new 
priority was shaped by practical experience with managing haddock and herring quota stocks 
over 1975-76 and evidence of a growing misalignment between available quota and fishing 
effort. In 1976, the UK haddock fishery was closed prematurely despite two additional quota top-
ups from NEAFC, and the North Sea herring fishery was forced to close early. In January 1977, 
the two Fisheries Departments identified the problem as “effort in some fisheries [being] too 
great in relation to the quota.”226 The government was aware that the situation was not only 
jeopardising compliance with national quota limits, but that it was also adversely influencing the 
behaviour of fishermen.227   
Alternative management mechanisms were considered in a paper on ‘Quota 
Management’ published on 1 June 1977. Alternatives included the introduction of selective 
licensing (limiting entry into the fisheries), allocating quota allowances to individual vessels, and 
deferring management to the industry through the Producer Organisations.228  The use of 
mechanisms that would directly restrict fishing effort – such as a regime that limited the amount 
of time a vessel could spend at sea – was rejected outright as it was deemed to limit the 
operational options available to vessels.229 
Further pressure on the government to adopt a new management approach came from the 
European Commission’s decision to reduce TACs. In 1977, it proposed a 10 per cent reduction 
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in the EEC’s total catch for 1978.230 UK overshoots of its haddock quotas for 1975-76 resulted in 
a 13% reduction in UK haddock quota for 1978.231  
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Landings as a % of 
Total Scottish 
Landings 
1970 133,813 176,335 75.9 250,608 543,788 24.6 
1971 143,669 181,263 79.3 272,898 453,187 31.7 
1972 114,966 156,624 73.4 262,077 463,042 24.8 
1973 99,268 149,511 66.4 262,382 500,837 19.8 
1974 84,586 126,193 67.0 262,077 477,012 17.7 
1975 72,834 112,479 64.8 249,503 409,199 17.8 
1976 90,837 127,461 71.3 273,966 442,231 20.5 
1977 93,653 122,938 76.2 251,275 412,231 22.7 
1978 63,114 82,399 77.6 232,910 426,152 14.8 
1979 55,527 72,759 76.3 203,292 354,976 15.6 
Source: Sea Fisheries Statistics Tables and Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistics Tables 1970-79. 
 
A Ministerial Submission, ‘Quota Management’, outlined that the government presented 
the industry with a choice – whistle-blowing could continue or the government “could attempt to 
manage UK effort relative to the quota in order to minimize closures”.232 The industry chose the 
latter with individual vessels quotas (IVQs) chosen for managing Area IV and VI haddock and 
whiting for 1978-79. The choice and design of the IVQ mechanism was shaped by the desire to 
sustain employment and by the lobbying power of the sector traditionally dependent on the 
haddock fishery. During the 1970s, the Scottish demersal fleet landed around 66-79% of the 
UK’s total haddock landings, with the specie representing around 40% of the total Scottish 
demersal landings (by weight) and 20% of Scottish total landings (by weight) (Table 4.1).233 
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Economic dependence translated into political weight, the result of which was the choice of 
quota management rules that worked to reflect and maintain the sector’s traditional working 
patterns.  
In a meeting with the Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation (SFO) on 30 January 1979, the 
Secretary of State for Scotland outlined that the aim of the government was to “sustain a twelve 
month fishery.”234 The aim of MAFF was to accommodate the Scottish haddock fleet’s argument 
that this was a necessity for its operations and required to protect seasonal fisheries that fished in 
the last months of the year.235 To protect traditional working patterns, the government had to use 
a mechanism that artificially restrained quota uptake over a 12 month period. The decision to use 
this type of time-control was taken despite awareness that this tool, popular in the 1950s, was by 
this point discredited.236  
The decision to operate a weekly as opposed to monthly or seasonal quota was again 
chosen to complement the traditional weekly working pattern of the Scottish whitefish fleet. This 
required the annual haddock quota to be divided into 52 weekly allocations. For allocating 
weekly allocations, several options existed. They could be allocated equally amongst vessels or 
allocations could reflect capital conditions such as vessel length or engine power. The objective 
to sustain employment led the government to choose a labour-saving criterion that would favour 
labour over capital. A ‘per-man’ allocation criteria was chosen for allocating weekly quotas 
between vessels with a vessel’s weekly allocation the aggregation of its crew’s entitlement. The 
intention was for this allocation criterion to work to sustain employment by creating a direct 
incentive for vessels to employ higher ratios of labour to capital. It also favoured the Scottish 
demersal fleet that operated smaller boats with higher crewing levels. It was therefore welcomed 
by the Scottish industry.237  
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235 The seasonal patterns of the different sectors depended upon the stocks targeted. For instance, the offshore 
English fleet in the North-east relied disproportionally on fishing cod in the last few months of the year. TNA (1979) 
MAF 452/1, Cod and Whiting (Licensing) Order 1979, ‘North Sea Cod and Whiting’, D. Boreham, Fisheries IV, 1 
August 1979.  
236 TNA (1982) MAF 452/4. White Fish Stock Management: Areas IV and VI. Note ‘Quota Management’, by W. E. 
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Yet the per-man IVQ mechanism necessitated a heavily administrative and restrictive 
system of quota management. It was bureaucratically burdensome on the government and 
restricted the operations of individual vessels in a way that was in stark contrast to the days of 
Mare Liberum. The support for this approach came from it being couched in the politically 
acceptable language of fairness and equity. The government defined its approach as “manag[ing] 
remaining rights in such a way as to sustain opportunities for all those interested and to allow fair 
and equal fishing opportunities for all those interested.”238  
This rhetoric and the primacy of sustaining employment worked to constrain severely the 
policy options available to the government. It had to retain unlimited entry and award licences 
free of charge. In practice, it had little choice but to adopt a quota management mechanism that 
would produce a twelve-month fishery and allocate quota on a labour-favouring basis. National 
and local political considerations resulted in policy that protected and promoted traditional 
behaviour and reflected rather than restrained pre-TAC fishing patterns. At an international level, 
this found little opposition due to the European Commission’s quest for economic growth in the 
1970s.239 Absent during this period was any consideration of the impact of fisheries management 
choices on the economic performance of the fleet. The first step towards rights-based fisheries 
management in the UK through licences and IVQs was not driven by an attempt to counter 
perverse behaviour and promote efficiency and sustainability within a TAC regime. It was to 
prevent fleet contraction in terms of the number of fishermen employed and stave off the social 
and economic costs of attempting to recover and sustainably manage stocks. 
 
4.3 The 1979 Conservative Government’s Approach to Fisheries Management 
and the 1980 Ministerial Review. 
 
This section argues that the first Thatcher Administration (1979 -1983) engaged with 
fisheries policy in a considerably different manner to the Wilson and Callaghan Labour 
administrations it succeeded. The new environment in which fisheries policy decisions had to be 
taken was driven by factors external to government. International and local pressures from 1978 
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interacted to create a policy environment ripe for a departure from the narratives and choices of 
fisheries policy in the 1970s. It is argued that this opportunity was lost due to the continued 
political prioritisation of avoiding the costs associated with running down the industry. The result 
was a schism between policy-makers and politicians who favoured a short-run approach to 
fisheries management and economic and scientific advisors in government who argued for a 
long-run approach.  
 
As Thatcher’s first administration entered government, it faced a fisheries policy and 
quota management crisis that demanded fresh thinking. This crisis was driven by international 
pressures (the looming introduction of the CFP in 1983) and by national and local pressures 
(fleet economics, non-compliance and administrative burden).  
 
CFP Conservation Policy A factor demanding a new approach to fisheries management was the 
looming introduction of the CFP’s conservation policy scheduled for 1983. In 1980, the UK 
Government began to accept that future fishing opportunities would decline as the Commission 
attempted to counter the persistent overfishing of stocks through TAC reductions. A 1980 
Ministerial Submission reflected that “the only certainty regarding future European and UK 
fishing opportunities is that they would be lower than present catch levels.”240 
 The first steep cut in quota was introduced in 1981. The Minister was advised that: “The 
Commission have proposed 1980 quotas for the UK which are, for about half the stocks covered, 
significantly lower than expected UK catches this year.”241 The other new issue for the UK 
Government and all Member States was that reduced opportunities would have to be managed 
within a legally-binding framework of national allocations for which non-compliance would be 
met with infraction.  
To avoid a situation in which the UK overshot legally binding national quotas and faced 
infraction proceedings, a new objective to reduce fishing effort in line with reduced fishing 
opportunities was created. This objective was defined by MAFF in March 1980 as “the need to 
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align present exploitation patterns with future opportunities.”242 This represented a significant 
shift in the time considerations of UK fisheries policy as it represented a move from focusing on 
the present to the future.  
The 1980s Ministerial Review of Quota Management described policy in the 1970s as 
“aimed at keeping UK catches in line with our quota aims.”243 Quota management was an in-
year allocation and annual balancing exercise. The new objective to match “present exploitation 
patterns with future opportunities” shifted the focus into the future as it became clear that how 
in-year allocations were managed would deliver either future benefits or costs.  Current levels of 
over-exploitation would result in future costs in the form of fewer fishing opportunities, with the 
government commenting that “if a system of free competition continues, the UK will overshoot 
its quota allocation, jeopardising future TAC allocations”.244 Though the principal motivation 
was the amount of quota the UK could expect to receive in the future, this shift brought the 
objectives of UK quota management into line with the ethics of conservation, an aim of which is 
to minimise the future costs of present action. 
The Quota Management Review indicated that the UK Government understood the 
management of quota to have been complicated by increasing fishing effort. The policy result 
was several inter-departmental meetings on the fishing capacity of the vessels targeting white 
fish stocks.245 This led to the Minister of State deciding that the government would have to take 
the initiative of controlling fishing capacity.246  
 
Impact of Policies on Fleet Profitability Political pressure and industry lobbying on the impact 
of policies on the economic performance of the fleet also drove the government’s reconsideration 
of how UK quota was to be managed. In April 1980, the Scarborough-Bridlington Fisheries 
Producer Organisation (SBFPO) wrote to MAFF describing the impact on its members: “Boats 
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have often been able to take their whole week’s whiting quota in one or two hauls, and then they 
have to tie up for the rest of the week... A boat with three-man crew is allocated 459 stones of 
whiting in a week, and with the depressed prices that we are experiencing this year, this has been 
fetching generally between £500-600. Boats cannot survive for long on weekly earnings of this 
order.”247 
This extract points to the weekly per-man allocation of quota increasing the cost per unit 
of catch. Though fish prices increased steadily in this period (Table 1.1.), under this system 
vessels were inhibited from responding to economic indicators such as market demand and 
economics of scale. Vessels had to fish every week and one vessel could not be used to catch two 
vessels’ weekly allocation or carry over its own quota to the next week. This led to the 
underutilisation of capital and labour and limited the ability for cost reduction through 
economies of scale and rationalisation. The inability to land catches according to market demand 
also restricted the ability to improve net returns by earning higher prices. The impact of the 
allocation mechanism on vessel profitability worsened throughout the year as the government 
was continuously reducing weekly landings to make up for over-shooting of weekly limits. The 
almost constant reduction in weekly allowances throughout 1979 forced vessels to fish weekly 
but land less and less. A 1980 Ministerial Submission acknowledged that the per-man per week 
system tended to “force up fishermen’s costs per unit of catch… to discourage reduced manning 
and discriminate against the relatively high capitalized”.248  
 The impacts of this were felt unevenly across the UK fleet as the labour-based allocation 
of quota awarded less quota to the larger vessels with higher capital to labour ratios. This 
economic cost translated into a high political cost as these vessels were concentrated in the 
traditional distant-water fishing ports in England that had effective representation. In February 
1979, the National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisation (NFFO), the British Fishermen’s 
Federation (BFF) and the Grimsby Seiner’s Association (GSA) – organisations representing the 
larger, more capital-intensive vessels predominantly based in English ports - wrote to MAFF 
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arguing that controls based on crew size discriminated in favour of fishermen of the Scottish 
fleet which was predominately made up of small, labour-intensive vessels.249  
 
Non-compliance and Enforcement Unknown levels of non-compliance with quota restrictions 
also worked to create national and international issues. In 1980, the government acknowledged 
that the mackerel and haddock quotas were evaded on a significant scale. The UK’s Fisheries 
Inspectorate identified the problem as one of industry behaviour and government resourcing.250 
The Head of the Inspectorate, M.G. Jennings identified the quota management mechanism as 
creating a direct incentive for vessels to conceal or under-declare landings due to the use of self-
reporting. The incentive for fishers to over-fish was increased by inadequate resourcing and 
infrastructure on the part of the Inspectorate. Vessels could land at up to four ports a week, many 
of which did not have a residential inspector. 
The issue for the government was not only illegal over-fishing but an issue of fairness at 
a national level. In 1979, MAFF officials were concerned that poor enforcement of quota 
restrictions allowed fishers breaking the law to survive while law-biding fishers faced 
bankruptcy. As the head of MAFF, Charles Cann, noted that: “Measures which restricted catches 
have, until recently, at least allowed the law-abiding fisherman to keep his head above water- 
and those less law-abiding have done well. But I suspect that it is becoming clear to fishermen 
that quota enforcement at present is fraught with difficulty and with the economic pressure 
presently surrounding the industry, there must inevitably be ill-will created among the law-
abiding men by our inability to act effectively against the wrong-doer.”251  
Non-compliance, principally through the under-declaration of landings, was also 
presenting itself as an international and scientific issue. Illegal landings and discarding 
undermined the data for biological stock assessments and the effectiveness of quota restrictions 
in delivering long-term, sustainable levels of fishing.252 In a 1982 report, ICES argued that: 
“Misreporting of data, i.e. deliberate reporting of falsified data, has become an issue in Atlantic 
fisheries statistics in recent years… such practices of misreporting will corrupt the entire 
programme; invalidate the only coherent time series internationally available on fishing activities 
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and thereby make international analyses of effects on management actions impossible.”253 
Unknown levels of over-fishing against quota meant that there was no real control on fishing 
mortality and TACs were not working to arrest over-exploitation and help deliver sustainable 
levels of fishing.  
 
Administrative Burden A final reason for the government’s reconsideration of quota 
management was the administrative burden the weekly quota allocation system placed on the 
government. The system created an excessive administrative task for the government as it had to 
monitor continually and adjust the weekly haddock and whiting quota to produce a 12-month 
fishery.  If an under- or over-shoot occurred, the national and individual vessel allocations would 
have to be recalculated and disseminated through the licencing system. This was a time- and 
resource-heavy duty with variations occurring monthly.  
 
The 1980 Ministerial Review on Future Quota Management  
 
The government responded to the quota management crisis by launching a Ministerial 
Review on ‘The Future of Quota Management’. This assessed the current system for quota 
management and consider alternative options. On 3 October 1980, Cann wrote to the Director of 
Fisheries Research at the Lowestoft Research Station outlining: “My submission [announcement 
of the Review] arises primarily from the hideous problem we have got into with our present so-
called quota management measures. I believe that we cannot go on as we are.”254  
The Review indicated that a significant shift in UK quota management was imminent. 
This came primarily from the inclusion of rationalisation of the fleet as a key objective of UK 
fisheries policy. The Review defined the objectives for quota management as: “a) the extent to 
which they enable fishermen to rationalize their fishing, to minimize costs and to maximize 
returns and to which allow the more efficient to displace the less efficient, b) the relative 
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difficulty of enforcement and the extent to which planned restrictions of catches is likely to be 
achieved, c) acceptability of public opinion and in particular to fishermen.”255  
 
Alongside enforcement and acceptability, rationalisation replaced the previous focus on 
sustaining employment and continuity. This substitution indicates that lessons had been learnt 
regarding the impact of quota controls on fleet profitability and fishers’ behaviour. A reference 
to “allow[ing] the more efficient to displace the less efficient” signalled an acknowledgement 
that industry contraction was required. The economic performance of the fleet was signalled to 
be a priority within the accompanying Ministerial Submission outlining “the need for 
management measures which enable fishermen to maximise their profitability”.256 The key 
question in the review was whether the UK Government’s approach to fisheries management 
(the weekly per-man landing restrictions) should be simplified or refined since. In 1980, the 
government considered that the: “current weekly vessel quota arrangements have serious defects. 
It seems necessary to move either in the direction of less management i.e. periodic closures, 
possibly combined with sectoral divisions, or in the direction of more but more flexible 
management i.e. more flexible vessel catch quota or flexible vessels days at sea quotas.”257  
 
The case for a long-run approach to fisheries management  In response to the review, the 
advice given by government economists and scientists gave overwhelming support for the use of 
mechanisms that represented a long-run approach to fisheries management. Consistent advice 
was to use mechanisms that would deliver fleet rationalisation including Individual Transferable 
Quotas (ITQs), effort controls and restrictive licensing. There was a clear rejection of Cann’s 
stated preference for moving to a system of seasonal closures.  
The Head of Fisheries Research at the Lowestoft Laboratory, David J. Garrod, warned 
Cann in September 1980 that seasonal closures were not a “viable option for rationalisation.”258 
Garrod prioritised rationalisation as a fisheries policy objective. Garrod warned Cann of the issue 
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of effort displacement associated with seasonal closures. If access to a sea area or fishery was 
prohibited by a closure, the rational reaction for a fisher was not to cease fishing but to move, 
where possible, to prosecute other less restricted stocks and areas.259 Seasonal closures would not 
create a downward impact on overcapacity but exacerbate capacity issues in other sea areas as 
fishers attempted to diversify operations.  
To deliver rationalisation, fisheries scientists supported a move to market-based 
approaches. Garrod outlined support for the use of ITQs which he argued would have “a more 
certain effect on fishing capacity.”260 The Review had considered the option of “more flexible 
vessel quotas” which would allocate vessels a share of national quota on an annual basis with 
rules for transferability and aggregation. Quota would be awarded to fishers “in perpetuity so 
that fishermen had a form of transferable property rights.”261 The Review acknowledged the 
benefits of ITQs for rationalisation as this approach “would provide increased scope for 
rationalization by individual fishermen as those wishing to enter the fisheries concerned or to 
expand activities would be able to buy fishing rights from, probably, the less efficient.”262  
Lowestoft scientists also demonstrated support for restricted entry, with one writing that: “with 
the knowledge of overcapacity… it is difficult to see how we can continue to allow free entry 
into the fishery.”263 
 
The position of fisheries scientists was mirrored by MAFF economists, albeit with 
economic advice displaying stronger support for the use of effort controls.264 Philip Lund, Head 
of Fisheries Division 3 (Economics), expressed his reservations with the Ministerial Review to 
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Cann. Lund commented that the paper was “too dismissive of effort quotas”265 and that he did 
“not accept your [Cann’s] somewhat summary dismissal of transferable effort quotas”. Lund 
argued that “effort controls … generally provide the most efficient solution.”266 Referring to a 
seminar in Melbourne on the economic aspects of limited entry and fisheries management 
measures, Lund reported that fisheries economists had discussed transferable catch quotas, 
limited entry schemes and landings taxes. Transferable quotas had been identified as the 
preferred management measure as they ranked “more highly on the criteria of efficiency since 
they allowed fishermen as a group the flexibility in matching their available effort to the quota 
provided or bought.”267  
The correspondences to Cann from government economic and scientific advisors 
demonstrate coherent and consistent advice from both analytical wings of MAFF. Officials at 
Lowestoft were primarily concerned with overcapacity and the MAFF Economics Department 
with improving economic efficiency. Yet, both objectives were interrelated and resulted in the 
advocacy of fleet rationalisation through restricted entry and the use of either ITQs or effort 
controls. MAFF economists and scientists both attempted to normalise the use of these 
instruments to policy-makers. Lund argued that a system of comprehensive individual property 
rights for fisheries was no more restrictive on fishermen than what was widely accepted on land: 
 “A farmer cannot simply decide to plant (and pick!) a crop on any piece of land which he may 
happen to fancy without first acquiring some form of property right in the land, why should 
fishermen be allowed to catch fish without any regard for the fishing equivalent of rotation and 
land improvement.”268  
Lee, an official in Lowestoft, also placed the question of access to fisheries within the 
wider context of other nationally owned natural resources. He argued: “I don’t see why 
fishermen should not pay for their transferable property rights. The national quotas allocated 
under the CFP will be a piece of national property like North Sea oil and gas, and it would be fair 
to charge a rent for parts of it.”269  
 
                                                      








Cann supported seasonal closures because they were easy to administer and, in the short-
term, “relatively easy to enforce”.270 Yet his prioritisation of short-term enforcement overlooked 
the fact that this would make enforcement harder in the long-run. Overcapacity was 
acknowledged to a principal cause of overfishing. In addition to adverse impacts on the 
biological health of stocks, overcapacity created economic and social costs. With available quota 
spread too thinly across too many vessels, available profit from the fisheries was dissipated. The 
link between poor economic performance and the incentive to cheat was experienced by the UK 
Government in its weekly quota system. High costs and low returns created perverse incentives 
for fishermen to land illegally and under-report landings. The Head of the Inspectorate was 
aware of the link between overcapacity and enforcement. In January 1979, it was explained to 
Cann that the enforcement problem was the result of “the UK fleet being too large for the 
available quota.”271 Mechanisms that could have delivered rationalisation were also likely to 
improve enforcement in the long-run by reducing the number of vessels in the fleet and 
weakening incentives to cheat by improving economic returns.  
 
The politics of a short-term approach to fisheries management     In contrast to the advice 
provided by government economists, scientists and enforcement staff, MAFF policy-makers 
opted for a short-term approach to fisheries management. This section argues that this was the 
result of a conscious political prioritisation of the welfare value of fisheries, principally in terms 
of employment, over the wider economic value of the resources.272  
MAFF rejected ITQs and effort control and opted for seasonal closures as a quota 
management mechanism. The long-term, market-based approach to quota management offered 
by ITQs and effort control was not rejected due to its inability to deliver rationalisation and the 
associated economic benefits of managing and utilising quota more efficiently. This decision was 
influenced by the political and administrative costs of rationalisation which were judged to 
outweigh the opportunity to improve the economic performance of the fleet. The government 
prioritised the socio-economic and political costs associated with running down the industry. 
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Rationalisation meant fewer jobs which carried high political costs for Ministers. Cann 
anticipated the Ministerial steer, explaining to Lund in October 1980 that while rationalisation 
was “a theoretically attractive objective” it was “not one which Ministers are bound to want to 
pursue if the political (or administrative) costs are too high.”273 
The steer to minimise political costs over fleet performance would have come from UK 
Government Ministers. On 4 November 1980, W.E. Mason wrote to Cann setting out the 
question to be put to Ministers: “Viewed simply from the economic point of view, there would 
seem to be strong arguments for letting fishing concentrate in the hands of the most efficient 
fishermen, using the most efficient methods. This would seem to be consistent which the 
government’s general approach to economic questions… on the other hand there is the 
competing political/socio-economic question of the welfare of and employment in the many 
small and in some cases remote fishing communities around our coast. For example, do 
Ministers in fact want the (efficient) purse seiners to take the bulk of the pelagic fish? I have 
suggested that much depends on the weight that Ministers give to the political consideration of 
economic use of resources versus the welfare of, and employment in, local fishing 
communities.”274  
 
No direct reference to the Ministerial decision on this question was in the archives. 
However, several key policy decisions indicated that preference was given to the welfare value 
of the industry with rationalisation as a policy objective effectively dismissed due to its 
associated political costs. Firstly, MAFF’s retained their preference for the use of seasonal 
closures. This went against the advice of economists and scientists and with MAFF aware that 
this mechanism would work against rationalisation. The adverse economic effect of this policy 
choice was communicated to Ministers, with a letter to the Minister of State outlining that 
simplifying quota management measures meant “giving up possible economic gains in terms of 
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more efficient exploitation of fish”.275 The Ministerial Review concluded that while management 
based on periodic closures would be less disruptive than “whistle-blowing”, it would not 
encourage rationalization. The government understood that “fishermen would still be encouraged 
to fish as hard as they could whenever they could, without much regard to marketing and 
maximization of returns”, the result of which was “over capacity and market instability.”276  
Secondly, in February 1981 MAFF defined the objective of UK quota management as 
“the need to sustain employment within the industry” and to “spread the reduction in 
opportunities evenly across the country.”277 Finally, political concerns shaped other areas of 
fisheries policy. In 1980, the government chose to continue to place no restriction on entry 
through the licensing system. Cann explained that this was due to the government’s “assumption 
that it would not be politically acceptable to exclude established fishermen.”278 
An alternative approach to restricted entry put forward by MAFF economists was also 
rejected on the grounds of political acceptability. Lund argued that all existing fishermen could 
be compensated for the removal of their quota and then, along with new entrants, be given “the 
right to bid for effort quotas.”279 Cann responded that an auction-based mechanism for allocating 
fishing licences or “putting fishing rights up for sale, which would exclude fishermen from 
fishing” was “really not likely to be a political starter.”280 The allocation of access rights via the 
market was strongly opposed by Scottish officials.  DAFS argued that “due to the low income 
and profit earnings of fishermen, few local operations would be able to financially compete for 
rights.”281 This indicates that a predominant concern of the Scottish department was the 
ownership structure of the industry. 
The administrative costs of different management mechanisms also influenced MAFF’s 
decision to reject a more comprehensive management system that would support rationalisation. 
The costs of UK fisheries management were not borne directly by resource users but by the 
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government and taxpayers.282 MAFF’s ability to dedicate sufficient resources to fisheries 
management was constrained by government fiscal policies which at the time were under 
pressure due to the government’s attempt to reduce the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. 
On 31 October 1980, Cann received a letter from the department responsible for manpower and 
staffing stating that “it is important for Ministers to be aware of the effect on manpower before 
they take a decision... This is especially the case at the present time when ministry staff numbers 
are going down and have to go down further.”283 A letter between Cann and Mason highlighted 
that resource and staffing availability were considered in the context of quota management:  
“To refine our quota management method could secure economic gains but at a price in terms of 
considerable political controversy and increased number of civil servants and increased public 
expenditure on administration and enforcement.”284 
The issue with a more comprehensive approach to quota management put forward by 
government economists and enforcement staff was that it was resource intensive. The resource 
requirements of an effective quota management system were implied in a note by W. E. Mason, 
4 November 1980: 
“one has to recognise the difficulties which we have experienced in administering weekly vessel 
quotas, difficulties which are likely to be even more difficult with a more refined system. This 
form of quota has much in common with the income tax system. As we plug each loophole, the 
industry finds another, and we do not have the manpower resources to indulge very much in this 
kind of activity. This consideration points very strongly away from any form of vessel quotas 
and towards whistle stopping, periodic closures or sectoral division.”285  
Cann’s contribution to Tim Gray’s The Politics of Fishing highlights the importance of 
political (Ministerial) will and support in securing adequate administrative resources. As Cann 
noted: “For the fisheries manager to be able to impose his will in the difficult situations where 
fishing capacity and effort are excessive, the fisheries manager needs to be able to deploy 
massive resources on administration and enforcement, prosecutions and so on. In normal 
circumstances the political will and resources to see such a battle through to success will not be 
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forthcoming.”286 In this situation, political will to address rationalisation was diminished by an 
awareness of the associated political costs of such action. This in turn worked to reduce the 
political support required for the Fisheries Department to secure adequate financial resources to 
deliver this objective.  
The decision to simplify quota management arrangements and tolerate such continued 
economic underperformance within the industry was due to the political and administrative costs 
of fleet rationalisation being deemed too high by Ministers and officials. Policy choices – 
notably the preference for the use of seasonal closures – demonstrates that the primary concern 
of the government was to find the easiest and least costly way of distributing quota that was 
acceptable to the industry.  Cann described the benefits of seasonal quotas as being “relatively 
easy to enforce”287 and that “fishing organisations have said that a system of periodic closures 
would be the least unacceptable management technique for the Area VII white fish stocks.”288  
Quota management mechanisms were to mitigate against the associated costs of running down 
the industry as oppose to facilitating the efficient and rational use of quota and fishing resources. 
 
Conclusion  
 The period from 1974-1981 represents the early years of modern fisheries management in 
the UK. In this period, the UK Government took on responsibility for actively managing both 
industry inputs and outputs and allocating fishing opportunities. In these formative years, several 
notable shifts occurred in the government’s approach to fisheries management. The 
government’s initial preference for arm’s length regulation reluctantly gave way to an 
increasingly administrative and interventionist approach. The reluctance felt by government in 
inserting itself into the day-to-day affairs of the industry was only overcome by pressure from 
the industry for protection from the socio-economic effects of quota restrictions.  
The next shift came as a challenge to politicians and policy-makers’ preference for a short-
term, reactive approach to fisheries management. The challenge came from inside government 
and from economic and scientific advisors who pressed for a long-term economic approach to 
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fisheries management as a solution for the practical problems experienced by both government 
and industry.  
This chapter has highlighted that the beginnings of an economic approach to fisheries 
management in the UK, wherein the impact of policies upon fishers’ behaviour and the economic 
performance of the fleet were considered as part of the decision-making process, was influenced 
primarily by practical experience and learning from the implementation and operation of earlier 
policy choices. The 1980 Ministerial Review indicates that policy-makers were influenced by the 
wider economic ideas and theories of fisheries management as civil servants considered the use 
of ITQs and other market-based approaches like the use of an auction mechanism for licences. 
However, the economic hardship experienced and communicated to government by sectors of 
the fleet and the growing administrative and enforcement burden felt by government departments 
created an opening for rationalisation to be identified as a policy objective by 1980. From 1979, 
there is an evident increase in the use of economic and scientific advice within the government 
fisheries departments.  
Nonetheless, the key consistency within this period was the primacy given to stemming the 
political and social costs of running down the industry. Policy-makers and politicians during the 
Wilson-Callaghan administrations can arguably be excused on the grounds of ignorance and 
inexperience for failing to consider the economic impacts of fisheries policies. By 1981, the 
continued dismissal of policy approaches and management mechanisms that would have 
facilitated fleet rationalisation represented a wilful rejection of advice by Ministers and civil 
servants. The continued political prioritisation of the social value of fisheries over the economic 
value of the resources obstructed the practical application of an economic approach to fisheries 
policy. Policies that failed to take economic considerations aside from employment levels into 
account continued. The result was that the economic hardship the government had attempted to 
avoid by maintaining employment was experienced by the fleet as profitability began to decline. 
The subsequent impacts of this outcome on policy decisions are explored in the next chapter.  
Lastly, analysis of this period also revealed evidence of the barrier to policy development 
created by the government’s use of language in the mid-1970s. In the formative years, the 
government had couched the labour-saving approach to fisheries management in the language of 
fairness and an equitable distribution of rights. This narrative was used to support the retention of 




equitable, per-man basis. This set a dangerous precedent as any attempt to move away from these 
mechanisms would be deemed as increasingly discriminatory and inequitable. Evident in the 
government’s overtly political rejection of the restriction, sale or auctioning of fishing licences is 












This chapter argues that the introduction of Producer Organisation (PO) management 
from 1984 represented a further attempt by the UK Government to use fisheries policy to avoid 
the issue of excess fleet capacity. This chapter is concerned with the issue of governance. PO PO 
management brought changes in where and by whom quota was administered, managed and 
allocated. The intention was to appease multiple sources of local political pressure and alleviate 
the symptoms of economic underperformance by allowing vessels greater autonomy over the 
time of use of capital and quota. 
Chapter four argued that over 1974-1981 a long-term, economic approach to fisheries 
management was repeatedly trumped by short-term political and administrative considerations. 
The resulting failure to support fleet rationalisation allowed the misalignment between the size of 
the fishing fleet and fishing opportunities to increase. By 1983, political lobbying repeatedly 
highlighted the damaging impact this had on fleet efficiency and profitability. In tandem with 
TAC reductions for key commercial stocks, this political pressure forced the government to act 
with PO management introduced in a bid to protect the economic performance of nationally 
significant sectors. The greater operational flexibility awarded to vessels through PO 
management was an attempt to carry through further reductions in fishing opportunities at lower 
cost. 
 Producer Organisations were voluntary membership organisations made up of fishers. 
They are a product of European Legislation (Regulation (EEC) No 1939/72) and, as such, are 
“the direct result of British membership of the European Union”.289 Originally intended as 
marketing organisations, the founding legislation provided for groups of fishers to come together 
and market their catch in a way that supported the common organization of the European market. 
The criteria (Regulation (EEC) 170/71) for recognising a PO was a level of economic activity 
that enabled the PO to “play their part in the common organization of the market” with this 
defined as the “ab[ility] to provide a concentrated supply sufficient in quantity, continually 
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available and homogenous in quality” and “adapt production to the requirements of the 
market”.290 In 1973, 24 European POs operated in the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Germany. In the following three decades, the number of European POs increased fourfold.291 
POs in the UK have had dynamic identities, with Goodlad referring to them as “largely, although 
not entirely, regionally based” and with the 19 POs in the UK in 1998 “reflect[ing] the 
geographical and sectoral diversity of the British fleet.”292  




The Fish Producer’s Organisation (FPO) 1973 
South Western Fish Producer’s Organisation (SWFPO) 1974 
Aberdeen Fish Producer’s Organisation (AFPO) 1974 
Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation (SFO) 1974 
Anglo-Scottish Fish Producer’s Organisation (ASFPO) 1975 
Anglo North Irish Fish Producer’s Organisation (NIFPO) 1976 
Cornish Fish Producer’s Organisation (CFPO) 1976 
Yorkshire and Anglia Fish Producer’s Organisation 
(YAFPO) 
1977 -2003 
Fife Fish Producer’s Organisation (FIFPO) 1980 
South East Fish Producer’s Organisation 1980 
North East of Scotland Fish Producer’s Organisation 
(NESFO) 
1980 
Grimsby Fish Producer’s Organisation (GFPO) 1981 
Eastern England Fish Producer’s Organisation  1982 -1985 
Shetland Fish Producer’s Organisation (SFPO) 1982 
Fleetwood Fish Producer’s Organisation 1983 
Wales and West Coast Fish Producer’s Organisation 1993 
Lowestoft Fish Producer’s Organisation (LFPO) 1993 
North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation (NSFO) 1993/4 
West of Scotland Fish Producer’s Organisation (WSFPO) 1995 
Northern Producer’s Organisation (NPO) 1995 
Northern Ireland FPO (NIFPO) 1976 
Scarborough and Bridlington FPO (SBFPO) N/A 
Orkney Fish Producer’s Organisation 2000 
North Atlantic Fish Producer’s Organisation (NAFPO) 2010 
 Source: European Commission. European Atlas of the Seas – Producers’ Organisations.293  
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From 1 June 1984, specific fisheries management responsibilities were devolved to the 
POs. This introduced a new element of co-management into UK fisheries policy whereby the 
government and industry came to share managerial responsibilities. UK quota holdings 
continued to be managed through an administrative licensing system that allocated shares in UK 
quota holdings to individual vessels. However, from 1984 certain POs were allocated a share of 
UK quota based on the aggregate historical fishing patterns of their members - if a PO’s 
membership had collectively landed 10 percent of total UK haddock landings over the reference 
period (initially a three-year rolling reference period) then the PO would be awarded 10 per cent 
of the future UK haddock quota. PO management replaced the per-man criterion for allocating 
quota with one that allocated shares in future UK quota based on a vessel’s historical 
performance, otherwise known as grandfathering.294  
The POs were given complete autonomy over how to manage and allocate their 
members’ quota shares. Several internal allocation arrangements would have been used, the most 
common being individual allocations to vessels or companies based on track-records and the 
pooling of quota and use of monthly landings limits for the PO’s member vessels.295 Alongside 
allocation duties, the POs became responsible for monitoring the activities and landings of 
member vessels and ensuring that total PO quota was not over-fished.  
By devolving responsibility for allocating quota and monitoring uptake at individual-
vessel level to the POs, the direct link between government and vessels in a PO was severed. The 
government retained responsibility for managing vessels outside PO membership. The number of 
non-PO vessels gradually declined with vessels in this category primarily engaged in the 
prosecution of non-quota species.296 Outside of this, the government moved to manage quota 
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uptake at a PO-level to ensure the UK was not placed in an over-fishing position. The other 
responsibilities retained by government included the administration of licencing, enforcement 
and, with the introduction of transferability of quota into the PO system in the 1990s, the 
sanctioning of in-year quota swaps and transfers. 
Section 1 discusses PO management as a concept developed by the Scottish industry in 
1977. It argues that the initial theoretical aim of PO management was to improve compliance 
with quota restrictions by creating an additional layer of local enforcement that would be more 
effective than enforcement at a national-government level. Section 2 argues that the UK 
Government rejected PO management in 1977 because a move to the use of a historical 
allocation of quota would disadvantage the English and Welsh fishing fleets. Section 3 examines 
the decision-making process behind the introduction of PO management in 1984. It argues that 
the MAFF policy shift was driven primarily by concern for cod quota management. The decision 
to introduce PO management was a reaction to political pressure from fishing constituencies and 
industry representatives which lobbied the government about the economic pressures facing their 
fleets. PO management was supported by the UK and Scottish Fisheries Departments as it 
represented a way for the departments to protect politically important parts of the fleet and 
distinct ownership structures. DAFS viewed PO management as a way to improve conditions for 
the Scottish vessels targeting haddock, while MAFF looked to it to provide relief to the large, 
company-owned vessels targeting cod. Ultimately, however, PO management was a tool to inject 
greater flexibility into vessel operations to allow for improvements in efficiency and returns to 
protect economic performance as fishing opportunities sharply declined.  
 
5.1 The Development of PO Management as a Concept in UK Fisheries 
Management 
 
PO management as an approach to fisheries management was developed by the Scottish 
fishing industry interests in 1977. It was proposed to the Scottish Office as a tool for improving 
the compliance and enforcement of quota restrictions. Industry support for the idea that POs 
should manage quota is acknowledged in a note prepared for Scottish Office meeting with the 
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Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation (SFO) on 17 December 1977.297 The rationale for PO 
management rested on the industry’s argument that the implementation of quota restrictions 
would be ineffective without industry cooperation.298 In March 1978, the Aberdeen Fish 
Producers’ Organisation (AFPO) argued that “the UK Government had insufficient resources to 
monitor and control landings”. AFPO argued that the government had to “rely on the active co-
operation of catchers in quota management” to ensure compliance.”299 
 In a paper produced by AFPO in 1978, entitled ‘Producer Organisations at the 
Crossroads’, PO management was presented as an alternative system of bottom-up enforcement 
that would use a carrot-and-stick incentive system to create compliance at vessel level. The paper 
argued for POs to be allocated their own percentage of any future quotas to manage. AFPO 
believed this would make PO membership attractive to fishers, which would in turn make it 
worthwhile for fishers to abide by the PO’s rules. Expulsion from the PO would carry a high 
economic cost with overfishing against the members pooled quota creating a strong incentive for 
self-discipline.300  
The concept of PO management rested upon two fundamental assertions. Firstly, that the 
POs needed to acquire control of their members’ quota. This was to be achieved by allocating the 
POs their memberships’ aggregate share and giving them a mandate to allocate this quota to 
individual vessels as they saw fit. This would incentivise PO membership as it would generate 
greater flexibility and more representative quota allocations. POs would use local and sector-
specific knowledge to allocate quota and manage uptake in a manner that would more accurately 
reflect traditional fishing patterns, seasonality and local market conditions. 
The second assertion was that once vessels had joined a PO, membership rules - designed 
and implemented at a local level by the PO -  would work to regulate vessel behaviour more 
effectively than national laws. The idea that fishermen would now have an incentive to “watch 
each other” represented a new monitoring tool as collective management of a group of 
fishermen’s quotas meant that overfishing or rule infringement by one fishermen directly harmed 
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the collective membership. This changed the dynamic of free-riding behaviour as the costs of 
such action were now borne at a local as well as a national level. This utilised the role for social 
capital - the relationships and social connections between fishermen – in creating more effective 
fisheries regulations. New, locally-administered social incentives and penalties for illegal 
practice/free-riding were created, which used fear of social exclusion and damage to reputation 
and relationships with fellow PO member vessels.  
Goodlad’s (1998) evaluation of growing industry support for PO management also points 
to disillusionment on the part of the fleet with the weekly quota system and the desire on the part 
of the industry to use its knowledge to improve quota management.301 Specific reference is made 
to criticisms regarding the lack of sectoral and local considerations in the operation of the weekly 
vessel quota mechanism. Goodlad points to the problems experience in the Shetland haddock and 
sandeel fishery in 1982 – wherein the absence of regard for the seasonality of the fisheries within 
the quota allocation system led to the loss of the summer haddock fishery- as underwriting the 
justification for the Shetland PO management trial in 1983.  
The issue identified in the AFPO paper was that to create effective levels of internal 
discipline the POs required the power to tie rule infractions to a member vessel’s licence. In 
1977, the POs were generally regarded as lacking control over their memberships with repeat 
infringements of PO rules by members. AFPO acknowledged that the “POs have no control over 
ports, buyers, processors or members.”302 To resolve this, the POs called for the power to effect 
changes, known as variations, in the fishing licenses of their members. In a letter to the Scottish 
Office, 27 January 1978, the Chief Executive of the Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation (SFO) 
Iain MacSween wrote: “the preferred solution by the SFO, to introduce discipline into any 
management scheme, would be to tie the rules of a PO to the licences issues by HM 
Government…a licence [would] contain a condition that a vessel landing in any particular area 
abides by the management rules set down by the PO in the whole economic area in which the 
vessel is landing. This solution would give the actual role of management to the PO whom we 
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feel are best equipped to act within the day-to-day role… in this way POs would be responsible 
for running management and the courts would be responsible for punishing offenders.”303 
Non-compliance with PO rules would be reprimanded by a member’s licence conditions 
being varied so that it was unable to go to sea or prosecute certain stocks. PO management, when 
conceived in 1977-78, represented a devolution of responsibility in terms of quota allocation and 
control functions.  
 
5.2 The UK Government’s Assessment of PO Management 1977-1978  
 
This section argues that the UK Government’s rejection of PO management in 1977 was 
shaped by regulatory and distributive concerns. These flowed from doubts regarding the ability 
of the POs to create effective levels of internal discipline and the political ramifications of using 
a historical criterion for allocating quota.  
The government was aware of industry support for PO management and the 
administrative and political benefits of devolving certain responsibilities. A joint MAFF and 
DAFS paper published in May 1977 concluded that “it is generally agreed that as much 
management as possible should be left in the hands of the industry itself and this points to a 
system whereby allocations are made to industry organisations”.304 The Head of MAFF, Charles 
Cann, commented that PO management was “a good way to avoid the administrative burden and 
inequities [of fisheries management]”.305 Despite this, official advice to the Fisheries Minister in 
October 1977 was to reject the idea of PO management. Officials argued that “to attempt to sub-
divide quotas between all the individual enterprise or vessels in the UK fleet would pose 
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enormous administrative and political problems and does not seem to be a practical approach for 
the foreseeable future.”306  
Officials were concerned that the POs would be unable to create sufficient levels of 
internal discipline and control their members. A 1977 Ministerial Submission commented that 
“some POs may not be able to effectively manage their members’ operations.”307 The 
government’s concern was shaped by experience with the PO system with DAFS reflecting that 
“experience so far indicates that there can be problems for the POs in enforcing, allocation and 
allied arrangements against their own members.”308 MAFF agreed, responding that “admittedly 
some POs may not be able to manage the activities of their members… even those POs which 
think they are able to do this, cannot necessarily be relied upon to succeed.”309  
Resourcing was also highlighted as a concern during the government’s consideration of 
PO management in the 1980 Ministerial Review of Quota Management. Though officials spoke 
of a “temptation to try to pass the buck to the fishing producer organisations”, advice to 
Ministers was that this option should not be pursued.310 MAFF officials reflected that given how 
hard it had been for the government to cope with the pressures of quota management “in spite of 
all our resources, the immense advantages of being the government, elected by national suffrage, 
the support that the safety value of Parliament gives, what real chance has a small PO with 
limited resources?”311 
The reference to “the immense advantages of being the government, elected by national 
suffrage, the support that the safety value of Parliament gives” highlights an issue that has 
persisted throughout the history of UK PO management. Identified in Section 1, the original PO 
management structure involved the POs being awarded the power to revoke and vary members’ 
licences to create effective discipline. This would have given the POs the mandate to control and 
revoke an individual’s economic rights and their means to make a living. Under Article 4 of the 
Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1967, the granting of a license and its conditions was a function and 
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power of the Minister with fishing licences granted in the Minister’s name. MAFF’s comments 
on PO management alluded to a perception that it was acceptable for government to limit the 
economic opportunities of individuals to produce stock conservation.312  
The international setting of the regulatory requirements reinforced the government’s 
reluctance to relinquish control of licencing. In response to a 1984 Committee recommendation 
that more fisheries management should be devolved to local authorities DAFS wrote: “Along 
with the other UK Fisheries Ministers, the Secretary of State has the responsibility to ensure that 
national quotas are not exceeded. There could therefore be no question of the Secretary of State 
giving up his central role in controlling the uptake of catch, and indeed in enforcing the 
numerous fishery regulations both Community and domestic… Fisheries Minister have to retain 
decision-making powers to ensure compliance with national objectives.”313  
This quotation indicates that the government’s perception was that, as the Member State 
and competent authority, it carried the risk. Therefore, it should control the means to avert this 
risk. As the Member States and competent authority, the government was ultimately responsible 
for implementing EC law. It was liable if UK quota shares were overfished and mismanaged. 
Penalties for infringements and non-compliance with CFP regulations were levied at Member 
State government level and most often took the form of infraction, with the EC taking Member 
States to court, risking fines and reputational damages that could affect future negotiations and 
allocation.314 The need for government to retain control over vessel licensing became further 
engrained from 1984 when, following the agreement of the CFP in 1983, a Restrictive Licensing 
                                                      
312 If power and function over licencing had been devolved to the POs the nature of the POs as organisations would 
have been fundamentally altered in a way that was incompatible with their creation under EEC regulation.  POs 
would be performing governmental functions thus becoming non-governmental organisations i.e. quasi-autonomous 
non-governmental organisation (Quangos), now more commonly referred to as non-department public bodies 
(NDPBs). 
313 NAS (1985) AF62/5588, Fish Farming - Montgomery Committee, ‘Committee of Inquiry into the Functions and 
Powers of Island Council- Regional Fisheries Management’, para.2, June 1983.  
314 While there has been a proliferation in the number of international treaties and international environmental 
agreements (IEAs) since 1945, the functions and responsibilities of national governments within these frameworks 
and agreements have not been superseded as IEAs are not a product of a ‘world government’ but of nation states 
participating in collective action. The role and responsibility of national governments have tended to increase as they 
have become increasingly bound by international laws and conventions. Mulkey and Chanon (2002) identify the 
indispensable role played by national governments in negotiating the agreement in line with national interests and 
their responsibility for implementing and translating the transnational agreement into effective law and regulation at 
national and local levels (Mulkey, Marcia E and Keith E. Chanon, “National Compliance of International 
Environmental Treaties”, paper presented at the Sixth International Conference on Environmental Compliance and 





Scheme was introduced as UK Ministers took powers to restrict fishing for a wide range of 
species subject to quota caught by UK fishermen.  
 
MAFF also rejected PO management in 1977 as it was aware that the use of historical 
allocation criterion would create distinct regulatory problems and severely disadvantage the 
English and Welsh fleets.315 Prior to 1977, quota allocations had included vessel characteristics 
such as length, engine power or crew size. A historical allocation was viewed as having several 
benefits. Firstly, it was viewed by the industry as the fairest way to allocate quota, it was 
administratively straight-forward and, as it was not tied to physical inputs, it would allow the 
fleet greater flexibility in employing capital and labour. A historical allocation was also viewed 
as providing the fleet with a greater sense of stability.316  
 
Table 5.2 UK Regional Landings (tonnes) by Region of Capture, 1969-1978 
 
 Landings (tonnes) from within 
European Pool* 
Landings (tonnes) caught in water 















1969 152,204 326,151 5,842 484,197 370,146 30,430 0 400,576 
1970 217,078 361,205 8,433 586,716 334,182 35,308 0 369,490 
1972 206,411 401,283 7,925 615,619 285,768 29,109 0 314,877 
1972 202,650 418,460 8,332 629,442 249,792 22,454 0 272,246 
1973 198,942 450,668 11,278 660,888 256,906 26,011 0 282,917 
1974 182,075 429,280 12,590 623,945 253,704 29,365 0 283,069 
1975 176,911 361,318 9,772 548,001 219,099 26,272 0 245,371 
1976 249,963 387,484 11,353 648,800 170,186 25,392 0 195,578 
1977 330,097 369,956 8,283 708,800 111,935 16,412 0 128,347 
1978 484,187 393,353 6,612 884,152 45,817 6,087 0 51,904 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 1969-1978. *Landings from; West Coast of Scotland, Irish Sea, North Sea, Rockall, West of 
Ireland and Sole Banks, English Channel and Bristol Channel. ** Landings from; Iceland, Faroe Islands, Barnets Sea, Norwegian 
Coast, Bear Island and Spitzbergen, Skagerrak, East Coast of Greenland, West Coast of Greenland, Labrador and Great Banks of 
Newfoundland. 
 
                                                      
315 Under PO management, there would be three distinct allocations: i) allocation of total UK quota between the POs 
as a group and the remaining non-sector (the non-sector reflected the group of vessels that were not members of a 
PO), ii) allocation of the aggregate PO share of UK quota between the individual POs, and iii) allocation of an 
individual PO’s share of total UK quota amongst its member. The first two allocations took place using historical 
data with the third allocation formula at the discretion of the individual POs.  
316 As with ‘Relative Stability’, a historical allocation provided some sense of stability for the industry in terms of 




In 1977, the ability to allocate quota on a historical basis in practice was identified as 
being undermined by the classic regulatory problem of missing or incomplete information. Data 
on uptake of UK quota landings at an individual vessel level did not existed. The SFO 
acknowledged that “one of the problems inherent in attempting to do this is the lack of statistical 
data available to POs as regards their members’ activities.”317  
The second and more pressing issue with allocating on a historical basis was that it would 
have severely disadvantaged the English and Welsh fleets.318 A DAFS consultation paper on PO 
management, 24 February 1978, had used data from 1975 to create an allocation formula for PO 
management. Data from 1975 had been used as it represented “the most recent year in which the 
North Sea white fishery was not subject to statutory restrictions affecting catches.”319 A separate 
industry paper had produced a similar allocation formula using annual average landings data 
from 1972-75.320 In August 1977 MAFF was concerned that a historical allocation using data 
from the 1970s would create a distributed outcome that reflected the slow pace of restructuring 
that was taking place following the extension of 200-mile EEZs from 1976.  Table 3.2 
demonstrates that over 1969-78 the English and Welsh fleets had increased their landings from 
within EU waters threefold. Yet while in 1978 English and Welsh landings from within EU 
waters represented 55% of total UK landings in this area, for 1975 (the year of the DAFS 
analysis) this figure was 32%.  
 
A historical allocation based on track-records in the mid-1970s would therefore distribute 
EU quota in a way that favoured the Scottish fleet. The internal note outlined that a historical 
allocation “would severely constrain the operations of POs whose members had been historically 
                                                      
317 TNA (1977) MAF 452/10, Producer Organisations, letter Iain MacSween Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation to 
John Cormack, Undersecretary for Fisheries, DAFS, 27 October 1977. 
318  A concern for the political costs of allocation remained in the 1980 Quota Allocation Consultation. (TNA (1986) 
MAF 452/34, Quota Management Methods, ‘Quota Management’, Submission to the Minister, p4, para 14, 
Fisheries IV, 27 October 1980). Moreover, while enforcement of sectoral quota management was evaluated to be 
“not much more difficult than with periodic closures,” the policy was concluded to be “inevitably more contentious 
than a policy of periodic closures. The decision on what share to give different sectors would be controversial. On 
the other hand, those sectors which felt protected by the policy could be expected to welcome the protection” (ibid., 
para.8).  
319 NAS (1978) AF62/5973, White Fish Conservation, ‘Draft Consultation Paper- Interim Arrangements for 
Management of Certain Fish Stocks’, Note by The Fisheries Departments’ 24 February 1978, p.3, para.4. 
320 TNA (1977) MAF 452/10, Producer Organisations, ‘North Sea White Fish Management’, Scottish Fishermen’s 




reliant on fishing in the non-EEC waters from which they had recently been displaced.”321 The 
DAFS formula, based upon track records from 1975, awarded the Scottish POs twice as much 
North Sea haddock quota as the English and Welsh (Table 3.3) and the SFO industry paper, 
using 1972-75 data, awarded Scottish vessels 84.7 per cent of total UK quota shares and within 
this 83.7 per cent of UK whiting quota and 49.9 per cent of UK cod quota.322 MAFF concluded 
in a note of 18 August 1977, that “it [historical performance] cannot be the only factor…it will 
be necessary to try and divide up any UK quotas in a way which balances the claims on the 
stocks in question of those fishermen who have traditionally fished it with a need to allow those 
displaced from other stocks to re-deploy at least some of their effort on to stocks not traditionally 
fished.”323 In the Ministerial Submission of 17 October 1977, MAFF also outlined the long-term 
impacts of this allocation and tied it to the issues of efficiency and fleet rationalisation:  “In the 
longer term, the fundamental problem would be to avoid quota management through the POs 
leading to the pattern of UK fishing being frozen, with the more efficient unable progressively to 
displace the less efficient.”324  
 




Scotland Total % 
Aberdeen FPO 116 18,218 18,334 18.1 
Anglo-Scottish FPO 3,387 3,716 7,103 7.1 
Fish Producer Organisation 27,627 17 27,644 27.2 
Scarborough & Bridlington FPO 755 0 755 0.8 
Scottish FO 85 29,502 29,587 29.1 
Others 7,616 20,162 27,778 17.2 
Under 40m 45 543 588 0.5 
Total 39,631 72,158 111,789  
Source: NAS (1978) AF62/5973, White Fish Conservation. ‘Interim arrangements for 
management of certain fish stocks’, 24 February 1978.  
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The advice given to Ministers in October 1977 counselling against the introduction of PO 
management stemmed from an amalgamation of regulatory and political concerns. The decision 
to reject - but ultimately delay PO management – represented an attempt by MAFF to protect the 
English and Welsh fleets from the distributive outcome of a historical allocation. This decision 
acts as evidence of the UK Government continuing to use quota management decisions to shape 
social and economic outcomes through the allocation of fishing opportunities.  
The case for maintaining a UK-wide and centralist approach to fisheries management was 
reinforcement in evidence submitted by the government to the 1984 Montgomery Committee. 
This was an inquiry into the functions and power of the islands councils of Scotland: 
“In face of conflicting demands from the industry and from local authorities, given the varying 
interests of sectors of the fleet based in different parts of the country, there is a need for the 
Secretary of State to retain a unifying influence on the direction to be taken for the good of the 
industry and the country as a whole…. The government has a duty to manage the fisheries for the 
benefit of all the participants; that duty often requires striking a balance between and among 
interests which can be in conflict and which may not be represented in the areas in question.”325 
The extract implies that the government was aware that a key responsibility was to 
arbitrate between conflicting local interests and that decisions taken were to spread out 
remaining opportunities to avoid sectoral and geographical concentrations. The reference to “all 
the participants” of fisheries also hints at a widening of the government’s focus. Historically 
fisheries policy had focused immediately on the catching sector and the onshore ancillary 
services. As policy developed, fishing communities and towns that surround the ports, and more 
recently consumers and wider public interests, had also come to be regarded as those having a 
stake in the management of fisheries. 
 
5.3 The 1984 Policy Shift and the Introduction of PO Management 
 
This section argues that the UK Government agreed to the introduction of PO 
management in 1984 to feed through decreases in fishing opportunities in a least cost manner by 
altering industry behaviour. The government aimed to give the fleet additional flexibility over 
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the time of use of capital and quota in ordered to improve economic efficiency and returns to 
offset TAC reductions. In this regard, the decision to use PO management was shaped primarily 
by economic pressure bearing down on the industry from European conservation policies. In 
2010, an independent panel reporting to  Marine Scotland recalled that: “Following a successful 
trial in 1984 with the Shetland PO managing the haddock quota on behalf of the member vessels, 
responsibility was gradually devolved to POs through a system that became known as sectoral 
quota management and which was unique to the UK.”326 However it was argued that the decision 
to implement PO management – an agreement brokered between MAFF and DAFS - preceded 
the conclusion of the trial in which the Shetland PO had been awarded a share of UK Area IV 
and VI haddock quota to manage on behalf of its members. 
 












Total E&W Scot’d N. I 
UK 






1975 39.6 72.8 112 195 46.7 1 242 6.38 37.1 2.02 45.5 579 
1976 36.6 90.8 127 164 47.1 1 212 6.92 39.2 3.29 49.4 576 
1977 29.3 93.6 123 108 37.9 1.18 147 8.32 38.9 2.69 49.9 499 
1978 19.3 63.1 82.4 82.6 42.7 1.07 126 9.37 45.4 3.08 57.9 434 
1979 19.2 55.5 72.7 64.8 42.8 1.58 109 8.74 49.4 2.95 61.1 359 
1980 19.2 65.6 84.8 57.3 44.8 2.16 104 8.04 44.4 3.95 56.4 384 
1981 15.7 84.4 100 58.8 54.1 2.81 115 7.34 35.6 9.5 52.4 413 
1982 16.4 112 128 56.2 54.9 3.23 114 8.71 34 9.93 52.6 448 
 
1983 11.1 109 124 53.3 56.4 2.92 112 6.28 45.4 5.26 56.9 427 
 
1984 11.7 95.7 107 34.7 53.9 2.22 90.8 6.56 48.4 5.66 60.6 395 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics, 1975-84. (HMSO: London). 
 
In April 1984, MAFF took the view that “the time [was] ripe to take a closer look at the 
role, structure and potential of our FPOs.”327 MAFF’s new position on PO management was not 
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shaped by identified regulatory problems being resolved.328 Indeed, an improvement in the 
government’s working knowledge of quota management and fisher’s behaviour post-1980 
worked to increase its awareness of potential problems. Additional concerns related to 
information and monitoring were identified. In a MAFF submission on ‘North Sea White Fish: 
Quota Management’, 28 March 1984, an official wrote that: “the status and expertise of some 
POs is by no means proven and we are far from certain that they could exert the necessary 
internal discipline on their members…in practical terms, it is difficult at this stage to obtain the 
data necessary to establish accurate sectoral quotas for the POs…the whole venture represents a 
step into the unknown”.329 Doubts persisted following the decision to allow for PO management 
more widely than the Shetland trial.330  
The primary factor shaping MAFF’s new position on PO management was the need to 
pass through an 18 per cent cut in UK cod quota for 1984.331  PO management was an attempt to 
improve fleet profitability to dampen the economic impact of TAC reductions.332 In 1983 
scientific advice had warned that cod stocks in Union waters were badly depleted.333 UK cod 
landings had fallen dramatically over the 1970s as access to the cold, cod-rich waters around 
                                                      
328 The issue of mandate and whether POs should be granted the authority to vary licences was sidestepped rather 
than addressed. For both the Shetland trial and the final implemented structure, POs were not given control of 
licensing powers. 
329 TNA (1984) MAF 452/6, White Fish Stock Management, ‘North Sea and West of Scotland Quota Management’, 
D.H. Griffith, 28 March 1984, para.6. 
330 TNA (1985) MAF 452/77/2 Producer Organisations, ‘Cod IV and VI Sectoral Quotas for 1984’, E. Morgan, 16 
July 1984. The MAFF had doubts regarding monitoring and the efficacy of the PO management to deliver effective 
quota management: “In my minute 25 April, I had serious misgivings about the granting of PO quotas at this stage, 
in particular because of the difficulties in monitoring catches and reconciling Ministry and industry figures. I 
currently have little reason to change my view and for a variety of reasons still feel that it is going to be extremely 
difficult.” 
331 UK cod allocations fell from 114,000 tonnes in 1983 to 93,000 tonnes for 1984.  
332 The TAC reduction coincided with the end of the ten-year derogation that delayed the introduction of the 
conservation component of the CFP until 1 January 1983. 
333 While this represented a sharp and unprecedented decline in quota, it should have come as little surprise to both 
industry and government. A minuet to the Minister of State, 3 April 1984, reveals that the government and industry 
were aware of the “scientific opinion that the stock [North Sea cod] had been badly depleted” and that low catches 
in 1983 supported this position (TNA (1984) MAF 452/6, White Fish Stock Management, ‘North Sea and West of 
Scotland Quota Management- Draft Minute for Signature by Mr Griffiths’, 3 April 1984 para. 3). Despite a 
government warning at the end of 1982 that the cod TAC for 1983 would be overfished without new management 
restrictions; in November 1983 Fisheries Division IV recalled that: “Once again the industry rejected the possibility 
of restriction on cod although at that time it was evident that the 1983 quota level would be exceeded. Throughout 
they were warned that in both cases [North Sea and West of Scotland stocks] there was a real risk of having to pay 
compensation to Norway if they contributed to a Community overshoot of the joint stock. This message was 
reinforced by officials on 24 and 25 October [1982] but the industry was unanimous in the view that it would 
vigorously oppose any further restrictions on effort of the early closure of the fisheries” (TNA (1983) MAF 452/5, 
White Fish Stock Management, ‘Quota Management 1983- Area IV Cod and Haddock’, Fisheries Division IV, 1 




Iceland and the Faroes had been lost due to the introduction of new international fishing limits. 
From 1975-84, UK cod landings fell by two-thirds from 242,000 to 90,800 tonnes (Table 5.4). 
Yet cod remained a commercially important stock for the UK fleet, accounting for 27 per cent of 
all UK demersal landings by weight and 37 per cent by value in 1980. UK. Attempts to manage 
cod quota uptake under the NEAFC and interim-EEC quota agreements had failed due to the 
diverse nature of the vessels targeting cod. As was concluded in a Ministerial Submission in 
March 1980, “as the groupings of vessels targeting [cod] stocks are so diverse, no agreement 
could be made at a national level regarding the best method to manage catch.”334  
The issue was the criterion for allocating cod quota between vessels as each group of 
local and sectoral interests lobbied for a criterion that would maximise their share of national 
TACs. The fleets of smaller vessels lobbied for a criterion that favoured labour over capital in 
order to be protected from displacement by the larger, more mobile vessels. This criterion was 
rejected by the distant-water fleets who lobbied for a criterion that would allow their more 
powerful and versatile boats to maximise their capacity. The SFO’s ‘per-man’ proposal was 
rejected by several English POs and the Aberdeen FPO. The Fish Producers’ Organisation wrote 
to MAFF on 10 December 1979, outlining its “unqualified opposition to the implementation of 
the per man regime for the regulation of cod landings.”335 The FPO argued that a per-man 
allocation undermined the efficiency and profit margins of the larger vessels. The Scarborough 
and Bridlington Fish Producers Organisation (SBFPO) petitioned MAFF for the use of either a 
flat-rate weekly quota (a 250cwts vessel quota “irrelevant of size or crew”) or a weekly quota 
based on vessel length with this justified on the premise that it would be “more equitable, less 
open to abuse and easier to police.”336 The SBFPO’s proposals, in particular allocation based on 
vessel length, would have allocated a greater share of UK cod quota to larger vessels. A lack of 
agreement within the industry led to the UK Government continually deferring the question of 
allocating cod quota to individual vessels.337   
                                                      
334 TNA (1980) MAF 452/3, White Fish Stock Management, ‘North Sea and West of Scotland Cod, Haddock and 
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VI’, Note by Fisheries Departments, DAFS/MAFF November 1979, para 2. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the design 
and implementation of the haddock and whiting weekly quota scheme was aided by the fact that the vessels 




 A political backlash erupted as the UK Government was forced to implement a 200 cwts 
per week flat vessel quota for cod from 1 January 1984 in order to meet its legal obligation to 
reduce UK cod landings by 18 percent.338 The decision was met with particular hostility in the 
fishing constituency of Grimsby, where a political campaign was spearheaded by two local MPs 
for the area Michael Brown and Austin Mitchell.339 The campaign centred on the narrative that 
the region was dependent on the cod fisheries and would suffer disproportionately under the new 
weekly quota restrictions. 
A joint petition submitted to MAFF, 11 January 1984, argued that the region “will be 
harder hit than any other port in the UK by a curtailment of its main activity which cannot be 
compensated for in any other type of catch.”340 Specific reference was made to the importance of 
the fishing companies to the area and the impact of the weekly quota on the economic viability 
of the vessels. The petition argued trawlers were the “mainstay of the port” as they were the only 
vessels “catching sufficient quantities to provide a base for the market”. However, the vessels 
were to be “badly hit” by new quota arrangements as “no account had been taken of what the 
vessels required to operate successfully.”341 
Political pressure and awareness of the economic impacts of the cod quota restrictions on 
the large trawlers led the government to focus on how quota reductions could be absorbed by the 
industry at least cost. With quota regimes fixing output by limiting landings and TAC reductions 
reducing output, the issues of time and capital came into play. With fixed or falling output, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1975-1979, UK landings of haddock and whiting had remained relatively static, with Scottish landings as a percent 
of the UK total averaging 73 percent and 79.5 per cent respectively. 
338 TNA (1984) MAF 452/6, White Fish Stock Management, ‘1984 North Sea Quota Management- Cod and 
Haddock’, A. Wilson, 17 February 1984, para.2. 
339In a subsequent meeting between MAFF and the Grimsby Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association, 19 January 1984, 
it was claimed that, excluding British Union of Trawlers vessels which were the biggest local company, the annual 
total gross income for the port of Grimsby from fishing related activities was £14 million per annum (TNA (1984) 
MAF 452/6, White Fish Stock Management, ‘Cod Quotas Grimsby: Meeting with Grimsby Fishing Vessel Owners’ 
Association’, Note by D.W. Harbourne, 19 January 1984. 
340 TNA (1984) MAF 452/6, White Fish Stock Management, letter to John MacGregor, Minister of State, MAFF 
from Michael Brown MP and Austin Mitchell MP, 11 January 1984. 
341 ibid. The petition outlined the fear that because inadequate provision for cod quotas the competitiveness of the 
area would continue to decline: “Without such a measure… the long-standing trend for the Grimsby industry to 
decline and for sections of it to transfer to Scotland will be accelerated”. The BUT also wrote to MAFF to outline 
the disproportionate impact this would have on the larger trawlers: “this method of cod quota management (monthly 
quotas) will effectively impose on this company a reduction that far exceeds that imposed on other sections of the 
industry. Even if the current level of cod quota (170 cwts per week) was to prevail thorough out the year, it would 
result in our vessels landing 30 per cent in June and 48 percent in July less than last year, thus rendering it totally 
uneconomic to put those vessels to sea.” TNA (1984) MAF 452/6, White Fish Stock Management, letter to J 




vessels could retain profitability by using inputs such as capital more efficiently, by making 
more appropriate decisions regarding when to land quota to capture higher market prices. 
 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics Tables 1965-1989. (HMSO: London). 
 
Pressure to allow the industry to have greater flexibility in the use of capital came from 
the industry. In a meeting between the industry and government, 20 January 1984, the National 
Federation of Fishermen’s Organisation (NFFO) lobbied for the weekly cod quota restriction of 
250cwts per week to be replaced by a monthly allocation of 1,000cwts. The NFFO argued that a 
longer time in which to catch and land against quota would allow for the more efficient use of 
capital and labour. The NFFO argued that, if desired, a whole month’s quota could be caught in 














Figure 5.1 UK Cod Landings by British Vessels into British Ports 1965-
1989
1 September, 1972: Iceland extends fishing limits to 50 nmiles. Second Cod War begins with 
a temporary agreement November 1973.
May 1975: Iceland declares 200 mile fishing limit. Third Cod War until June 1976.
UK declares 200 mile EEZ and European Common Pool created
1 Jan 1983: CFP TAC and quota programme implemented
1 Jan 1984: 18% cut in 




revenue would be received but variable costs could be avoided, thus allowing for better profit 
margins as economies of scale could be captured.342   
Profitability could also be maintained by giving the vessels greater autonomy over when 
to land fish. In support of the Shetland trial, the Scottish Office argued that greater flexibility 
would allow vessels to land in response to local market demand and seasonal fluctuations and 
secure a higher price. MAFF conceded by recognising that vessels fished for the market 
differently.343 Even though market prices were less firm, some vessels took the bulk of their 
quota in the middle of the year when cod was plentiful to reduce fishing costs. Alternatively, 
some vessel fished out with the season to target higher market prices.  
The outcome was the design of a two-tier system that remains the basis of UK quota 
management three decades later. Annual sectoral quotas would be allocated on a historical basis 
to groups who could provide “evidence of internal discipline in the group so that enforcement is 
possible”.344 For vessels choosing to remain outside PO membership (the non-sector), a monthly 
vessel quota would be allocated based on vessel size. While MAFF referred to the non-sector 
arrangements as “an inflexible instrument”, the basis of the new system was to give vessels the 
choice between the systems and greater operation flexibility under PO management: “Our hope 
would be that a combination of these 2 methods of control would give the various sectors of the 
fleet the maximum flexibility to choose a system to suit their needs, within the constraints 
imposed by the requirement to achieve an 18% reduction for the year.”345 
 
 The decision to adopt PO management before the completion of the Shetland trial was 
triggered by a conflict of a political nature between MAFF and DAFS that rested upon the issue 
of fleet ownership and structure. Each department was drawn to PO management as a way of 
protecting certain elements of the UK fleet. DAFS and the Scottish industry looked to PO 
management to get rid of the inflexibilities of the weekly vessel quota and sustain the operations 
of the smaller-scale, local Scottish fleets targeting haddock. MAFF’s position on PO 
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management was forced by an attempt to protect the economic viability of the large trawlers and 
fishing companies targeting cod stocks. MAFF papers show that the department intended to use 
PO management as a mechanism to award the large companies annual individual quotas, for 
which the British Union of Trawlers (BUT) had begun lobbying in February 1984. This annual 
company quota would allow the companies maximum freedom to realise economies of scale. 
The archives suggest that through a series of meetings between the English POs and MAFF, an 
arrangement was made in which annual Individual Quotas (IQs) for individual vessels and 
companies would be ‘parked’ within PO management. As was outlined in a letter of 31 October 
1984 from MAFF, “what we had in mind was little more than a window-dressing exercise under 
which the Producer Organisation would assume umbrella responsibilities, i.e. it would normally 
receive the allocation but leave the individual members to more or less carry on with present 
arrangements”.346   
The problem was that DAFS and the Scottish industry objected to the introduction of 
company quotas. The reason for this hostility was outlined in a letter to the Minister of State, 3 
April 1984: “The Scottish industry were strongly opposed to a sectoral quota being allocated to 
groupings other than Producer Organisations… Their principal objection was that individual 
companies would be afforded undue flexibility to lay up or scrap some of their vessels, with the 
aid of laying up premium and decommissioning grants, while prosecuting the company quota 
with the remaining vessels in their fleet. This they claim would be unfair to the POs, who 
because they tend to consist of a number of individually owned vessels cannot operate so 
flexibly…The English industry disagree with this and made a strong case for company sectoral 
quotas.”347  
The letter to the Minister of State outlines that MAFF was “clearly committed to 
satisfying the English companies, particular at Grimsby” and aimed “to give further 
consideration as to how to reconcile these conflicting views.” 348 
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MAFF used knowledge of industry pressure on DAFS to broker a political agreement that 
provided for the use of both PO management and company quotas. MAFF was aware that DAFS 
was under increasing pressure from its industry to extend PO management of haddock to other 
POs before the completion of the Shetland pilot and that the Scottish purse seine fleet had been 
petitioning to manage an annual cod quota.349 On March 28, 1984 a MAFF official wrote:  
“DAFS now want to extend the facility for PO management to cod and to areas other than the 
Shetlands, the purpose of this being to provide their large number of pair trawlers with the same 
sort of flexibility which our companies will enjoy from their proposed sectoral quotas. DAFS 
seem much more committed to PO management than we are and wish to allow bids for PO 
management for cod.” 350  
In May 1984, MAFF offered DAFS a deal. MAFF would “swallow [its] reservations over 
PO management” if DAFS was “prepared to recommend the acceptance of company quotas”.351 
In an internal MAFF note on May 21, 1984 an official concluded that the department should 
accept the DAFS deal as it offered the only way of securing what was required for the 
companies.352 This approach was also seen to offer the industry more time to adapt to PO 
management with many of the POs in England and Wales not being ready to take on new 
responsibilities.  
The outcome was that to protect the cod sector, MAFF agreed to the introduction of PO 
management despite significant reservations regarding the actual ability of some of the POs to 
deliver effective quota management, especially in England and Wales. This led to a long lead-in 
time for PO management in England and Wales as it took several years for some POs to 
convince the government of their ability to adequate manage quota and their members’ 
behaviour.  
 Changes to PO management since 1984 have primarily been shaped by attempts to 
correct perverse incentives. From an initial focus on haddock and cod stocks in Areas IV and VI 
1984, in 1985 annual allocations to POs were extended to include saithe and whiting as well as 
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Area IV herring.353 In 1991 the opportunity to manage whitefish quota stocks in the English 
Channel and Western waters (Area VII) was created.  By 1990-91, all UK POs were choosing to 
manage some quotas on behalf of their members. In 1995, the decision was then taken to require 
POs managing quota allocations for whitefish stocks in Areas IV, VI and VII to manage all 
stocks with similar requirements made for the pelagic stocks in 1999. This made it obligatory for 
all POs to manage all quota stocks. The reason for this, as outlined in Hatcher et al., (2002), was 
to mitigate against perverse behaviour on the part of the POs resulting from the use of a track-
record allocation criteria and to push the POs into taking up more managerial responsibility.354  
From 1997, the allocation criteria – historical track record – was also adjusted and in 
1999 it was replaced with the Fixed Quota Allocation (FQA) method which awarded each vessel 
a fixed percentage of UK quota shares. While this was a fixed percentage, the actual amount of 
quota (FQA units) and its economic value would fluctuate depending upon the size of national 
quota and prices. 355 The change aimed to counter perverse incentives created by the track-record 
allocation. To increase or maintain allocation quota shares, vessels would inflate landings and 
track records known as ‘ghost-fishing’. The third significant evolution in PO management 
concerns the use of the PO structure to introduce trading into UK quota management which is 
addressed in the next chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
The devolution of quota management responsibilities to the POs represented a significant 
shift in UK fisheries policy. In part, it represented an acknowledgment on behalf of government 
that a highly-centralised, top-down method of allocation had its limitations. The flexibility 
provided in the shift from national to local and/or sectoral quota allocations and the choice 
awarded to the industry in terms of use of capital and quota would enable the UK fleet to meet 
the challenges of the CFP’s TAC regime. A Ministerial Submission showed that the government 
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had realised different policies were required by different sectors of the fleet to obtain a 18% 
reduction at least cost. 356 More than one method of quota management was needed.  
PO management represented an acknowledgment on the part of government of the 
sectoral nature of the UK fleet, the differing operations of the sectors and the conflicting interests 
and needs this produced in terms of quota allocation structures. Conflicting sectoral interests and 
industry fragmentation had resulted in a policy deadlock for cod management. PO management 
created a new administrative mechanism to allocate quota in a way that would circumnavigate 
such deadlock and allow for the sectoral interests to allocate as they saw appropriate.  
The government’s acquiescence in or with the idea that more autonomy and decision-
making should occur at sectoral and individual vessel level was forced by new economic 
constraints that politically validated the need to focus fisheries policy on improving the 
economic performance of vessels. This was forced by the need to sustain performance and 
profitability in line with declining opportunities. This economic pressure and the political 
lobbying that amplified its importance within central government worked to shift the policy 
focus away from labour-favouring policies towards a more favourable appreciation of capital 
inputs. The experience of the cod-targeting fleet and the primacy it received in government 
considerations of quota management help to underline the extent to which the impact of quota 
allocation mechanisms on vessel economic viability was vital. Spreading out declining fishing 
opportunities equally across the country would not protect against economic hardship as TACs 
reduced.  
It is also clear that the original motivations for PO management did not embody the user-
participation theories of governance discussed in the literature review. Certain themes within the 
literature are, however, present within the concept of PO management. For instance, more 
accurate industry knowledge of local economic conditions and the seasonality of fisheries was to 
be used firstly in guiding the POs towards a sector-appropriate internal allocation structure and 
secondly, vessels awarded IQs could use their own knowledge and expertise to fish for the 
market and improved returns. Moreover, the industry conception of PO management saw PO 
management improving the legitimacy of fisheries regulations with industry-established 
membership rules improving compliance. Despite echoes between theory and practice, analysis 
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of the government’s decision-making process shows that the introduction of PO management 
was not motivated by a desire on the part of government to increase industry participation in 
centralised decision-making processes. Instead, the POs were to represent an extension of 
government and carry out and implement centrally-determined administrative tasks. The archives 
show that PO management was highly attractive to government as it freed it from an unwanted, 
resource-intensive administrative burden and would deliver political benefits in terms of giving 
the industry what it wanted. Equally clear, however, is that the government saw itself as retaining 
a strong, central role in fisheries management, most notably in terms of control and enforcement 
and through the decision not to devolve licensing powers to the industry. PO management was 
not originally intended to be a mechanism that enabled greater industry involvement in the 
remaining centralised components of UK fisheries policy making; it offered the industry 
autonomy and control over decisions over quota allocation and uptake at a local level and not at 
a national level. 
Arguably, a key criticism that can be levied against the PO management structure 
introduced in 1984 is not that it was an inauthentic user-participation governance structure but 
that, given its principally administrative nature, it created an imbalance for the POs in terms of 
responsibility and power. This imbalance came from the government’s decision not to devolve 
powers of control such as the POs request to limit and vary the fishing licences of members. 
While the government’s reluctance to devolve control (and keenness to devolve responsibility) is 
understandable – it was the body ultimately responsible for ensuring that the UK as a fishing 
fleet and Member States did not breach EU law – the decision regarding control of licences 
worked to undermine the efficacy of PO management in the UK as the POs as management 
organisations were left with too few powers to control their members. Membership rules were 
the main vehicle for this, with expulsion from the PO a key stick. However, POs had themselves 
been reluctant to carry out such sanctions as expelled members would take with them their track 
records/FQAs and the PO would have a reduced amount of quota to allocate. A sense that POs 
have ultimately been unable to control the actions of rogue members that threaten their collective 
membership has arisen again recently with POs lobbying government for this power to 
implement the landing obligation.357  
                                                      




6. UK fishing industry structural policy between 1983 and 
1996 
 
This chapter argues that from 1989 the UK Government knowingly embraced an 
increasingly economic approach to fisheries policy to reduce fishing capacity. However, in line 
with the central thesis, the translation of this new approach into practiced policy was obstructed 
and diluted by sub-national political pressures. The key constraint was government-industry 
tensions and pressure from the Scottish Office. As a result, the UK failed to meet EU targets to 
conserve and protect declining fish stocks.  
From 1984, the UK Government could no longer skirt the issue of fleet capacity. Chapter 
4 argued that while fleet rationalisation was identified as an objective of fisheries policy in 1980, 
mechanisms that would facilitate capacity reduction were rejected by UK Ministers as the 
political costs of running down the industry were deemed too high. This pressure lessened 
somewhat from 1983 as economic and political pressures arising from the growing misalignment 
of the size of the fleet and fishing opportunities forced the government to consider a capital- as 
opposed to labour-favouring approach to quota management. Regardless, chapter 5 argues that 
the decision to devolve quota management to the industry in 1984 represented an attempt to 
address the symptom of declining economic performance and not the root cause of overcapacity.  
The introduction of the CFP’s conservation regime in 1983 ended the government’s 
ability to defer decisions on capacity management. The CFP reflected the European 
Commission’s intention to reduce excess fishing capacity and effort. A 1986 Ministerial 
Submission commented that CFP restructuring measures reflected the Commission’s recognition 
“in the mid-1970s that the capacity of the European Community fishing fleet would exceed the 
fishing opportunities likely to be available to it in the foreseeable future.”358  
The structural policy component of the CFP was the Multi-Annual Guidance Programme 
(MAGP). Five MAGPs operated over the course of 1983-2002: MAGP I over 1983-1986; 
MAGP II 1987-1991; MAGP III 1993-1996; MAGP IV 1997-1999; and MAGP V 2000-2002. 
The Commission used the MAGP to set targets for Member States to reduce fishing capacity. 
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The aim was to adjust the size and shape of national fishing fleets relative to total fishing 
opportunities.359 The UK Government understood “the objective of the [EC Structural Policy] 
scheme as being to control fishing effort in the interests of conserving the stocks”.360 The 
definition of the MAGP scheme as one to assist fleet restructuring as opposed to fleet reduction 
indicates an economic as well as a biological objective. EC Structural Policy aimed to promote 
the restriction and reduction of fishing effort while reducing the costs of fishing through capital 
rejuvenation and modernisation.361 
The MAGPs adopted a results-based approach leaving Member States free to implement 
and achieve their targets through means of their own choosing. All Member States bar France 
and Germany failed to meet their MAGP I target. By 1991, results improved slightly with five 
Member States (Denmark, Germany, Spain, Italy and Portugal) meeting their objectives.362 The 
UK was one of four Member States (alongside Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands) to fail in 
meeting their 1991 objectives by margins of at least 11 per cent. The fleets of Greece, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and the UK were larger on 31 December 1991 both in terms of tonnage and 
kilowatts than their MAGP objectives for 31 December 1986.363 
This chapter uses the UK Government archives to identify the incentives faced by UK 
policy-makers when choosing between different instruments for reducing fishing capacity and 
effort. It examines the decisions made by the UK Government to understand how national and 
local political pressures interacted and led to the UK failing to achieve legally-binding European 
targets. Section 1 examines the period 1983-89 in which policy for MAGP I and II was 
developed. This period is defined by the use of administrative and grants-based approaches to 
capacity reduction and is identified as one of policy failure. It argues that an increase in UK 
fishing capacity was facilitated by a mix of policy inexperience, a failure to consider how fishers 
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would respond to new regulations and a limited working definition of the concept of fishing 
capacity.  
Section 2 examines policy-making from 1989 and identifies the adoption of an 
increasingly economic approach to fisheries policy. It argues that while economic and scientific 
advice was increasingly use in policy-making, the Scottish Office used its political leverage to 
obstruct the application of this advice by objecting to mechanisms that would have exerted 
downward pressure on fishing capacity and effort. Compared to the 1970s-80s, policy-making 
tension was no longer between government economists and politicians but between the UK and 
Scottish Fisheries Departments. The result was that by 1996 the UK’s approach to capacity 
reduction was based on the use of publicly-funded decommissioning -  an approach which the 
UK Government knew to be ineffective for conserving rapidly deteriorating stocks.  
 
6.1 MAGP I and II: UK Structural Policy, 1983-1989 
 
This section argues that the period over which the first and second MAGPs operated (1983-
1991) represented a period of policy failure and stagnation in the UK Government’s approach to 
capacity reduction. By 1989, there were fewer vessels in the UK fleet but the overall capacity of 
the fleet had increased. It attributes policy failure to a poor design of capacity-reduction 
mechanisms. Choices were shaped by the political aim of maintaining distance from decisions 
regarding how the fleet should be structured, a flawed understanding of the concept of fishing 
capacity and a failure to anticipate the reactionary behaviour of fishermen to the new rules and 
regulations. 
 
MAGP I: The 1984-86 Decommissioning Scheme and Restrictive Licensing  
 
The UK Government’s response to the first MAGP (1984-1986) was to introduce a 
decommissioning scheme. The 1983 Fishing Vessels (Financial Assistance) Scheme used public 
funds to pay for vessels to be temporarily and permanently removed from fishing activity. A 
laying-up premium was paid to vessels that temporarily removed themselves from fishing 




vessels from the UK fleet.364 From 1984-1986, £17.35 million was spent decommissioning 225 
vessels.365  
The decision to use a decommissioning scheme to reduce capacity was shaped primarily 
by the availability of European funding. The 1983 Community Structural Package Directive 
515/83 permitted “Member States to introduce measures to take vessels permanently out of 
fishing (decommissioning grants) and encourage the temporary reduction of capacity (laying up 
premium).”366 Member States were allowed to pay decommissioning grants up to a maximum of 
€650 (£400) per gross registered tonne.367 The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (FEOGA) then reimbursed up to 50 per cent of a Member State’s expenditure on 
decommissioning vessels over 12 meters.368  The UK was one of the first Member States to take 
advantage of this facility with UK decommissioning grants paid at the maximum permitted 
rate.369 European funding to reduce the capacity of the European fishing fleet followed a period 
over 1971-1979 1979 wherein financial assistance had been awarded to the building of 
vessels.370 
A decommissioning scheme supported the government’s intention to retain distance from 
decision-making as to which vessels should be removed from the fleet. Decommissioning grants 
would allow vessels to exit the industry, thus reducing the size of the fleet. At the same time, 
decisions as to who would exit the industry would be taken by individual vessels. Grants offered 
operators a choice over how best to use their resources. They could go to sea, fish and earn a 
return or they could take the grant and exit the industry. In making this decision, operators 
weighed the benefits of action (industry exit) against the benefits of remaining. A wider benefit 
of this approach was that those exiting would theoretically be the less efficient and profitable; the 
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fixed per tonne grant rate would represent a greater return to those with lower marginal 
profitability and earnings.  
Evidence given by MAFF officials to the 1987 National Audit Office (NAO) Committee 
indicates the government understood decommissioning to represent the use of a market 
mechanism to deliver the policy objective of a reduction in capacity. As was stated to the PAC: 
“the emphasis, certainly in the mind of Ministers, was that we should allow the market to sort 
this out, not seek within government to take a view as to precisely what sort of fleet we were 
looking for”.371 The government saw the use of grants as reinforcing and encouraging individuals 
to “response to existing economic pressures, leading to a withdrawal of vessels no longer 
viable.”372 Evidence given to the NAO indicates that the government had come to view “the 
operation of market forces [as] more likely to achieve a realistic fleet structure than a centrally-
imposed blueprint”.373 While the use of grants did not represent the use of a market-mechanism, 
the government’s thinking indicated a shift away from a traditional preference for an 
administrative approach to fisheries management.  
 
A 1985 policy review prematurely declared the government’s capacity reduction policy a 
success with “progress made towards a better balance between fishing opportunities and catching 
capacity.”374 It concluded that policies had “reduced the overall size of the UK fleet from 
150,592 GRT on 31 December 1983 to 131,065 GRT on 31 December 1984.” In 1987, the 
decommissioning programme was suspended after MAFF became aware of a NAO investigation 
into the scheme.375 The subsequent 1987 Public Accounts Committee (PAC) inquiry into 
‘Financial Support for the Fishing Industry in Great Britain’ scrutinized the 1984-86 
decommissioning scheme and questioned the value the scheme had provided for public money. 
The inquiry’s conclusion was that the decommissioning scheme had represented poor 
value for public money. Criticisms were made not of the use of a decommissioning scheme as a 
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tool to reduce fishing capacity but of the government’s administration of the grants scheme. The 
scheme was judged to have “lacked precise objectives and qualified targets” with the PAC 
questioning whether “MAFF was well enough informed on the financial state of the industry to 
enable them to make proper judgments.”376 The PAC inquiry and the NAO investigation both 
drew attention to the government’s decision to pay decommissioning grants at a flat rate of £400 
per gross tonne irrespective of the size of the vessels. This decision, when combined with no 
assessment of the value of vessel to be decommissioned relative to the size of the grant to be 
received, was said to have led to “evident abuse of the system”.377 The PAC inquiry identified 
that over half of total decommissioning expenditure in the period was paid to 15 large trawlers 
which each received an average grant of £562,000.378 The inquiry heavily critiqued both the 
benefits and the costs of the decommissioning scheme. The inquiry found that several of the 
trawlers awarded grants had been brought back into commission with the sole intent of 
qualifying for decommissioning grants.379  
The limited success of the scheme was further undermined by inflated delivery costs. The 
EC was set to refund 50 per cent of eligible costs. However, due to the rebate given under the 
Fontainebleau agreement and the UK’s nominal contribution to EC expenditure, the level of EC 
reimbursement was closer to 14 per cent.380 With the total costs of the scheme at £17.5 million, 
the cost to the UK was over £15million.381 The inquiry concluded that “unnecessarily large sums 
were paid to decommission vessels.”382  
 
Capacity reduction policies in this period were also undermined by the narrow remit 
given to a new license limitation policy. The introduction of the Restrictive Licensing Scheme 
(RLS) for certain demersal stocks from February 1984 represented the second and more enduring 
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component of the UK Government’s initial approach to capacity reduction.383 The introduction 
and gradual extension of the RLS represented a fundamental change in UK fisheries policy. A 
limit was placed on the number of fishing licenses thus ending the unrestricted nature of access 
to UK quota. Licenses had been required for several stocks fished by the UK fleet since the 
1970s. Until 1984, these had been unrestricted in number and free of charge. As argued in 
chapter 4, this policy choice arose from the Labour Government’s attempt to protect employment 
in the industry by retaining the free, public right to fish. The decision had been taken despite the 
status of restrictive licensing as a well-established fisheries management tool since the late 
1960s.384 By 1980, license limitation programmes were in use in Canada, the US and New 
Zealand.385  
 
The design of the RLS scheme determined its limited impact on fleet capacity. A 
Pressure Stock Licence (PSL) was created with a stock deemed a pressure stock if it was “one 
for which the UK’s quota is considered insufficient to allow unrestricted fishing”.386 PSLs were 
then allocated on an administrative basis that used a historical allocation criterion. A vessel was 
allocated a PSL if it could prove to have fished a pressure stock within the 12 months prior to the 
introduction of the scheme.387 The number of PSLs was then capped following this initial 
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allocation.”388 The government was aware that this system created no active downward pressure 
upon the number of vessels able to fish against pressure stock holdings with MAFF commenting 
that “the effects of which [PSL] will be largely to restrict pressure stocks licences to the existing 
fleet.”389 
The government’s limited ambition for the RLS is explained by the fact that the 
mechanism was forced on the UK Fisheries Departments by the Treasury to protect public 
investment in decommissioning. It was adopted “to satisfy the Treasury that decommissioning 
grants would not be used for replacement vessels”390 and to “prevent the money spent on taking 
vessels out of service being used simply to replace the unwanted capacity.”391  The RLS would 
support public investment in decommissioning as once a vessel was decommissioned its PSL 
was revoked to ensure it could not be attached to a replacement vessel. The objective given to the 
RLS in 1984 was to “protect the valuable effects expected to flow from the introduction of 
decommissioning grants”, with the scheme designed to avoid being “overly restrictive on fleet 
activities or too complicated to administer.”392 
The reason behind the introduction of license limitation in UK fisheries management 
bears little reflection to its roots in fisheries management theory and literature. Limited entry was 
viewed by academics and fishery managers as a key tool to mitigate against rent dissipation and 
protect the economic performance of fleet within TAC regimes. Townsend (1990) argued that 
limited entry as a management tool dominated fisheries economics for 25 years.393 In UK 
fisheries policy, one of the most seminal and long-running approach to fisheries management 
was instead applied to protect public expenditure in decommissioning. The RLS was to be a 
supplementary, supportive measure for the primary decommissioning scheme and no 
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consideration of the wider economic benefits it could bring to harvesting quota is identifiable in 
the archives.  
The limited pressure applied by the RLS on fleet capacity was due to its design, which 
was in turn a product of the government’s shallow ambition for the mechanism. This weakness 
was acknowledged by the government in a 1986 Review of the RLS, when it was accepted that 
although RLS was “designed to protect the benefits of the restructuring scheme… in practice it 
seeks to do no more than contain the number of vessels fishing the pressure stocks at the level, 
which existed before February 1984… Licences were freely available at that time”.394 The 
progressive extension of license limitation to a greater number of stocks – eventually covering all 
TAC species and vessels lengths – serves to highlight the reactive nature of fisheries policy-
making in the period. In 1986, the government designated additional stocks as pressure stocks 
following a round of CFP TAC reductions.395 This indicates that when the government 
considered “fisheries structural policy [as] the adaption of the size and composition of the fishing 
fleet to the fishing opportunities available to it”, the adaptation was to diminishing fishing 
opportunities. 396 
 
The Concept of ‘Fishing Capacity’ in UK Sea Fisheries Policy-Making over 1983-87.  
This section uses the UK Government archives to examine how conflicting European 
structural objectives operated at a national level. It argues that, within the confused Community 
structural policy, the increase in UK fishing capacity over 1984-89 was shaped by the UK 
Government’s flawed understanding of the concept of fishing capacity and the failure to consider 
how fishers would react to new rules and incentives.  
The UK was not the only Community Member State to experience an increase in fishing 
capacity. In 1991, the fleets of Greece, Belgium, and the Netherlands increased in terms of both 
tonnage and kilowatts relative to their 1986 objectives.397 Increasing fleet capacity was a 
Community issue. It was a product of conflict within the CFP structural policy that sought to 
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reduce the capacity of the fleet while promoting modernisation and rejuvenation to “enable the 
available fish catch to be taken economically and efficiently.”398  
 
Table 6.1 Member State MAGP objectives and actual situations 1986-91. 
 






% difference 1991 
objective and actual 
Belgium GRT 22,000 21,340 27,089 + 21% 
 kW 70,656 69,242 79,816 +13% 
Denmark GRT 122,879 119,188 114,926 -4% 
 kW 525,214 514,716 488,278 -5% 
Germany GRT 78,479 85,336 78,341 -8% 
 kW 161,494 206,465 190,273 -8% 
Greece GRT 134,659 130,946 162,395 +17% 
 kW 502,467 493,776 710,899 +31% 
Spain GRT - 673,303 644,989 -4% 
 kW - 1,955,372 1,910,145 -2% 
France GRT 207,560 201,604 195,969 -3% 
 kW 1,158,576 1,055,050 1,072,428 +2% 
Italy GRT 275,255 268,198 267,471 = 
 kW 1,568,288 1,541,664 1,536,518 = 
Ireland  GRT 45,300 48,750 50,693 +4% 
 kW 181,200 197,011 176,075 +11% 
Netherlands GRT 66,800 - - NA 
 kW 390,080        382,878         414,953 +6% 
Portugal GRT - 186,449 164,447 -11% 
 kW - 461,143 433,549 -6% 
UK GRT 146,000 193,027 214,733 +10% 
 kW 763,515 1,095,206 1,228,922 +11% 
*Source: Holden (1994), 27. 
 
Capacity reduction was to be delivered through the MAGPs and modernization through a 
capital-enhancement grant programme that would reduce the costs of fishing by making the fleet 
more efficient. Capital replacement grants were offered to existing operators and new entrants to 
regenerate labour. The 1984 UK Fishing Vessels (Acquisition and Improvement) Grants Scheme 
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provided £35 million over 1984-86 for the construction and modernisation of vessels.399 The UK 
Government chose to contribute 25% to the cost of new vessels despite only being obliged to 
contribute 5%.400 FEGOA contributed a further 25% therefore leaving 50% to come from the 
beneficiary.401 
While the capacity reduction component of the CFP’s structural policy was new policy, 
the Community had offered financial assistance for boat building throughout the 1970s. From 
1970-1983, the size of the fleet (GRT) increased by 64 per cent and engine power had increased 
three-fold. Up until the mid-1980s, increasing fishing capacity was supported by a stock 
fluctuation that saw a much larger number of young fish than normal coming into the fisheries. 
This biological boom burst around 1983-84 with Holden (1994) identifying this as driving the 
dramatic change in direction for European structural policy.402  
 A central problem of the government’s capacity reduction policy was that it understood 
fishing capacity to be an expression of the number of vessels in the fleet. In the 1986 Review of 
the RLS, MAFF evaluated the success of its capacity reduction policies over 1984 to 1st January 
1986 based on a reduction in the number of 40ft- and over-registered vessels from 2,207 to 2,052 
– a 7 per cent reduction in the number of vessels in this category.  
The reduction in the number of vessels did not produce a linear reduction in actual 
fishing capacity or fishing effort. Government data (Tables 6.2 and 6.3) show that the failure to 
consider the physical characteristics of fishing vessels led to a numerically smaller but more 
powerful fleet.  Table 6.2 highlights that over 1984-87 the length (tonnage) and horse power 
(engine size) of Scottish vessels increased. Table 6.3. shows that over 1981-86 an increasing 
proportion of Scottish landings were taken by larger vessels (vessels 80ft and over). 
A numerically smaller but more powerful fleet was influenced by several factors. Firstly, 
the decommissioning scheme removed older, less efficient vessels. In response to the 
government’s 1985 ‘Review of the Restrictive Licensing Scheme’, a compliance official 
commented that “the paltry decommissioning grant has resulted in the removal of older, 
inefficient vessels, which caught few fish, from the fleet, whilst those with the real catching 
captures the influence of the grant scheme’s price mechanism: the fixed per tonne grant rate 
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represented a greater return relative to fishing for vessels with lower marginal profitability and 
earnings.  The flat-rate price signal encouraged the removal of older, inefficient vessels.  
 
 
Table 6.2. Scottish Fishing Fleet Trends in Tonnage and Horse Power 1984-1987 
(1984 = 100) 
 
Size Group 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Under 40  
   Tonnage 100 102 103 105 
   Horse Power 100 106 108 113 
40 – 59.9 
   Tonnage 100 101 103 105 
   Horse Power 100 102 106 109 
60 – 79.9 
   Tonnage 100 102 103 103 
   Horse Power 100 103 106 106 
80 – 109.9 
   Tonnage 100 102 102 98 
   Horse Power 100 101 102 103 
110 and over 
   Tonnage 100 104 108 113 
   Horse Power 100 105 106 113 
Total 
   Tonnage 100 102 106 110 
   Horse Power 100 103 107 111 
Source: TNA (1988) MAF 452/70/1, Quota Management – Restrictive licensing for pressure stocks, ‘The 
further development of licensing and the capacity of the UK fishing fleet,’ Annex B, Table 4. 
 
Secondly, the expansion in capacity was driven by the creation of perverse incentives in 
the government’s licensing scheme which allowed fishers to trade in smaller, less powerful 
vessels for larger, more powerful vessels. The government allowed the trading of licences to 
allow for fleet rejuvenation. MAFF was of the view that “a certain amount of selling of licensed 





Table 6.3. Landings in Scotland by Scottish vessels catch per vessel 1981-86 
(tonnes) 
 
Vessel length 1981 1985 1986 Percentage increase 
1981-1986 
Under 40ft  15 18 17 + 13 
40 – 59.9ft  158 173 145 -8 
60 – 79.9ft 466 505 485 + 4 
80 – 109.9ft 1,202 2,723 2,485 + 107 
110ft and over 1,713 4,908 4,050 + 136 
Source: TNA (1988) MAF 452/70/1, Quota Management – Restrictive licensing for pressure stocks, ‘The 
further development of licensing and the capacity of the UK fishing fleet’, Annex B, Table 1. 
 
new construction”.403 Design of the trading scheme was influenced by the aim of reducing the 
size of the fleet (vessels numbers) while simultaneously enabling fleet modernization and new 
entrants.404 A PSL was attached to a vessel as opposed to a vessel-owner or skipper for 
administrative ease as historical data on fishing patterns only existed for vessels.405 A licence 
transfer was then permitted, subject to conditions. Firstly, the owner of a vessel with a PSL could 
sell the vessel and the attached PSL to a new owner. Secondly, the owner of a vessel with a PSL 
could sell the vessel, retain the PSL and attach it to a new vessel, with the sold vessel able only 
able to fish for non-pressure stocks.406 The fundamental rule of the scheme, and the mechanism 
through which RLS supported decommissioning in reducing the number of vessels, was that a 
licence could not be transferred from a vessel that was decommissioned.407  
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The availability of capital-replacement grants and the PSL trading mechanism allowed 
fishers to purchase a small vessel with a PSL and use financial assistance to transfer the licence 
to a larger, more powerful vessel. An extract from the 1986 RLS Review indicates that this 
practice was endemic across all length categories: “owners of smaller vessels, including those 
under 10 meters have been able to acquire larger vessels up to a maximum of 40ft… owners in 
the other category of over 40ft have been able to move up the ladder in a similar fashion.”408  
By 1986, both the government and the industry acknowledged this perverse practice.  A 
Ministerial Submission in March 1984 referred to “the greatest abuse of the system” as “people 
buying up small vessels purely for the purpose of getting a licence to transfer to a much larger 
vessel”.409  In November 1986, the Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation (SFO) reflected that “the 
major problem in trying to restrict capacity is that new vessels are almost certainty more efficient 
than those they replace.”410 
The ability for vessels-owners to trade PSLs also led to licences gaining a financial value. 
This created a new financial barrier to industry entry and ended the unrestricted and free nature 
of fishing rights. Government discussions indicate that this outcome was unintentional. This was 
first discussed by the government as part of a reaction to a Fishing News article, ‘Price of stock 
licence: £30,000!’, which reported that “the government’s seven-week old licensing programme 
has sent the price of old licenced boats rocketing and some crafts are even being offered for sale 
at two prices – with and without a licence. The going rate has been up to £30,000.”411 In a MAFF 
note on the Fishing News article, officials wrote:  
“It is perhaps inevitable that restrictions on the supply of licences will result in an initial increase 
in demand with an associated increase in value. However, we can only assume that this will be a 
temporary phenomenon and that price will return to normal once the scheme has been running 
for a while. The fact remains that the stocks to which these licences apply are by definition 
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“under pressure” and reduced supplies ought to result in lower demand in the medium to longer 
term.”412  
In this extract, MAFF officials acknowledge that a restriction in supply will lead to an 
increase in demand and value. Yet, the assertion that this would constitute a temporary price 
spike confuses demand for licences in the medium- to long-run as being determined by the 
supply of another good – fish. An explanation is that MAFF officials predicted that declining 
fishing opportunities would lead to a contraction in the industry with fewer number of fishers 
working to reduce demand for licences.  
A lack of awareness within MAFF that allowing restricted licences to be traded would 
lead to the licences gaining a value is couched in a note ‘Restrictive Licensing and Pressure 
Stocks’ of February 1984. In the note, MAFF considered that “there will be no trade in licenses 
as such, since transfer between individuals are allowed only where a vessel changes hands.”413 
MAFF not only failed to foresee the creation of a new barrier to entry but that incumbent 
fishermen freely allocated a PSL based on historical rights enjoyed a considerable wind-fall. A 
conclusion of the 1987 NAO Report was that “the present arrangements under which licences are 
provided free of charge but then traded for large sums of money within the industry are 
unacceptable.”414 Though the PAC recommended that “consideration be given to the possibility 
of licences reverting to the state for reallocation…rather than their being sold for windfall profit” 
this was not taken forward.  
 
MAGP II 1987-1991: The 1987 Policy Response  
 
The period 1987-91 is identified as a one of stagnation for UK fishing structural policy. 
In November 1986, the SFO criticized the government’s approach to capacity reduction. It 
argued that there was a “paradox” in seeking to both devise ways to restrict capacity while also 
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encouraging new build through grant schemes”.415 The SFO suggested that restrictions on 
economic forces could be more effective than a licensing system. Despite this, in 1987 UK 
structural policy avoided any reference to market mechanisms and opted to introduce “a more 
rigorous licensing system”.416 A process of rule tightening occurred to “ensure that the system 
imposes greater restrictions than hitherto on the growth of effective fishing capacity”.417  
A key policy success in this period was the development of a more accurate and robust 
definition of fishing capacity though the application and use of statistical analysis. The UK 
undertook this work following pressure from the Commission. The UK’s strategy for MAGP II, 
to plug loop-holes in the existing RLS scheme, had failed to impress the EC. Commission 
officials pressed the UK to adopt a more active approach.418 The Commission displayed a 
tougher stance on national MAGP plans in a meeting in which UK officials tried to justify a 
FEOGA application for 43 new vessels. A minute of the meeting outlines that the UK 
Government was taken aback by the EC’s attitude: 
 “Mr Tilgenkamp [Commission] said that the number of new constructions on which FEOGA 
assistance was sought was completely out of step with our MAGP. He threatened... the project 
could not be approved. I reminded Mr Tilgenkamp of our Restrictive Licensing Scheme… Mr 
Tilgenkamp conveyed the impression that he was bored with these frequently repeated 
arguments and pointed out that the removal of deep water trawlers did not provide justification 
for the expansion of near and middle water fleet. Any vessel removed from the fleet should only 
be replaced by a vessel of a similar size and tonnage…I must confess to being somewhat uneasy 
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about the seemingly tough stance the Commission are taking on matters connected with our 
MAGP.”419  
The stick held by the EC to influence the direction of UK policy was a financial one: “they [the 
Commission] can to a certain extent hold us to ransom over FEOGA grants.”420  
To avoid adopting a more active and restrictive MAGP II strategy for 1987-91, the UK 
Government agreed to undertake a review of policy measures to inform future MAGP policies. 
At the Commission’s request, this included a re-evaluation of the concept of fishing capacity 
with a view to including engine power as a variable.421 The movement to include engine power 
as a parameter of fishing capacity was also influenced by international practice. In 1987, a 
delegation of MAFF and DAFS officials visited Canada to learn about Canadian fisheries policy. 
The visit led to the UK Government reflecting on the limitations of its own approach with a 
Ministerial Submission commenting that “the MAFF and DAFS Fisheries Secretaries were 
strongly impressed during their visit to Canada earlier this month by the difficulties which the 
Canadians had got themselves into by relying too heavily on vessel length as a yardstick for a 
strict licensing system.”422 The visit led to MAFF officials reflecting that “our visit to Canada 
established that an approach based on restricting length of vessels alone was probably too 
crude”.423  
In April 1987, UK Fisheries Ministers announced that “studies would be put in hand on 
the measurement of capacity of fishing vessels” through a programme of work to “explore the 
scope for more accurate measures (other than vessel length) of effective fishing capacity”.424 The 
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work concluded with the publication ‘Restrictive Licensing Review: Announcement of 
Conclusions’ in July 1988.425 The traditional association between vessel length in size and catch 
was confirmed.426 However, it was noted that length was not related to capacity in a directly 
proportional manner.427 Capacity was identified as being “related most meaningfully to a 
combination of the physical dimensions of the vessel and the power of its engine”.428 Physical 
variables identified were tonnage, horsepower, crewing numbers, size of fish hold and range of 
gear. Age of a vessel – which was associated with horsepower – was highlighted as an important 
factor: “a connection between increased catches and younger vessels as well as its converse of 
declining catches associated with increasing age.”429 The outcome for policy-makers was a 
formula for calculating the capacity of a fishing vessel, a product of the application of the 
statistical methods of regression and correlation: length (l) x breadth (b) + 0.45 engine power 
(hp). The formula explained between 70 and 80% of the difference in catching capacity.430  
The dedicated study on the measurement of fishing capacity represented a step-change in 
the use of statistical analysis in UK fisheries policy. Prior to 1987-88, statistical analysis of 
fishing data had predominantly been used as a mechanism for policy delivery. Statistical analysis 
was used to determined quota allocations once an allocation criterion had been defined by 
policy-makers. It was also used to monitor landings and calculate quota uptake relative to 
holdings to inform the closure of a fishery. The application and use of the capacity formula in 
UK fisheries policy – despite resistance from some officials that it was too complicated for the 
industry to understand – represented statistical analysis and advice actively participating in and 
shaping the design of policy levers. It represented evidence-based policy making.  
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6.2 UK Structural Policy from 1989: Letting the Market In  
Analysis of UK fisheries policy from 1989 indicates that an attempt to adopt an economic 
approach to fisheries management in the UK was frustrated and diluted by national and local 
political pressures. This section argues that the Scottish Office and Scottish Fisheries Department 
used their political leverage to obstruct the application of policies that aimed to deliver 
significant reductions in fishing effort and capacity to meet international commitments.  
Individual Transferable Quotas  
The idea or regulatory tool that had the most discernible and enduring influence on UK 
fisheries policy from 1989 was Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). The influence of ITQs in 
the history of UK fisheries policy is interesting given that the UK Government has never 
officially implemented an ITQ system.431 An ITQ is a catch-share approach to fisheries 
management designed to give quota holders an exclusive and transferable right to a given 
proportion of a stock’s TAC.  In an ITQ system, fishers can buy and sell quota shares in an open 
market, hence the individual and transferable nature of the quota holdings.  
ITQs are recognised as an economic approach to fisheries management as a market price 
signal is used to allocate quota shares. Overtime, quota becomes concentrated in the hands of the 
most efficient operators resulting in an efficient distribution of resource rights. The concept of 
using quotas or permits to control environmental externalities and the creation of a market for 
“transferable property rights” originated with the Canadian economist John Dales (1968).432 
Dales drew upon Coase (1960) to argue that the ability of firms to trade ‘pollution rights’ would 
lead to the most efficient firms making the largest pollution reduction and then selling their 
remaining rights to the less efficient firms – thus reducing pollution at lowest social cost.433 In 
1992, a DAFS official described ITQs as a “system which is much loved by fisheries 
economists.”434  
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The UK Government’s revived interest in ITQs from 1989 was shaped by external 
international experience and a domestic shift in the government’s approach to fisheries 
management. The government had first considered ITQs in 1980. Over the following decade, 
ITQs had develop from a theoretical concept to a legitimate tool of international fisheries 
management. In 1984, the Icelandic Government applied ITQs to Icelandic demersal fisheries 
and in 1986 an ITQ system was introduced in New Zealand.435 This shift from theory to practice 
was manifested in the new focus in the academic literature on ITQs which moved to analyse real-
world experience, notably Dewees (1989), Boyd and Dewees (1992), Arnason (1993), Clark 
(1993), Grafton (1996) and Weninger (1998).  
ITQs represented the quintessential expression of a new economic and capital-favouring 
approach to fisheries management. This new approach is evident in the UK Government’s 1989 
Fisheries Review and inter-departmental discussions of ITQs.  From 1989, the government 
intended for market forces to play a greater role in fisheries policy. The 1989 Review referred to 
this approach as representative of wider political-economic changes within government and 
described ITQs as being “in line with government’s overall industrial and deregulation 
policies”.436 
In the 1989 Fisheries Review, the government made greater use of economic language 
when considering its role in relation to the industry. Government intervention was justified 
through the definition of overfishing as a product of market failure and the value of government 
intervention was evidenced by cost-benefit analysis.437 Using data from the 1988-89 financial 
year, the cost of intervention was estimated to be £36 million.438 The total value of UK landings 
was estimated at £400 million and the gross value added of the UK sea fishing industry at around 
£200 million per annum.439 The Review argued that “the cost of intervention to protect the 
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renewable resources” was justified as without it “the fish resources would be at risk”.440 The 
government set the cost of intervention against the value of UK fishing and commented that 
government spending on fisheries management was “a modest figure in relation to the waste of 
capital which would be likely to occur without such intervention.” 
UK officials were interested in ITQs for both economic and administrative gains. ITQs 
represented a tool to deliver a reduction in capacity combined with an improvement in 
efficiency. This rationalisation was a product of ITQs transferability.  In theory, a fisher would 
expand their operations if it was economically sensible to do so. This was achieved by the 
purchase or lease of quota from other fishers. Fishing firms with lower costs and higher marginal 
profitability would be willing and able to pay a higher price for a unit of quota than a less 
efficient firm. The allocation of quota through a price mechanism facilitated the concentration of 
quota ownership amongst a smaller number of efficient firms. Echoing government discussions 
in 1984, ITQs also retained decision-making as to the structure of the fleet with the industry. The 
1989 Review commented that “over time, a fleet structure could evolve which would be 
appropriate to the available fishing opportunities, but the decisions on the shape of the fishing 
fleet will have been taken by the vessel owners themselves.”441 
The government also recognised the value of ITQs as a tool to improve the capital 
performance of the fleet. The Review acknowledged that the incumbent quota management 
system actively encouraged over-investment.442 Measures adopted had “had the effects of 
limiting the scope for more efficient fishermen to expand their share of fisheries by displacing 
the less efficient…they have impeded the owners of bigger and more powerful vessels expanding 
their shares of fisheries.”443 The Review argued that by awarding individual operators a fixed 
percentage share of the TAC (expressed as a tonnage) vessel owners would be encouraged to 
“use a vessel appropriate to his quota and which would catch the quota at a minimum cost”.444 
Rationalisation could therefore improve net profitability at an individual and fleet level.  
                                                      
440 ibid, The Sea Fisheries Review, Chapter 2, Section E ‘The remaining Treasury criteria’, p.8, para.8. 
441 ibid., Annex G, p.80, para.4. 
442 ibid., Annex G, p.80, para.5. 
443 ibid., Section F ‘The Social Objective’, p.10, para.12. 




The principal political benefit of ITQs was that “Ministers would be able to detach 
themselves from the day-to-day involvement of fisheries management”.445 In 1984, PO 
management was to substitute for government involvement in key elements of fisheries 
management. In 1989, responsibilities were to be devolved to the market.  This prospect was 
attractive to the government and eagerly supported by the Treasury. The Review referred to the 
government’s “losing battle against fishermen’s ploys to get around or exploit government quota 
management and capacity control measures”446 and a Scottish Office memorandum stated that: 
“the Treasury’s objective is to reduce government involvement in the operation of the market 
and this leads them to favour either the option of substantial withdrawal from fisheries 
management or ITQs”.447  
Nonetheless, in 1989 the UK Government rejected ITQs as a tool for quota management 
and capacity reduction due to socio-political considerations and constraints. This was based on 
three key issues: compliance and enforcement under an ITQ regime; ITQs in a mixed fishery; 
and the socio-economic effects of ITQs on fleet ownership. ITQs were seen to require a 
politically and financially unpalatable level of government involvement in the day-to-day 
management of the industry and there was concern that ITQs would rationalise fleet ownership 
in a socially and politically unacceptable way. 
Compliance and Enforcement  The government concluded that its role in the management 
of the industry at an individual vessel level would have to increase if the potential economic 
benefits of a UK ITQ system were to be realised. This undermined the potential political benefit 
of enabling Minister to “detach themselves” from fisheries management.448 While the allocation 
of ITQs via the market would release the government from quota allocation responsibilities, this 
would be offset by the need for a substantial increase in enforcement activities.  
The 1989 Review acknowledged that the economic benefits of an ITQ system would be 
realised “only if fishermen believed that buying up other fishermen’s ITQs was a more efficient 
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and economical way of expanding their potential production than relying on cheating”.449 Fishers 
had to be “confident in the enforcement of quotas, so as to make it worthwhile to expand by 
purchasing additional quota rather than under-declaring the catch.”450 Low or no confidence in 
the enforcement of quota restrictions would incentivise illegal, over-quota landings and reduce 
the present and future value of a fisher’s investment in ITQs.  Inadequate confidence in 
enforcement undermined the present value of an ITQ as a purchased entitlement was not 
exclusive, secure or the most cost-effective way to increase operations. The future value of an 
ITQ unit was undermined as unsustainable fishing levels from illegal landings would result in 
eventual TAC decrease, thereby reducing the future tonnage associated with each ITQ unit. 
The issue was that “there was a fair amount of evasion and cheating under the present 
system”.451 In the 1989 Review, the UK Government argued that incentives to illegally over-fish 
would increase in an ITQ system. The rationale behind this was spurious. The primary economic 
inventive to cheat in an ITQ system comes from the ability to increase revenue relative to fixed 
quota holdings by under-declaring landings. Yet, this incentive was the same for the incumbent 
quota management system. Moreover, it can be argued that incentives to cheat could decrease 
under an ITQ system as, unlike the incumbent system, it offered a route to increase landings 
legally through the purchase of additional quota.   
The government identified social and cultural factors as a potential driver for an 
increasing level of non-compliance under an ITQ system. The 1989 Review referred to the 
current management system giving fishermen “some sense of imposing equality of misery”.452 
By allowing some operators to increase their share of fishing opportunities by buying out others, 
the “sense of equality of misery” would be weakened and “some fishermen would try to 
maximize their earnings by evading our controls”.453  
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Despite the specious logic used by officials, a real regulatory problem existed. The UK’s 
enforcement of quota restrictions was insufficient to deliver a level of confidence that would 
drive investment in an ITQ system. The government’s concern was not the existence of this 
problem per se but the financial and administrative cost of fixing it. The 1989 Review was 
“unable to recommend this system for the management of UK fishing largely because of the 
substantial cost of enforcement and serious doubts about whether even with such costs sufficient 
enforcement could be achieved.”454  
The issue was that financial and administrative responsibility for creating an “acceptable 
level of compliance” would fall to the government.455 Officials were conscious that as ITQs 
represented a quasi-property right, the defence of an access right would fall to the state. To 
achieve effective enforcement, the government was advised that its strategy of inspecting a 
minimum proportion of landings would have to change to inspecting each vessel at sea a 
minimum number of times per year.456 Using a probability analysis, it was gauged that five 
inspections per year per vessel would produce the desire level of effective enforcement.457 To 
operate this scheme across Areas IV and VI for over 10 meters vessels only (approximately 
2,100 vessels) it was calculated that 43 additional inspectors were required at an additional cost 
of £1.6m.458 ITQs would require the Fisheries Departments to monitor individual vessels.459 ITQs 
were also described by the Scottish Office as making the PO’s redundant (in terms of their role 
in allocating quota, monitoring uptake and enforcing restrictions). The introduction of ITQs 
representing a policy reversal away from the recent attempt to foster a system of industry self-
regulation and self-policing through PO management.460  
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ITQs in mixed fisheries  The Scottish Office drew heavily on the work of the Canadian 
fisheries economist Parzival Copes to argue that the economics benefits of ITQs would not 
materialise in the North Sea due to the mixed nature of the fisheries. In a letter to the Minister of 
State, the Scottish Office referred to Copes as the “major external expert on ITQs”. It cited his 
1986 article in Land Economics, ‘A Critical Review of Individual Quotas as a Device in 
Fisheries Management’, to highlight the limited nature of global experience with ITQs. The 
Scottish Office argued that while the system has been used in one or two countries it had never 
been tried in anything like the mixed fisheries of the North Sea: “the major external [Copes] 
expert on ITQs regards the possible benefits in an area like the North Sea to be more theoretical 
than real, and we regard that as a sound judgment.461 
The practice of discarding, specifically the impact of ITQs on discarding behaviour, was 
at the heart of this argument. The government acknowledged that a significant draw-back of 
ITQs was that it was likely to increase post-capture high-grading - the practice of discarding 
lower-value fish in order to maximize the revenue potential of quota holdings with landings of a 
higher-value species.462 This was influenced by Copes’ 1986 paper which argued that high-
grading “might be worse under ITQs”.463 The Scottish Office used this academic insight to argue 
that as ITQs would provide fishers with relatively small bundles of quota that would not reflect 
catch compositions, discarding could be worse under an ITQ system.464  
 Discussions on the regulatory issues of enforcement and discarding indicate that the 
influence of incentives on fisher behaviour was considered by policy-makers. This chapter 
previously argued that policy failure during MAGP I and II was partly driven by a lack of 
consideration given as to how fishers would respond to new rules and for the potential of 
perverse economic incentives to be created and exploited. By 1989, the government had learnt 
from its experience with licensing and quota management that rules and regulations did not 
guarantee that fishers would behave in the way desired by said rules. 
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The issue was that the objectives of government and industry actors were not aligned. 
The government was attempting to restrict and reducing fishing pressure to fulfil its legal 
requirements through the CFP to support stock conservation and sustainable fishing. Fishers’ 
behaviour represented the pursuit of maximum economic profit in the short-run. This created 
perverse incentives for fishers to illegally over-fish, discard and behave in ways that contravened 
the government’s objectives if the costs of non-compliance were perceived to be lower than the 
costs of compliance. Given the government’s assessment of its control and enforcement 
activities, it can be assumed that the perceived cost of non-compliance was low. The costs of 
compliance would have been specific to each vessel and ranged from a reduction in net 
profitability to bankruptcy. As the government was unwilling to increase the associated costs of 
non-compliance due to the financial and administrative costs of this for the government, the need 
to design rules that created incentives for fishers to act in alignment with government policy was 
intensified. The dilemma for fisheries policy at this juncture was that any effective incentive 
regime was unlikely to be realised without an initial investment by the government in increasing 
the associated costs of rule-breaking.  
The socio-economics of fleet ownership ITQs were also rejected due to the perceived socio-
political costs of the industry contraction they would likely bring. From 1989, the Scottish Office 
lobbied central government that market-based mechanisms would produce “a concentration of 
capacity in undesirable ways.”465 The Scottish Office argued that ITQs would affect fleet 
ownership in two negative ways: ownership patterns in Scotland would be threatened as small, 
independent firms would gradually be replaced by a corporate ownership model employing 
fewer and larger vessels and UK quota holdings would become increasingly located “in the main 
North East ports at the expense of smaller west coast or island ports” due to the “transfer of 
quota entitlements away from Scotland through purchases by the large English fishing 
companies.”466 
The threat to the Scottish industry was the competitive advantage of larger companies to 
access finance and achieve economies of scale. The Scottish Office wrote to the Minister of 
State, 3 April 1990, arguing that: “in this market, trawler companies would have an edge over 
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individual fishermen because of their greater financial resources…with the cost of £500 per 
tonne for demersal quota and the cost of a new 100ft trawler around £1 million… financial 
constraints would quickly limit the operations of even the most successful of the existing trawler 
companies.”467 
The potential impact of ITQs on the ownership and structure of the Scottish fleet was also 
at the forefront of MAFF’s considerations, with an official writing:  “from a purely Scottish point 
of view perhaps the major objection to ITQs is that their introduction would lead to a shift in the 
pattern of ownership since large companies would have the financial muscle and incentive to buy 
quotas. There are therefore potentially serious implications for the ownership of the Scottish fleet 
and the fishing communities dependent on fishing”.468 MAFF set out the potential social 
problems to the Minister. A submission highlighted that: “the social problems are potentially the 
most serious; there would be consequent effects on economic activity in communities dependent 
on the fishing industry”.469 
 The concern for industry structure in terms of the number, composition and location of 
fishing businesses was shaped by an understanding that “in some areas where fishing 
communities are concentrated, there are few, if any, alternative employment opportunities.”470 
The 1989 Review argued that concern for “the needs of remote communities with few alternative 
employment opportunities” had led “Ministers [to] recognise a social need – to ensure that local 
fisheries, especially in remote areas, should not be made non-viable.”471 A note to the Secretary 
of State, May 5, 1992 outlined that the government “regard[ed] the introduction of ITQs as 
wholly at variance with the Secretary of State’s social objectives.”472 
Overview 
This section examined the UK Government’s assessment of ITQs to argue that the 
potential socio-economic impacts of quota management influenced the government’s assessment 
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of the feasibility of policy options.  It also indicated a discrepancy between the government’s 
ideological attachment to the use of market forces to deliver international commitments and its 
willingness to bear the associated administrative and political costs. 
The 1992 Fisheries Package  
This section argues that local and national political tensions worked to constrain the 
application of economic and scientific approaches to capacity reduction in the design of the 1992 
Fisheries Package. The Package intended to reduce fishing pressure to deliver the UK’s 1992-96 
MAGP targets.473 It represented a mix of old and new approaches to capacity management and 
centred on three key elements: a quota trading mechanism; new restrictions on fishing effort 
through a tradable Days at Sea (DAS) programme; and a further round of decommissioning. UK 
structural policy-making in this period represented a process of appeasement in which local and 
national political pressures trumped international, legally-binding commitments to conservation.  
The Scottish Proposal - Producer Organisation ITQs  
The 1992 Fisheries Package introduced new quota trading arrangements. This built upon 
MAFF’s determination from 1989 to use market forces and industry-funded capacity reduction to 
meet MAGP targets. The extent to which the market was brought to bear to fishing pressure was 
intentionally restricted by the design of the trading arrangements. Like Producer Organisation 
management, the policy (known in government as the ‘Scottish Proposal) was a product of 
collaboration between the Scottish Office’s Agriculture and Fisheries Department (SOAFD) and 
Scottish fishing industry. It aimed to appease MAFF’s preference for market forces while 
protecting the role of the POs in fisheries policy.  
The Scottish Proposal represented a SOAFD strategy to provide MAFF with an 
alternative to ITQs.474 Pressure to develop an ‘ITQ-like’ mechanism was triggered in 1990 by a 
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Ministerial request for a team of MAFF and SOAFD officials to “investigate further the 
possibility of introducing an ITQ system in UK fisheries”.475 The 1989 Fisheries Review’s 
rejection of ITQs had not dissuaded MAFF officials and Ministers of the potential long-term 
benefits of a market mechanism.476 The role for trading to create a downward pressure on 
capacity had continued to influence government thinking. Over 1989-1991, aggregation schemes 
that used a “newly created market [to] finance a slimming down of the industry” were 
designed.477  
New ‘licence aggregation’ rules allowed fishers to purchase licences from multiple 
vessels exiting the industry and aggregate the capacity of the vessels into one vessel. Similarly, 
‘entitlement aggregation’ enabled fishers to buy the track-records of vessels exiting the industry 
and aggregate them into one vessel. This approach to capacity reduction aimed to rationalise 
capital through industry-funded means. MAFF explained to the Cabinet that the mechanisms 
would allow fishers to “buy up quotas and market share” and allow other to “sell quotas and 
leave the business”.478 A MAFF policy paper outlined that the basic aim of introducing the idea 
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of aggregation into our licensing management would be to enable fishermen to buy each other 
out.”479 
The Scottish Office wanted “MAFF to realise that ITQs and variations of that system 
would involve greater intervention by government than at present.”480 SOAFD’s strategy was “to 
press MAFF to consider an alternative that strengthens the PO sector.” The aim was to set the 
market in motion within the confines of the PO system by using “the POs as a means of 
increasing the role of market forces in fisheries management.”481 The idea was for ITQs to 
operate in the UK at PO-level, as opposed to individual vessel-level, by allowing POs to trade 
quota with one another. Individual vessels would retain their track records, a PO would continue 
to manage its membership’s aggregated allocation but it would be able to buy, sell and trade its 
members’ quota with other POs.482 
The POs were to be encouraged to purchase the track-records, vessels and licenses of 
members wanting to exit the industry.483 This would allow a PO’s total fishing opportunities to 
remain the same but be fished by the fewer vessels in its membership. This idea was derived 
from “clear indications from the POs that they are prepared to buy up their own members’ 
vessels” and SOAFD’s perceptions of the financial status of the PO: “we could be fairly 
confident that the POs would invest in buying up quota, or at least the SFO and the 
Shetlanders…POs are reputed to have fair amounts of money in their reserve”.484 
PO-ITQ paid lip-service to MAFF’s preference for the use of market instruments but 
created no real downwards pressure upon capacity. Firstly, the mechanism shifted responsibility 
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for industry-funded decommissioning from an individual to a collective level. Arguably, the 
incentives for the POs to purchase fishing entitlements would have been weaker than individuals 
operating in an ITQ system as the latter would have benefited directly and exclusively from such 
purchases. Secondly, PO trades took place through private agreements so no open market was 
created. Overall, the incentives for individuals to sell up and exit the industry were not 
strengthened. Scottish Office officials noted in February 1992 that “the use of POs would 
hopefully act as something of a break on full market forces, which if left uncontrolled might 
have consequences unacceptable for Ministers.”485 The Scottish Office intended for PO-ITQs to 
have limited impact on fleet contraction. It was designed to obstruct and tame the introduction 
and operation of market forces.   
The Scottish Proposal was instead built upon the objective of industry acceptability with 
fundamental components of PO-ITQs designed with some Scottish POs. This is indicated in a 
SOAFD reference to “clear indications from the POs that they are prepared to buy up their own 
members’ vessels”.486 Moreover, the SFPO initiated the case for inter-PO purchases. A letter 
from the Chief Executive of the SFPO, John Goodlad, wrote that the idea of PO-ITQs had “much 
to commend it” and that strengthening the role of POs in introducing an element of market forces 
would “lead to a much more efficient catching sector”. As he explained: “to limit the new system 
to internal PO purchases will only freeze the 1992 geographical fleet distribution as a snap shot 
in time, something that must be contrary to the objectives of introducing market forces. It is 
therefore essential to permit inter-PO purchases…without this the system would be unworkable 
and cumbersome”.487  
PO support for the Scottish Proposal is unsurprising given that it allowed them to 
continue to exert power and influence which would have diminished under ITQs. As well as 
being “acceptable to many in the industry”, SOAFD saw PO-ITQs as a means of retaining PO 
management.488 By 1991, the POs were responsible for managing around 85 per cent of total key 
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UK whitefish quota and 80-90 per cent of pelagic quota.” SOAFD saw PO management as 
“reliev[ing] fisheries departments of a substantial burden”489 and that abandoning PO 
management, which would occur under an ITQ system, would return responsibility for 
monitoring and enforcing individual vessel activity to the government.490  
The Scottish Proposal borrowed from and played up concepts that were a part of new 
wave of thinking in an economic approach to fisheries management. Yet, in promoting the idea 
to MAFF, the Scottish Office argued that success was to be found not in new, revolutionary ways 
of thinking but by building upon existing mechanisms. The Scottish Office argued that the 
government had “wasted a lot of time in the last few years pursuing new ideas which we would 
either be unable to sell to the industry or that were in other ways impractical”.491 Policy should 
instead “build on existing and well understood management mechanisms… going with the grain 
or the industry rather than asking them to sign on for a completely new and untried mechanism”. 
SOAFD argued that: “it seems sensible to examine whether other steps can be taken to bring 
market forces to bear and to reduce government intervention but in ways that build on rather than 
destroy present arrangements, and which therefore follow better the train of industry 
thinking”.492 
Creating a system that fishers accepted was a clear priority for SOAFD. Though there 
was a clear intention with PO-ITQs to shield the industry from economic pressures and protect 
the POs, the department did recognise the important role of industry buy-in and support for 
policy success. The Scottish Office argued that “ad hoc measures taken so far have put most 
parts of the industry against us; we will not make progress without their consent and cooperation 
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and we need to regain this”.493 With the industry able to easily flout quota management rules, 
policy built with industry consent may not deliver required contraction but could support better 
compliance. 
Decommissioning  
This section argues that the inclusion of a £25 million decommissioning scheme in the 
1992 Fisheries Package represented a political concession by the UK Government. From 1989-
91, MAFF was firmly against the use of decommissioning to achieve MAGP targets. This was 
influenced by both economic and conservation concerns. In December 1989, MAFF “decided 
against decommissioning because it would not provide value for money nor contribute to 
effective conservation” and concluded that “[there is] no economic case for using £25m of 
taxpayers’ money in this way.”494  
The economic case against decommissioning was shaped by the legacy of past policy 
failure. MAFF was preoccupied with its experienced with the 1987 PAC inquiry into the 1984-
86 scheme. A paper,  ‘Decommissioning and Fisheries Management’, July 18, 1989 outlined that 
a decommissioning scheme could be seen as using “substantial expenditure to undo the recent 
expansion in the UK fleet which has been encouraged by grant aid and permitted by insufficient 
licensing policy” and “avoid[ed] the spectacle of substantial sums of money being paid to 
individual fishermen and enterprises to pay them to stop fishing.”495 The paper concluded that 
“paying large amounts of public money on buying out fishing capacity cannot be justified”.496 
MAFF was also concerned that a decommissioning scheme would represent the use of 
public funds to unwind an expansion in capacity that had been financed by fleet profitability. 
Over January 1987-89, 313 vessels had been brought into the UK fishing fleet adding an 
additional 27,264 GRT.497 This exacerbated the UK’s 1991 MAGP targets – 33,000 tonnes 
would have to be removed from the UK fleet, a 19% reduction in tonnage and a 16 per cent 
                                                      
493 NAS (1992) AF62/5715. ‘Fishing Fleet Overcapacity’, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Scotland, 18 
September 1991, para.3. 
494 NAS (1991) AF62/5714. letter to the Prime Minister from the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 7 May 
1991, p.1, para.1. 
495 NAS (1989) NAS AF62/5710. ‘Decommissioning and Fisheries Management’, Fisheries Departments, 18 July 
1989, p.19, para.49. 
496 ibid. 
497 NAS (1989) AF62/5710. Note for Fisheries Minister ‘Fishing Fleet Structure Policy – Measures Necessary to 




reduction in horsepower.498 This expansion had been facilitated by loop holes in the licensing 
system but financed by fleet profitability resulting from higher fish prices and lower oil prices.499 
MAFF viewed decommissioning as “subsidising the restructuring [of] an industry following 
over-expansion induced by high profits”500 and “subsiding the unwinding of this over-investment 
so as to assist the profitability of those who remain in the industry.”501  
MAFF’s aversion to decommissioning was strengthened by central government fiscal and 
budget pressures. At a meeting with the Fisheries Minister, the Treasury stressed that “public 
expenditure was becoming increasingly tight”502, with the Prime Minister conveying a need to 
find “significant savings” in line with the 1989 Public Sector Expenditure Programme. The 
Treasury concluded that it “did not see the case for such a scheme, given the likely cost and the 
PAC criticisms of the previous decommissioning scheme.”503 MAFF used support from key 
central government departments to resist political pressure from the Scottish Office to fund a 
decommissioning scheme. Recalling a meeting on November 30, 1989 between the Cabinet 
Office, MAFF, DAFS, FCO, No.10, DTI, DANI and the Welsh Government, a DAFS official 
wrote: “[we] won the argument decisively but lost the vote. MAFF had no arguments, FCO 
offered strong support and the Cabinet Office were sympathetic and finally influenced by the 
weight of other departments’ opinion. The Treasury did not want to spend money. DTI and 
No.10 gave greater weight to the market forces arguments.”504 
Contrary to the position of central UK Government, the use of a decommissioning 
scheme to meet the UK’s 1991 MAGP targets was supported by the UK industry, the European 
Commission, the Scottish Office and DANI.505 Opposing views between MAFF and SOAFD 
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became apparent in September 1989 when the two departments published “very different papers” 
on the options for UK structural policy.506 SOAFD argued for a decommissioning scheme 
targeting small and medium sized vessels as a means of removing 10,000 tonnes of the 33,000 
tonnes required by the 1991 MAGP target.507  SOAFD viewed £10 million per annum over 3 
years as good value for money. This assertion was made by the Scottish Office even though the 
scheme would have been considerably more expensive than the 1984-86 decommissioning 
scheme, paying out average £1,720 per tonne compared to £400 per tonne in 1984-96.508  
SOAFD and MAFF’s respective views on decommissioning were shaped by different 
perceptions of the financial state of the industry. While MAFF saw evidence of fleet profitability 
as justification for industry-funded capacity reduction, SOAFD was reacting to political pressure 
from the Scottish industry for financial help: “Pressures are growing, in particular amongst the 
Scottish industry, for financial help… (the) ability to resist the pressure for subsidies will be 
much greater if we can point to a willingness to help the industry undergo structural change.”509 
In meetings between SOAFD officials and the Scottish industry, industry representatives “re-
emphasise[d] the importance they attached to a decommissioning scheme.”510 Pressure on the 
industry came from TAC reductions as the CFP attempted to reduce pressure upon stocks, with 
SOAFD commenting that “pressures will grow further if the scientists are proved correct and cod 
and haddock stocks decline later this year.”511  
To deliver local political gains, SOAFD attempted to exploit knowledge of international 
diplomatic and political sensitivities to pressure MAFF into agreeing to a decommissioning 
scheme. To MAFF’s acknowledgement, SOAFD argued that aggregation policies “might work 
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well in the long run but not in time to satisfy the EC Commission”, in essence they would not 
remove enough capacity in time for the 1991 MAGP target.512 Lord Sanderson, the Minister of 
State for Scotland, wrote to the UK Fisheries Minister to argue that “it is wrong in principle and 
potentially damaging to our wider relations with the EC and with other Member States that we 
should take on such obligations and then do nothing to fulfil them”.513 The SO drew upon 
political intelligence that the Fisheries Commissioner Manuel Marin was expected to use an 
upcoming review of the CFP to “seriously disadvantage the UK and to advance the interests of 
Spain and Portugal”.514 The Scottish Office understood this to mean that Marin would attempt to 
undermine the principle of Relative Stability and award greater shares in the EU TACs to Spain 
and Portugal at the expense of net beneficiaries like the UK. Lord Sanderson wrote: “there is a 
disposition in MAFF to disregard the MAGP targets, or at best, not take them too seriously. I 
regard that as very dangerous.”515  
SOAFD’s tactics failed as MAFF’s political appetite for the MAGP had waned to the 
point that it favoured a policy of non-compliance with MAGP targets rather than the use of a 
decommissioning scheme. In Summer 1989, John MacGregor, the Minister of State for 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, issued a paper that set out two courses of action: “the first, 
favoured at an official level, involved essentially ignoring the MAGP targets and accepting the 
consequences” and “the second involved decommissioning on a scale large enough to remove 
the fishing capacity required in order to meet our EC targets.”516  
MAFF was of the view that “EC capacity targets are not sacrosanct and the consequence 
of ignoring them are likely to be less serious or extensive than we believed.”517 It’s position was 
that there was “no link between meeting our MAGP targets and negotiations on the CFP.” The 
issue was instead whether “we (MAFF) had a moral or legal responsibility to reduce capacity 
and whether it was in our interests to do so”.518 MAFF policy-makers saw the cost of non-
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compliance with MAGP targets as the loss of structural aid, with MAFF and DAFS disagreeing 
over whether infraction proceedings were a likely outcome.519 In November 1989, Charles Cann 
commented that: “if we reconcile ourselves to the loss of aid, there is nothing more the 
Commission or the Court of Justice could do.”520 
With MAFF failing to respond to international pressure, in 1991 the Scottish Office 
changed tactic and applied pressure to national political tensions. The tenet of the Scottish 
Office’s argument was that a further round of decommissioning was required to repair industry-
government relations with a letter to the UK Minister referencing “concern over the present state 
of relations between the government and the fishing industry”.521 MAFF Ministers were accused 
of being “out of touch with the industry” over decommissioning.522 The Scottish Office place 
this within a wider political context by arguing that decommissioning could deliver political and 
electoral benefits for the Conservative Government: “fishing interests are important to a number 
of Scottish seats not currently held by the government… Scottish Nationalists are making a great 
play with the need for a decommissioning scheme… they are ready to seek electrical popularity 
by sponsoring narrow short-term sectional interest.”523 
MAFF attempted to push back against the political pressure exerted by the Scottish 
Office. In a letter to the Prime Minister on May 7, 1991 the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food attempted to focus on the policy and political ramifications from giving in to Scottish 
political pressure: “if we unashamedly seek to buy off specific and particular groups of 
fishermen with a decommissioning proposal we will expose ourselves to the ridicule of being 
pushed by the SNP to adopt a policy which we know to be wrong. Decommissioning seems 
notably economically indefensible but also politically inexpedient, we will have been seen to 
have bowed to nationalist pressure against our better judgment.”524 
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Fishing Effort  
This section argues that over 1989-91 the political value of a decommissioning scheme to 
MAFF increased. The inclusion of a publically-funded decommissioning scheme in the 1992 
Fisheries Package represented a political concession used by MAFF to introduce a controversial 
new mechanism that would directly control and reduce fishing effort.  
By 1991, MAFF’s focus had shifted from fishing capacity to effort reduction. The OECD 
defined fishing effort as the ‘amount of fishing’ – it reflects a combination of fishing inputs such 
as time spent fishing (hours or days) or the type and amount of gear used (number of hooks on a 
long-line or composition of a net and mesh).525 Fishing effort represented the actual use of the 
fleet while capacity represented its potential. In a letter to the Prime Minister, May 7, 1991 the 
Fisheries Minister referred to decommissioning as a “short term and expensive decision which 
will not tackle the real conservation problem…[we] must deal with the real issue of fishing 
effort.”526 MAFF officials had come to realise that reducing capacity did not produce a linear 
reduction in fishing effort and that fishing effort was what mattered for stock conservation.  
The new focus on fishing effort was influenced by scientific concern with excessive 
fishing mortality. In 1990-91, the Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management (ACFM) 
recommended “immediate reductions” in fishing effort.527 A SOAFD note, ‘Fish Conservation 
and Effort Control,’ January 18, 1994 discussed the most recent scientific advice that “almost all 
fish stocks” were under pressure with “demersal species at greatest risk”.528 Scientific advice 
“consistently” proposed a “30 per cent reduction in effort from a 1989 baseline.”529 
Mechanisms to limit fishing effort and control fishing mortality were in place. TACs, 
licence limitation and mesh regulations all attempted to limit the amount of fishing. In practice, 
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the effectiveness of these mechanisms was undermined by several factors including: the political 
inflation of quota, discarding, illegal and over-quota landings and non-compliance with technical 
conservation measures. UK officials acknowledged that “there is no doubt that significant 
quantities of over-quota whitefish are being landed.”530 
 The European Commission accepted ACFM’s advice and outlined a 40% reduction in 
EU fishing effort.531 MAFF officials referred to the Commission “making clear [it would] devise 
MAGPs which address the problem of fishing effort and not just fishing capacity”.532 In 1991, 
the European Commission attempted to reduce fishing effort through an instrument that limited 
the amount of time vessels could spend at sea.533 This was translated into UK law via the Sea 
Fishing (Days in Port) Regulation in 1992. The EU legislation (SI 1991/93) outlined that certain 
vessels were to remain in port for 8 days per calendar month.534 This policy tied-up capital assets 
to prevent their use. 
The EC’s focus on controlling fishing effort filtered into UK policy. The purpose of the 
1992 Fisheries Package was described as being “to reduce excessive fishing pressure which has 
contributed to the decline of many stocks”.535 It was MAFF’s new focus on fishing effort that led 
to the Department’s interest in ITQs waning, with officials commenting that while “[ITQs] might 
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reduce the size of the fleet further, there is no guarantee they would reduce its fishing effort”.536 
MAFF’s shift away from ITQs was also influenced by a change in Prime Minister with DAFS 
officials commenting: “Steve Hunter (ex ITQ team)…offered the view that this may partly 
reflected the demise of Mrs Thatcher. Apparently, there was a feeling within MAFF that 
something had to be done as a promise had been given to the Prime Minister”.537 
In May 1991, MAFF began to consider new a “comprehensive system of days at sea 
controls” to address the “fundamental overfishing problem.”538 A tradeable Days at Sea (DAS) 
instrument was designed that aimed to freeze fishing effort (time spent at sea) at 1991 levels. 
MAFF acknowledged that while time spent fishing was what mattered, time spent at sea was 
easier to enforce. In 1993, provisional DAS allocations were given to individual vessels based on 
levels of fishing activity in 1991. The DAS allocations were based on half-days and used data 
provided by individual vessel logbooks and landings declarations submitted to the Fisheries 
Departments. For vessels that had no data, 160 half days were awarded. The industry would be 
allowed to trade DAS allocations, thereby facilitating industry-financed rationalisation.539  
The DAS effort control regime was extremely unpopular with the industry and generated 
little enthusiasm within SOAFD.540 MAFF’s strategy to circumvent this opposition was 
multifaceted. With the Scottish Office, MAFF argued that decommissioning would not support 
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stock conservation, arguing that “the EC Commission knows as well as we that a 
decommissioning scheme would have practically no conservation effect.”541 MAFF outlined that 
decommissioning without supplementary restrictions on effort would deliver no benefits for 
conservation as while vessels would be removed from the fleet, the opportunity remained for 
remaining vessels to increase their effort as others exited.  MAFF’s position was that a 
decommissioning scheme could only be used if it was packaged with an effort control scheme to 
promote conservation and secure maximum value from public funds.542  
For the public, MAFF broadened the concepts of time (future generations) and space 
(fishing communities) to build support for the policy objective of stock conservation. The 
financial costs to be carried by the industry were to be balanced against the benefits to be 
realised by future generations. In the press release for the 1992 Fisheries Package the UK 
Government stated that “our key objective must be to reduce fishing effort if we are to protect 
the stocks for fishermen today and their children tomorrow”.543 This narrative was employed 
frequently, with the Fisheries Minster writing to the Prime Minister John Major to argue: “if we 
are to preserve fishing communities we must conserve fish… [with] the objective that there 
should continue to be fish stocks for the next generations of fishermen and the next generation in 
the fishing communities. That precludes policies which attempt to buy temporary peace at the 
expense of the conservation measures”. 544  
Internally, MAFF attempted to dilute the potential political impact of the industry’s 
resistance to direct effort controls by arguing that unpopular regulations were necessary and 
bound to be unpopular due to the nature of the UK industry: “The industry itself is fragmented 
and separated and has generated a vast and not uncommonly contradictory set of views. It has 
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failed to act collectively or responsibility to conserve fish stocks and failed to respond to normal 
market signals and economic imperatives. There are no signs that this will change.”545  
 The result was the 1992 Fisheries Package which introduced: new quota trading 
arrangements for the POs (the Scottish Proposal), a £25 million decommissioning scheme, the 
new Days at Sea controls, refinement to licence aggregation rules and the extension of licencing 
to vessels below 10 meters. However, MAFF’s attempt to push through radical change with the 
DAS controls by appeasing the Scottish Office and industry with a decommissioning scheme 
back-fired. In the Summer of 1993, the NFFO launched a Judicial Review (JR) against the DAS 
Scheme (the 1993 Order). The JR considered whether the UK was entitled under Community 
Law to introduce the DAS restrictions and argued that the Order was contrary to European 
Law.546 The JR argued that the “Order retrospectively imposes on the fishing industry in the third 
MAGP the cost of the failure of the UK to comply with the terms of the second MAGP”.547 The 
case was heard in the High Court from November 1-5 and a Judgment which deferred the case to 
the European Court was delivered on December 2, 1993.548  
The government suspended the DAS scheme. With a decision from the European Court 
excepted to take at least 18 months, the government was concerned with policy legitimacy.549 
There was an intention within government to return to effort control, with the Minister of State 
writing that “in the interests of conservation and enhancing biodiversity and the sustainable use 
of the marine environment, I should like these measures introduced as soon as possible. 
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However, it would not serve our purpose if they were introduced in a way that encourage non-
compliance and brought the policy into disrepute”.550  
The 1992 Fisheries Package aimed to “develop a self-sustaining, economic and profitable 
sea fishing area, reduce fishing effort to conserve stocks, allow market forces to operate and 
minimise public expenditure”.551 Yet, following the suspension of the DAS, the package 
consisted of a series of policy mechanisms that obstructed the introduction of market forces and 
created no active pressure on vessels to reduce their fishing effort. In 1994 and again in 1996, 
decommissioning “was the UK’s primary means for trying to meet MAGP targets for reducing 
fishing effort”552 – an instrument the UK Government believed to be inadequate to meet 
economic or conservation objectives. Over 1992-1996, decommissioning failed to reduce overall 
UK fishing capacity. While the £25 million scheme removed 6.8 per cent of UK capacity, this 
was offset by vessels coming into the fleet and using existing licencing rights. Opting again for a 
further round of decommissioning in 1996, the UK Government commented: “the relatively 
small contribution which the UK decommissioning scheme is making to the underlying needs [of 
the MAGP] is likely to need fundamental reappraisal.” 553 The UK Government was forced to 
reduce capacity through a decommissioning scheme over 1992-1996 due to a failed political 
gamble. Its decision to continue with decommissioning post-1996 represented an attempt to use 
public finance to alleviate economic pressures being experienced by the industry.554  
In 1994, the UK Fisheries Department stated: “the industry appears to be in a “deeply 
troubled” state and a significant number of vessels in all sectors are close to bankruptcy. Another 
two years of current quota levels could see a serious decline in the UK fleet.”555 In this situation, 
decommissioning was chosen over a ‘do-nothing’ approach to capacity reduction in which the 
financial pressures facing the industry from declining fish prices and quotas would work to 
naturally drive out marginal operators. The government was aware that “an opposite, cheaper but 
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controversial approach would be to allow the growing difficulties in the industry to deteriorate 
further thus bringing pressure to bear on the marginal fishermen to leave the industry.”556 The 
financial crisis facing the industry in the mid-1990s was to be alleviated with publicly-funded 
decommissioning to help those marginal operators exit the industry.  
Two progressive policy outcomes did materialise from this period. Firstly, the central 
ideas of using markets to allocate resources and of directly controlling fishing effort through time 
at sea controls did not disappear. In 1996, the UK Government consulted on the idea of the 
vessel owners of decommissioned vessels retaining their quota allocations to sell. While this was 
rejected by the industry in 1996, in 1999 quota allocations attached to fishing licences were 
awarded on a fixed basis – on landings recorded between 1994-96 as opposed to a rolling track-
record – and transfers of allocated units between licences (trading) became permitted. This led to 
large movements of quota between vessels from 1999.557 Secondly, in 2003 the Scottish 
Government introduced a DAS effort control regime.  
The second progressive development was that the government began to consider 
improvements to control and enforcement to conserve stocks and reduce capacity. The 
government was aware that non-compliance with quota restrictions had become institutionalised 
with younger generations of skippers showing increasing disregard for the rules.  In 1994, 
SOAFD considered how an improvement in enforcement would affect the economic pressure on 
marginal operators.558 A new control mechanism suggested by the SFO was for vessels to be 
given designated ports to land into so as to reduce the opportunities for over-quota landings.559 In 
2005, the Scottish Government introduced the Registration of Buyers and Sellers Scheme in 
Scotland which required all landings to be weighed before transportation. Enforcement was also 
aided by technology such as the introduction of the Vessel Monitoring System which uses 
satellite-tracking technology placed on board fishing vessels and electronic reporting systems to 
allow the real-time transfer of catch data.  
Conclusion  
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A significant shift in the UK Government’s approach to fisheries management is evident 
over the period 1983-96. Quota management remained a central focus of fisheries management 
with the need to reduce fishing capacity and effort increasingly influencing quota management 
decisions. Over this period, the instruments for delivering policy objectives broadened as the 
acceptability of market mechanisms in distributing fishing entitlements increased from 1989. The 
UK’s focus on labour-saving approaches to fisheries management in the 1970s and early 1980s 
was gradually replaced by policies focused on the use of capital. The enduring influence of the 
ITQ mechanism on UK fisheries policy from 1989 is evidence of this shift. In 1989 and again in 
1991, ITQs were rejected for regulatory and political reasons. Yet, the concept of mechanisms 
that “enable[d] fishermen to buy each other out” remained and was used to design more 
politically acceptable capacity and quota management mechanisms.560 
Political support for the use of the market was reflective of the Thatcher administration’s 
approach to public policy, with this increasingly legitimized in fisheries management by the 
failure of previous administrative mechanisms. The period 1983-91 has been identified as one of 
policy failure due to the government’s relative inexperience with capacity management and a 
lack of consideration given to how fishers would respond to new rules in the design of policy 
instruments. The shift to a more economic and conservation-focused approach to fisheries 
management from 1989 was influenced by the increased use of economic and scientific advice in 
policy-making, policy learning and UK commitments to reduce fishing pressure through the 
CFP.  
This chapter has argued that despite the UK Government’s aim to adopt a more economic 
approach to fisheries management, the application of this in practice was obstructed and diluted 
by political gambles and negotiations between central government and sub-national and industry 
interests. This directly contributed to the UK’s failure to deliver against its commitment under 
the CFP. The influential role played by the Scottish Office and Scottish Fisheries Department in 
the formation of UK fisheries policy from the late 1980s is evident. The result of all these 
changes was that in comparison to the 1970s and 1980s, the fisheries policy-making tension was 
no longer between government economists and politicians but between the UK and Scottish 
Fisheries Departments.  
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UK policy became increasingly formed through a process of political-trade-offs and 
bargaining between SOAFD and MAFF officials and senior political representatives. The close 
relationship between SOAFD and the Scottish Office and the dexterity of the Scottish institutions 
in moving between the use of different European, UK and local political pressures were key to 
the successful representation of Scottish fishing interests. The ability of the Scottish Office to 
delay the introduction of market forces and its triumph in the battle over decommissioning did, 
however, come at a cost. While public funding was used to protect and prop up the industry as it 
entered the economic turmoil of the mid-1990s, the resulting package of weak policy measures 
meant that the stocks they were fishing were not managed sustainably.  
The importance of industry acceptance and buy-in to conservation regimes in a situation 
of lax control and enforcement was also brought to the surface in this chapter. SOAFD can be 
criticised as appearing to be captured by Scottish industry representatives. However, a working 
government-industry relationship and industry agreement to restrictive measures was required to 
foster compliance in an industry rife with cheating and illegal activity. MAFF’s ill-judged 
attempt to push through new effort control restrictions against significant industry opposition 
delayed the introduction of effort controls into UK fisheries policy. The result was that UK 
structural policy in the early and mid-1990s was left depended on a mechanism the UK 





7. Conclusion  
 
This analysis of the development of UK fisheries policy between 1945 and 1996 has 
emphasised the shifting economic and political considerations shaping government policy. It has 
considered the impact of local interests on policy-making and implementation, in what is often 
discussed as a global problem of fisheries management.  
Global concern for fisheries conservation increased over the period with super-national 
approaches to fisheries management, such as the UN LOS Conferences and the 1982 
Convention, of clear importance. Yet issues of national interest shaped the policy debates behind 
negotiation positions. The UK Government’s support for the EEZ concept represented a means 
to secure access to the hydrocarbon resources in the seabed. Over the period, UK negotiation 
positions for the LOS Conferences and international fishing limits were influenced by national 
defence and later oil interests with fishing interests only of secondary importance.  
In then seeking to implement controls on fishing activity, the involvement and assistance of 
local actors was essential. The early years of UK fisheries management between 1974 and 1981 
allocated new fishing rights in a manner that supported transitional concerns with 
unemployment. The conferring of the right to fish through a licence and to land catch through 
quota was significant change for the industry. The political decision to grandfather rights and 
place no limitation on licences was a pragmatic decision even if it did protect rather than restrain 
pre-TAC fishing patterns.   
From the early 1980s, regulation and policy was increasingly designed to create incentives 
that would alter fishers’ behaviour and bring it in line with the global conservation agenda. As 
the government gained practical experience in managing fishing activity, the endemic problems 
of illegal over-quota landings and discarding became clear, indicating the importance of 
individual fisher behaviour in conserving fish stocks. Policy failure, in particular with capacity 
reduction, was often the result of a lack of consideration given to how fishers would respond to 
new rules and restrictions. This drove the government towards the use of ITQs, or at least the 
individualisation and trading of rights. With sections of the industry and the Scottish Office 




quota aggregation rules. The use of more effective enforcement of fisheries regulation was only 
considered in 1996 with the government acknowledging that more effort to enforce basic 
regulations would have the desired effect of reducing capacity in line with fishing opportunities. 
Throughout this whole process, much use was made of economic and scientific advice with 
the movement towards the individualisation of fishing rights following the economic literature 
on fisheries management. The political use of economic advice increased notably from 1989, 
with the government coming to define overfishing as a product of market failure. This advice 
continued to be used in a in a selective and politically convenient manner. Sea fisheries policy, in 
particular on the issue of ITQs, demonstrated a discrepancy between the Thatcher and Major 
administration’s ideological attachment to the use of market forces to deliver policy objectives 
and a willingness to bear the associated administrative and political costs.  
 
The objectives of UK fisheries management  
 
This thesis built upon the work of Symes who argued for an inevitable conflict between 
equity and efficiency in distributing fishing quota.561 He identified the objectives of UK quota 
management as the maximisation of allowable catches, equitable distribution, efficiency in the 
use of resources and continuity of supplies to market. These objectives were reoccurring themes 
within the policy-making environment. Yet the overriding objective of UK fisheries policy was 
often not clear, with the policy intention of governments changing markedly throughout the 
period. 
A conclusion of this thesis is that the friction and perpetual motion inherent in the policy-
making environment was driven by the continuous interaction and competition between long- 
and short-term ambitions for fisheries policy. The long-term goal was to gain control of fishing 
levels to facilitate stock conservation and sustainable resource exploitation. Constant technology-
induced economic pressure drove the need for fleet rationalisation if biologically and 
economically sustainable fisheries were to be achieved.  
Conversely, the short-term objectives for fisheries policy continually evolved as they 
represented a process of change management. Initially, the government attempted to gain control 
of labour to address transitional concerns with unemployment. The introduction of global EEZs 
                                                      




brought the open-access regime to an end and triggered huge structural change for the UK 
fishing industry. It accelerated the decline of the economically and politically dominant distant-
water fleet. This triggered national tensions as the large deep-sea vessels were forced to fish in 
the waters of the offshore fleet. When allocating NEAFC quota over 1974-76, the government 
was exposed to industry pressure to adopt an interventionist approach to quota management to 
protect the physically smaller and less-mobile fleets from direct competition with the displaced 
deep-sea trawlers. Newly created fishing rights were grandfathered and quota was allocated on a 
labour-basis to assist the transition from the old world of open-access and Mare Liberum to one 
of restricted economic activity.  
This transition period drew to a close as the new Conservative administration of 1979 
came to power. Fisheries policy became increasingly influenced by the concerns of the civil 
service and industry for the impact of policies on the economic performance of the fleet. 
Tightening fishing opportunities accentuated the need for rationalisation but technological 
advances and a shift from favouring labour to capital offered the opportunity to reduce fishing 
costs. The introduction of PO management relieved the UK Government of a significant 
administrative burden but, importantly, it awarded the industry greater freedom over the time of 
use of capital. Vessels could seek economies of scale, react to market prices and improve profit 
margins in the face of declining opportunities.  
The greater freedom and flexibility awarded to vessels gave way to a need to control 
capital as the government attempted to reduce fishing capacity and effort in line with EU MAGP 
targets. This process drew from the increased prominence of conservation-based concerns as 
evidence of serious stock depletion threatened the long-term future of the fishing industry. The 
focus on controlling capital gave way to increased support for the allocation of local property 
rights to individuals. With the behaviour of individual fishers acknowledged to be essential in 
delivering the global agenda, connecting access to stocks to individual fishers was understood to 
be more effective in delivering both economic and conservation objectives.  
 
The shifting focus of the short-term objectives defined the policy-making environment, as 
too did their ability to trump the application of management mechanisms designed to facilitate 
fleet contraction. The result was the choice and use of policy mechanisms that, more often than 




Nevertheless, the sheer constancy of the economic pressures driving the need for 
rationalisation worked to anchor this as the direction for fisheries policy over the period. Capital-
enhancing technological development was a constant feature of this period. It created the initial 
opportunities for overfishing, with early local and global regulations an attempt to reconcile the 
technology-induced increasing efficiency of fishing practices with the biologically determined 
supply of fish. As the efficiency of individual vessels increased, fewer vessels were required and 
those remaining could employ lower labour to capital ratios. The pace of contraction was 
intensified by the steady decline in stock sizes and associated TACs.  
The long-term approach to fisheries management was embedded in the environmentally-
focused principles of the global agenda. At a national level, it was present in the advice given to 
policy-makers by government economists and scientists. This advice drew from the property 
rights and economic literature to promote the creation of de facto rights at individual fisher 
and/or vessel level and the use of market mechanisms. This advice was increasingly used by 
politicians and policy-makers with this demonstrated by the prominence of economic ideas in the 
1989 Fisheries Review compared to the 1980 Review of Quota Management. 
A reoccurring theme within this thesis is that, in practice, economic ideas and advice 
were rejected in favour of short-term political aspirations. Though this can be viewed as a key 
criticism of fisheries policy in this period, the policy choices were often pragmatic and, when 
considered as a pattern across the period, represented a sustained process of change management.  
At the time, the decision to value oil resources over fish resources was pragmatic for both UK 
economic and energy interests, as was the decision to grandfather newly created fishing rights 
and adopt an administrative approach.  
National policy ultimately acted as a buffer to the continual economic pressure by 
attempting to punctuate and deliver the inevitable contraction at a pace that would not cause 
dramatic upheaval across an industry and a country. The slow pace of change wired into the 
UK’s approach to fisheries policy undermined its ability to meet successive capacity reduction 
targets. It did, however, give the industry more time to adapt to changing economic 
circumstances. The long-term benefits of a slower pace of change can be seen in the 
government’s attempt to push through DAS effort controls without industry support. The 




causing the mechanism to be abandoned. This delayed the introduction of direct effort controls 
for almost a decade.  
 
There were several junctures at which the distance between the long- and short-term 
objectives for fisheries policy narrowed. The most prominent occurred in 1983 with the 
introduction of the CFP’s conservation regime. This created a legal framework the UK 
Government had to comply with. More importantly, however, it created a time-shift in the UK 
Government’s understanding of fisheries management. This is demonstrated in chapter four’s 
analysis of the 1980 review of quota management and chapter five’s evaluation on the 
introduction of PO management. The pressure and direction set by the new TAC and quota 
regime forced the UK Government to accept that if sustainable levels of fishing were to be 
achieved, fishing opportunities would decline for the foreseeable future. Aligned with this, 
excess effort relative to opportunities created severe economic pressure within the industry. In 
response, the UK Government moved from viewing quota management as an in-year 
administrative process of matching annual quota to fishing activity to the need to align present 
capacity and effort with anticipated future opportunities. Action, or more precisely the failure to 
act, in the present would undermine the future.  
Another constancy that worked to align short- and long-term policy objectives was 
continual policy-learning through practical experience. This occurred at two-levels. There was an 
evolution in the global scientific community’s understanding of the elements of fishing activity 
to control and reduce. Initial attempts to control fishing mortality through technical inputs such 
as the 1946 Mesh Regulation Convention were gradually supplanted by the introduction of 
controls on access (licences) and outputs (quota). From 1992, direct controls on effort were 
introduced with days in port regulations and the attempt in 1996 to introduce the days at sea 
restrictions.  
At a national level, the UK Government’s experiments with different quota allocation 
mechanisms provided invaluable learning that helped converge the long- and short-run 
approaches to fisheries management. Allocating fishing rights to protect labour through equal 
per-man allocations had initial political and economic appeal. Once the administrative and 
economic costs of a ‘fair and equal’ distribution of fishing opportunities were experienced, a 




involvement in fisheries policy from 1989 also worked to align policy objectives. Public-sector 
spending constraints and the Treasury and central UK Government’s belief in the efficacy of 
market forces worked to increase the political use of economic advice, in particular the role for 
economic incentives in influencing fisher behaviour.  
 
The role of local interests in national and international environmental policy  
 
A central research question concerned the role and influence of local interests in the 
delivery of international agendas. In this thesis, the term ‘local interests’ has been used to 
represent both sub-national, geo-political interests and sectional industry interests that were often 
representative of regions and local communities within the UK. As discussed in the literature 
review, the tendency for international fisheries management agreements to fail to deliver 
sustainable levels of fishing is often attributed to inadequacies and failures of the international 
machinery such as the CFP. This thesis has demonstrated that the success of these agreements 
was dependent on negotiations between local interests and central government. Within these 
negotiations, local concerns were of more influence than the global conservation agenda and the 
economic theory of fisheries management.  
This thesis has sought to provide a bridge between analysis of the CFP and UK fisheries 
policy by examining the development and organisation of UK policy designed to deliver the 
objectives of the CFP’s conservation regime. It has demonstrated the importance of local 
negotiations and interests in the construction of national and international approaches to 
environmental and natural resource problems. It has shown local and sectional industry interests 
to have had a significant bearing on the development of policy and the design of mechanisms to 
deliver international commitments. The exception to this was the development of UK policy on 
the international distribution of fisheries resources at the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Conferences (1958, 1960 and 1973-82). Economic considerations drove early environmental 
policy with sectional fishing industry interests of secondary importance to the potential economic 
benefits associated with the more valuable energy resources. 
The influence awarded to local interests was shaped by the government’s use of national 
fisheries policy as a tool to accommodate local tensions within the global agenda. Global 




the costs of this to be carried by fishers, fisheries-related industries and national economies. 
Local political conflicts arose from the uneven way in which the economic costs of reducing 
fishing activity were experienced across the UK. Local fishing activity was often defined by the 
prosecution of specific stocks, such as the Scottish fleet’s traditional dependence upon haddock 
and whiting and the English fleet on cod. Costs borne by different local actors depended upon 
their location, the nature of their fishing operations and the relative health of the stocks they 
targeted. At the centre of early policy choices was an attempt to spread these costs more evenly 
across the UK. This resulted in the choice and design of policy to protect groups of fishers as 
opposed to fish. Social policy may not have been an explicit component of UK fisheries policy 
until 1989 but it is evident from 1974.  
 
Of importance to UK fisheries policy-making was the changing relative ability of 
different sectional industry interests to influence central policy-making. A recurring theme in this 
thesis is the growing influence and representation of the Scottish industry. While this thesis has 
shown the local geo-politics of UK fisheries policy to be complex, the Scottish Office and 
Scottish political institutions were able to effectively influence UK-wide policy-making in this 
period. In the 1960s, the UK Government was mindful of the increasingly nationalistic tone of 
the Scottish lobby and sought to appease this force with the first extension of UK fishing limits 
in 1964. By the 1990s, UK policy formation was the direct result of political trade-offs between 
the UK and Scottish Fisheries Departments. By this time, the Scottish fishing interests had a 
superior and more focused form of representation than non-Scottish interests.  
 
Accounting for the political influence of UK fishing interests  
 
The influence enjoyed by UK fishing interests in the formation and implementation of 
UK national policy-making and, in turn EEC/EU fisheries policy-making, is notable given the 
relatively low economic contribution of the industry. Drawing upon Wise (1984), this can partly 
be explained by the geographical concentration of the industry in key marginal political 
constituencies. In 1978, fishers represented 0.1 per cent of the British labour force and 
contributed 1 per cent of UK GDP.562 However the concentration of fishing activity around key 
                                                      




ports enabled it to provide a much higher direct economic impact for certain areas across the UK. 
This economic and political concentrated created what Brookfield et al., (2005) described as 
‘fisheries-dependent communities” or what Wise (1984) referred to as constituency ‘fishing 
seats’.563 Wise (1984) identified British fishing communities as having been located in 
electorally marginal constituencies. He provided evidence of the responsiveness of UK 
Government’s to the wants of these constituencies during key elections. For example, of the 
main 22 ‘fishing seats’ during the 1974-79 Labour Governments, 9 were held with majorities of 
less than 6 per cent of the total vote.564 In Aberdeen, it was 0.7 per cent and Grimsby 1.2 per 
cent. Wise concludes that in this period of miniscule parliamentary majorities, these seats were 
important. Examining the influence of the 1979 UK General Election on the formation of the 
CFP, Wise concludes that it was the UK MAFF Minister John Silkin’s “vigorous defence of 
British objectives in Brussels [that] helped produce a 3 per cent swing to Labour in such 
constituencies”, allowing the Party to gain an extra 5 seats.565  
While this thesis maintains a strict focus on fisheries policy to allow for an in-depth 
examination of policy development over time, a short comparison with other extractive 
industries provides context for understanding the disproportionate political influence of the 
fishing industry. A key example is British farming. Flynn et al., (1996) argue that while the 
economically central role of agriculture diminished over the 20th century, political relations and 
representations have been slow to register this change.566  
Cox et al. (1991) argued that competition for the farming vote between the Labour and 
Conservative Parties increased with the establishment of the National Farmers Union (NFU) as a 
powerful pressure group in the interwar years.567 In competing for votes, politicians offered 
subsidies and market distortions – with farmers dependent on public financial support, they were 
more likely to vote for the Party which promised them the most security. Flynn et al., (1996) 
argued that while economically irrational, this behaviour was politically rationale. In the 1950s, 
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110 out of 630 British constituencies had a significant agricultural presence: 80 in England, 9 in 
Wales and 21 in Scotland.568 While the number of agricultural constituencies declined with the 
number of agricultural workers– from 100 constituencies to 74 over the course of 1950 to 1964 – 
Flynn et al. argued that the ability of the farming vote to affect the outcome of an election 
remained roughly constant as the major parties were fairly evenly balanced over the period with 
an increasing number of seats won by small majorities.569  
Literature on the political influence of British farming not only highlights the interest of 
British political parties in gaining votes from geographically concentrated extractive industries 
but Grant (1990) also identifies the important influence of close connections between industry 
interests and government departments.570 The link between the NFU and central government 
(MAFF) is strikingly similar to that identified in this thesis between fishing organisations and 
MAFF. As with Pemberton’s study of British economic policy in the 1960s, government 
department’s reliance on industry bodies to implement policy allowed these interests a 
significant degree of influence on policy development as well as implementation.   
Alongside the political parties’ desire to capture marginal fishing seats during key 
elections, major political changes in this period are likely to have contributed to the 
disproportionate political weight given to fishing interests. With the UK fishing industry 
increasingly concentrated in Scotland from the end of the 1970s, the transformation of Scottish 
politics will have heightened the influence of this lobby group. The increasing presence of the 
SNP from the 1960s, the prominence of Home Rule and devolution issues in UK politics during 
the 1970s and the Labour Party’s increasing dependence on Scottish and Welsh votes are all key 
features of this transformation. 
This thesis has provided evidence of ‘nationalist pressure’ from the SNP party 
influencing the hand of the UK Government at several key stages. This was identified in Chapter 
4’s analysis of UK national fishing limits and the decision to implement a 12-mile fishing zone 
in 1964, and Chapter 6’s consideration of capacity reduction, and the pressure exerted by DAFS 
and the Scottish Office for the UK Government to continue funding decommissioning schemes 
over 1991-96. Devine (2016) argues that from the late 1960s, all Parties, including the 
                                                      
568 Flynn et al., (1996): 23.  
569 Ibid.,  





Conservatives, began to take the ‘nationalist threat’ more seriously. He argues that at a political 
and policy level, frequent nationalist appeasement was used to stave off the threat of 
separatism.571 While Devine argued that this threat waned following the 1979 Independence 
Referendum, the increasing unpopularity of the Conservative Party in Scotland throughout the 
1980s fuelled the need for policies to appease the Scottish electorate for the 1992 General 
Election. With much of rural Scotland voting against devolution, and the collapse of the 
traditional textile, shipbuilding and mining industries in Scotland during the 1980s, Scottish 
fishing and farming seats would have been a more natural ally for the Conservative Party to 
target.572  
 
Limitations of the study 
 
This thesis is not a history of the UK fishing industry. It is a study of policy-making 
processes and the decisions taken by central government. While it provides insight into the 
development of industry-government relations and evidence of industry influence on policy 
choices, this has been informed by the archives. It therefore considers the industry from the 
perspective of government. It does not provide insight into how the industry understood, adapted 
and evolved in line with the policy development and the challenges it faced.  
The scope of this thesis was intentionally limited to focus on policy for one sector in the 
UK industry, the whitefish fleet. No consideration or comparison has been made to the pelagic 
and inshore fleets. Both are important components of the UK industry and have distinct 
geographical and political-economic characteristics. Initial consideration was given to a thesis 
with a chapter dedicated to each sector. Given the complexities of fisheries regulation and the 
heterogeneous nature of the competing local interests within the whitefish fleet, this was rejected 
in favour of a narrower focus that would support a sustained, in-depth analysis of the policy-
making process over the time period. This thesis has created an initial framework that would 
support further analysis of the other sectors and a comparative analysis with other areas of 
government policy that used quotas, such as milk, or the fisheries policy of other countries.  
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Implications for academia 
 
This thesis provides evidence of the explanatory power of examining the intersections 
where different policies meet and overlap. In this instance, UK policy on international fisheries 
conservation was determined by defence and energy policy. This research supports and 
reinforces the work carried out by scholars like Carmel Finley (2011) who examined the 
interdependencies between policies.  
This thesis will make disappointing reading for academics interested in the use of 
economic ideas in the policy-making process. Barnes argued that the scholarship of eminent 
fisheries economists played an important role in advocating for the enclosure movement 
embedded in the EEZ concept.573 Property rights theory clearly influenced the global approaches 
to fisheries conservation and the tools for fisheries regulation. However, it had marginal impact 
on the UK Government’s acceptance of the EEZ concept. In domestic policy-making, academic 
ideas were at best cherry-picked to deliver predetermined political and distributive agendas.  
The essence of the ITQ concept was captured in management mechanisms designed by 
the UK Government notably licence and capacity aggregation schemes and the Scottish 
Proposal. Yet it was diluted and modified to accommodate the objectives of administrative ease 
and industry acceptability. The issue was that economic theory and advice provided by 
government economists gave little consideration to the short-term objectives of government or 
the political and social costs associated with the transition from one property rights regime to 
another. As the political and policy-making environment was highly sensitive to these costs, the 
application of economic-based mechanisms was often disregarded as impractical or as requiring 
adaptation.  
 
Implications for policy-making  
 
At several key junctures, the UK Government actively excluded the UK Fisheries 
Department and industry from the development of UK negotiation positions and concessions. 
This includes acceptance of the EEZ concept and the equal access principle within the CFP. The 
                                                      




marginalisation of domestic fishing interests was required to secure international agreement. This 
thesis has demonstrated that this approach created the need to accommodate local interests 
within national policy-making. It heightened the political requirement for national policy to act 
as a tool for arbitration between global and local tensions and conflicting sectional interests. This 
created a policy-making environment that incentivised policy choices that undermined the 
implementation and delivery of the international commitments. There is therefore an inherent 
question to be asked – what is more important, whether an agreement is struck or whether it can 
be delivered? This thesis indicates that the latter was given priority in this period. 
An interesting point for further study would be to consider how this process has changed 
since 1996. Since this time, both UK and EU fisheries policy-making have attempted to include 
local interests in the formation of international policy-making. In 2010, the European 
Commission established stakeholder-led Advisory Councils to provide the EC and Member 
States with advice on fisheries management matters. The extent to which the new space and 
responsibility given to local interests has influenced international decision-making and the 
effectiveness of policy delivery would be of value.  
 
This thesis also offers insight for industry sectors caught up in complex international 
negotiations.  Throughout this period, UK policy on international fishing limits was driven by the 
UK Governments’ prioritisation of non-fishing interests. As a result, the detail of global fishing 
agreements was used as a concession or trade-off to protect and further discrete national 
priorities. International fishing agreements – such as the UK promoting the concept of equal 
access in the CFP – did often not make a lot of sense for the UK fishing industry.  
As mentioned, the decision in 1971 to value oil resources over fish resources was 
pragmatic for both economic and energy interests. Since the outcome of the UK’s referendum on 
membership of the EU, the political value of restricting access to the UK’s EEZ has increased 
markedly. The importance of UK fishing rights in the Brexit negotiations remains to be seen. 
However, a likelihood is that fishing interests will now trump energy interests in the guise of UK 
exit from the Internal Energy Market.574 It may now be the UK’s energy sector that is exposed to 
                                                      
574 Several major energy actors have argued for continued UK participation in the EU Internal Energy Market 
(IEM). This includes National Grid, the GB electricity system operator, and several large-scale utilities including 
Centrica and SSE. In a report for National Grid, Vivid Economics concluded that the potential impact of exclusion 




a package deal which makes little sense for energy interests and the impact of which may take 
years to be fully realised. 
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